Wamstad v. Mangelsen (In re Mangelsen)

843 N.W.2d 8

2014 ND 31

In the Matter of Sandy Lee MANGELSEN.Haley L. Wamstad, Grand Forks County State's Attorney, Petitioner and Appellee

v.Sandy Lee Mangelsen, Respondent and Appellant.

No. 20130155.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Feb. 13, 2014.

Haley L. Wamstad, Assistant State's Attorney, Grand Forks, N.D., for petitioner and appellee.

Tyler J. Morrow, Grand Forks, N.D., for respondent and appellant.

KAPSNER, Justice.

[¶ 1] Sandy Mangelsen appeals from a district court order finding he is a sexually dangerous individual and committing him to the care, custody, and control of the Executive Director of the Department of Human Services. We affirm, concluding the district court did not err in finding the State established by clear and convincing evidence that Mangelsen is a sexually dangerous individual.

I

[¶ 2] Mangelsen's first sexual offense occurred in South Dakota in August 2005, when he was 18 years old. Mangelsen touched the breast of a 13–year–old girl over her clothes, and touched the thigh and held hands with a 14–year–old girl. As a result, Mangelsen was convicted of sexual contact with a child under the age of 16 and received a suspended sentence.

[¶ 3] Mangelsen's second sexual offense occurred in North Dakota in 2007, when he was 20 years old. Mangelsen kissed on the mouth and touched the buttock of a 14–year–old girl. Mangelsen was convicted of gross sexual imposition and sentenced to five years imprisonment with four years suspended. While incarcerated, Mangelsen successfully completed a low intensity sex offender treatment program.

[¶ 4] After his release from prison on probation, Mangelsen was not to leave North Dakota or be in public areas where children congregated. In February 2010, Mangelsen was seen touching an adult female who looked younger than 18 at the public library in East Grand Forks, Minnesota. In April 2010, Mangelsen provided false information to police about his residence. He was charged with, and pled guilty to, failure to register as a sex offender and making a false report to law enforcement. In addition, his probation was revoked and he was resentenced to 120 months of incarceration, with 59 months suspended.

[¶ 5] Prior to Mangelsen's scheduled release from incarceration, the State filed a petition seeking to commit him as a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. ch. 25–03.3. A commitment hearing was held on January 4, 2013. The district court found that Mangelsen is a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. § 25–03.3–01(8) and ordered him committed to the care, custody, and control of the Executive Director of the Department of Human Services.

II

[¶ 6] Mangelsen contends on appeal that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is a sexually dangerous individual.

[¶ 7] Before a person can be civilly committed as a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. ch. 25–03.3, the State must establish four elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the individual has engaged in sexually predatory conduct; (2) the individual has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; (3) the condition makes the individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health or safety of others; and (4) the individual has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. In re Hehn, 2013 ND 191, ¶ 8, 838 N.W.2d 469;In re Whitetail, 2013 ND 143, ¶ 5, 835 N.W.2d 827;In re Voisine, 2010 ND 17, ¶ 9, 777 N.W.2d 908;N.D.C.C. § 25–03.3–01(8). We review civil commitments of sexually dangerous individuals under a modified clearly erroneous standard, and we will affirm the district court's order unless it is induced by an erroneous view of the law or we are firmly convinced that the order is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re Johnson, 2013 ND 146, ¶ 5, 835 N.W.2d 806.

[¶ 8] In reviewing the district court's order, we give great deference to the court's credibility determinations of expert witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, because the trial court is the best credibility evaluator in cases of conflicting testimony. In re J.M., 2013 ND 11, ¶ 8, 826 N.W.2d 315. A claim that the district court improperly relied upon the opinion of one expert instead of another challenges the weight the evidence was assigned, not the sufficiency of the evidence. Whitetail, 2013 ND 143, ¶ 5, 835 N.W.2d 827;In re J.T.N., 2011 ND 231, ¶ 8, 807 N.W.2d 570. Because the evaluation of credibility where evidence is conflicting is solely a trial court function, this Court will not reweigh expert testimony nor second-guess the credibility determinations made by the trial court in sexually dangerous individual proceedings. J.T.N., at ¶ 8. A choice between two permissible views of the weight of the evidence is not clearly erroneous. Id.;In re Wolff, 2011 ND 76, ¶ 14, 796 N.W.2d 644.

