Waselik v. Twp. of Sparta

SCOTT M. WASELIK, Plaintiff, v. TOWNSHIP OF SPARTA, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 16-4969 (KM-JBC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

May 18, 2017

OPINION

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:

This matter comes before the Court on the defendants' motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The plaintiff, Scott Waselik, sues the Township of Sparta and six of its police officers: Officer Daniel Elig, Officer Kurt Morris, Sgt. Keith Hannam, Sgt. Terrence Mulligan, Sgt. Joseph Pensado, and Lieut. John-Paul Beebe. Mr. Waselik alleges that he came to the police badly injured, seeking help in connection with a domestic violence incident, and wound up criminally charged with possession of marijuana. The evidence in the case was suppressed and the charges were dismissed. Mr. Waselik asserts, inter alia, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that a search of his home was illegal and that the criminal charges were unfounded. I hold that, whatever their surface merits, the majority of these causes of action are barred by the applicable two-year statutes of limitations. What remain are malicious prosecution claims under Section 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act. This dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the submission, within 30 days, of a proposed amended complaint that remedies the defects of the original.

I. The Allegations of the Complaint

The factual allegations of the Complaint, assumed to be true for purposes of this motion, occupy some 21 pages. They may be summarized as follows:

On October 8, 2013, the plaintiff, Scott M. Waselik, was stabbed and beaten by Kevin Rios. Christopher McElwee witnessed the incident, which took place in Waselik's residence. McElwee drove Waselik to the Sparta Police Department. After reporting the incident as a domestic violence matter, Waselik was taken to Morris County Memorial Hospital, where he was admitted and treated for his injuries. (He was released five days later, on October 13, 2013.)

Police Officers Daniel Elig and Kurt Morris went to Waselik's residence. There they located Rios in the back yard, arrested him, and handcuffed him. At this point Rios, the sole suspect, was in custody, and Waselik was in the hospital. Elig and Morris entered Waselik's residence without a warrant and observed marijuana. On October 9, 2013, Sparta police officers obtained a search warrant and re-entered Waselik's residence, where they seized the marijuana and associated paraphernalia.

On October 24, 2013, Waselik turned himself in to the Sparta police. (It does not appear that there was an arrest warrant, but he alleges that he appeared under threat of arrest.) He was charged by summons and complaint with possession of a controlled dangerous substance and drug paraphernalia. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:35-10(a)(4) and 36-2. At the time, the police knew or had reason to know that Waselik was entitled to possess marijuana for medical reasons. His medical marijuana card was in his wallet, which had remained at the police station until Waselik was discharged from the hospital on October 13, 2013.

On November 7, 2014, the Hon. Thomas J. Critchley, J.S.C., entered an order granting Waselik's motion to suppress the evidence seized from his residence. On January 15, 2015, the charges were dismissed. On December 3, 2015, the Appellate Division affirmed Judge Critchley's order of suppression.See State v. Waselik, 2015 WL 7761051 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., Dec. 3, 2015).¹

The Complaint contains eleven Counts:

I. Pattern and Practice Allegations (Municipal and Governmental Liability) [asserted against Township]

II. Unreasonable Search and Seizure under the United States Constitution [interpreted by the court as a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Fourth Amendment rights]

III. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 False Arrest²

IV. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Malicious Prosecution

V. Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act [cited as 42 U.S.C. § 1997; asserted against Township and Beebe]³

VI. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Conspiracy⁴

VII. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Supervisor Liability

VIII. Negligent Hiring/Training/Retention [asserted against Township]

IX. Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress⁵

X. Violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act - N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to 2

XI. Punitive Damages

II. The Applicable Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Animal Science Products, Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 469 n. 9 (3d Cir. 2011). For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the complaint are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. New Jersey Carpenters & the Trustees Thereof v. Tishman Const. Corp. of New Jersey, 760 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir. 2014).

Federal Rule of Procedure 8(a) does not require that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations. Nevertheless, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, the complaint's factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff's right to relief above a speculative level, so that a claim is "plausible on its face." Id. at570; see also West Run Student Housing Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat. Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2013). That facial-plausibility standard is met "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While "[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

The defendants first argue that all of the Counts of the Complaint, except Count IV, must be dismissed because they are untimely under the applicable statutes of limitations. I set aside Count IV (§ 1983 malicious prosecution), which is not time-barred, as defendants concede. See n.8, infra.

The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, however, a complaint may be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds, but "only when the statute of limitations defense is apparent on the face of the complaint." Wisniewski v. Fisher, ___ F.3d ___, 2017 WL 2112308 at *4 (3d Cir. May 16, 2017) (§ 1983 case, citing Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014)); see also Fried v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 850 F.3d 590, 604 (3d Cir. 2017). To be sustainable, however, such a dismissal must consider the applicability of tolling doctrines. See Wisniewski, 2017 WL 2112308 at *4 (reversing dismissal and remanding for consideration of whether time spent in exhausting administrative remedies tolled the § 1983 limitations period).

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts II, III, and VI)

Section 1983 claims,⁶ such as Counts II, III, and VI, are subject to New Jersey's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, N.J. Stat.Ann. § 2A:14-2. Patyrak v. Apgar, 511 F. App'x 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010)); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (§ 1983 claims borrow the relevant state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims).⁷

The date when a cause of action under § 1983 accrues is a matter of federal law. See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Gentry v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991)). "Under federal law, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is based." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "As a general matter, a [§ 1983] cause of action accrues at the time of the last event necessary to complete the tort, usually at the time the plaintiff suffers an injury." Id. (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120 (1979)). Accrual occurs, then, "when a plaintiff has 'a complete and present cause of action,' that is, when 'the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.'" Wallace, 549 U.S. at388 (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997).

Accrual may be delayed by a plaintiff's lack of knowledge of the facts. The threshold of knowledge, however, is not a high one. The tort accrues when the "plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the section 1983 action." Fullman v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 265 Fed. Appx. 44, 46 (3d Cir. 2008); accord Kach, 589 F.3d at 634. Accrual does not require that plaintiff be aware of all of the facts. New Castle County v. Halliburton Nus Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Zeleznik v. United States, 770 F.2d 20, 24 (3d Cir. 1985)). Nor need the plaintiff contemporaneously appreciate the legal ramifications of the facts. See Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1127 (3d Cir. 1988) (the required awareness is awareness of injury, not appreciation that the injury constitutes a legal wrong).

The essential wrongs alleged in the section 1983 counts are a false arrest and an unlawful search. Although it is possible to conjure unusual scenarios, in a false arrest or illegal search case, it is the rare plaintiff who would not be contemporaneously aware of the tortious acts or the fact of injury. It is for this reason, I believe, that the case law simply states that the § 1983 constitutional tort accrues, and the limitations period begins...