III

[¶ 9] Mangelsen's primary contention on appeal is that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he has serious difficulty controlling his sexual behavior. Mangelsen argues the State therefore failed to establish the fourth element required to show he is a sexually dangerous individual.

[¶ 10] The fourth element of the commitment standards evolved in response to substantive due process concerns, as expressed in Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412–13, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002), as a corollary to the third statutory-based element of the test. Voisine, 2010 ND 17, ¶ 9, 777 N.W.2d 908. We explained the requirements of this constitutionally based component of the sexually dangerous individual test in J.M., 2013 ND 11, ¶ 7, 826 N.W.2d 315 (citation omitted):

We have construed that statutory definition of a sexually dangerous individual in conjunction with Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002), and substantive due process to require the State to prove the committed individual has serious difficulty controlling his or her behavior. Under Crane and requirements for substantive due process, the definition of a sexually dangerous individual requires a nexus or connection between the disorder and dangerousness, including evidence showing the person has serious difficulty controlling his or her behavior, which distinguishes a sexually dangerous individual from the dangerous but typical recidivist in an ordinary criminal case.

[¶ 11] Mangelsen argues the State failed to satisfy the due process component because it did not prove he had exhibited conduct demonstrating he has serious difficulty controlling his sexual behavior. Mangelsen contends there must be evidence specifically showing a continued difficulty in controlling sexual behavior to warrant civil commitment under N.D.C.C. ch. 25–03.3.

[¶ 12] This Court, however, has expressly rejected the argument that the conduct demonstrating serous difficulty in controlling behavior must be sexual in nature:

Neither Kansas v. Crane nor our case law, however, require the conduct evidencing the individual's serious difficulty in controlling his behavior to be sexual in nature. See Crane, 534 U.S. at 412–13, 122 S.Ct. 867 (holding the Constitution only requires proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior); Matter of R.A.S., 2009 ND 101, ¶ 19, 766 N.W.2d 712 (explaining that in order to continue an individual's commitment, North Dakota's statute does not require proof of conduct sexual in nature after the individual's initial commitment). To the extent Wolff argues our decision in Interest of J.M., 2006 ND 96, ¶ 10, 713 N.W.2d 518, should be read to require proof of an individual's serious difficulty in controlling his behavior be sexual in nature, we now clarify that not to be true.

Wolff, 2011 ND 76, ¶ 7, 796 N.W.2d 644.

[¶ 13] The district court based its finding that Mangelsen had serious difficulty controlling his behavior on some instances of sexual conduct and some instances of non-sexual conduct. The court also considered conflicting testimony presented by the two expert witnesses, Dr. Lisota for the State and Dr. Ertelt for Mangelsen. Dr. Lisota diagnosed Mangelsen with Paraphilia NOS (Polymorphous Perverse), Polysubstance Dependence, Antisocial Personality Disorder, and Borderline Intellectual Functioning. Dr. Lisota opined that Mangelsen's disorders resulted in serious difficulty controlling his behavior. Dr. Ertelt diagnosed Mangelsen with Attention–Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, Alcohol Dependence, Impulse Control Disorder, Adult AntisocialBehavior, and Borderline Intellectual Functioning, but ultimately opined that there was nothing separating Mangelsen from the typical recidivist.

[¶ 14] The district court found that Dr. Lisota's testimony was more credible and supported a finding that Mangelsen had serious difficulty controlling his behavior and was likely to engage in further sexually predatory conduct. We give great weight to the court's credibility determinations, J.M., 2013 ND 11, ¶ 8, 826 N.W.2d 315, and we do not reweigh expert testimony or second-guess credibility determinations made by the trial court in sexually dangerous individual proceedings. J.T.N., 2011 ND 231, ¶ 8, 807 N.W.2d 570.

[¶ 15] The district court fully explained the rationale for its finding that Mangelsen's conduct demonstrated serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. The court noted:

Both experts agree that Mangelsen has difficulty controlling his impulses. Dr. Ertelt diagnosed Mangelsen with Impulse Control Disorder NOS, and Dr. Lisota addresses this difficulty in controlling impulses in his diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder. Recent examples of Mangelsen's impulsivity include his numerous disciplinary infractions while incarcerated at the State Penitentiary, such as quitting his employment in the kitchen without prior approval, being discharged from low intensity sex offender treatment...