Washington v. CT Scoop Shops LLC

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Benjamin Washington Plaintiff, v. CT Scoop Shops LLC, Olga Cherkasova, and Dmitriy Gorbunov Defendants.

No. 21-cv-276

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

March 8, 2022

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' [51] MOTION TO STRIKE AND DISMISS

Hon Vanessa L. Bryant United States District Judge.

Plaintiff brings this action as a self-represented party alleging that his former employer, CT Scoop Shops, LLC and its owners-Olga Cherkasova and Dmitriy Gorbunov-violated Title VII and various state laws when he was terminated in June 2019. Plaintiff's complaint argues he was discriminated against on the basis of his religion and he was retaliated against after complaining about OSHA violations and questioned food labeling of products sold by CT Scoop Shops. Defendants have filed a motion to strike and motion to dismiss seeking to strike portions of Plaintiff's complaint and dismissing the complaint in full. [Mot., Dkt. 51]. Plaintiff opposes. [Opp., Dkt. 61]. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion to strike and GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants-CT Scoop Shops, LLC, Olga Cherkasova, and Dmitry Gorbunov-generally alleging he was wrongfully terminated “over a religious matter.” [Compl., Dkt. 1]. On March 25 2021, the Court struck Plaintiff's complaint under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Plaintiff failed to sign it. [Order, Dkt. 10]. On March 31, 2021, Plaintiff refiled his original complaint with his signature. [First Am. Compl., Dkt. 12].

On May 20, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to strike and dismiss arguing, inter alia, that the amended complaint fails to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted and must be dismissed in its entirety. [First Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 26].

On October 13, 2021, the Court conducted a pre-scheduled routine discovery status conference with the parties. [Dkt. 43]. At the status conference, the Court inquired as to the status of discovery at which point defense counsel reported wishing to hold off on discovery until the pending motion to dismiss was adjudicated because the first amended complaint was unclear on what causes of action Plaintiff was raising against Defendants. The Court suggested that, in the interest of efficiency, Plaintiff be permitted to amend his complaint to expressly alleged the legal basis for his complaint prior to adjudicating the pending motion to dismiss. The Court then explained to Plaintiff the pleading standard, including the need to allege facts comprising the legal basis for his claims and prayer for relief. Plaintiff reported he understood. Neither party objected to proceeding in this manner.

On October 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint wherein he raised three causes of action: (1) religious discrimination, (2) violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 31-51q, (3) violation of Connecticut General Statutes §§ 31-51m and 4-61dd. [Second Am. Compl., Dkt. 44]. As alleged in the second amended complaint, Plaintiff was hired by CT Scoop on May 1, 2019 to work as an ice cream scooper with the intent Plaintiff would become a district manager. [Id. at ¶ 2]. He was enrolled in a management program called “Scoop U” where he would learn how to become a manager. [Id.]. When Plaintiff was hired, it was on agreement that he would not be disturbed or required to work on the Sabbath. [Id.].

Plaintiff claims that during his employment he reported Defendant to OSHA for unsafe work conditions, which could have resulted in a fine of $10, 000. [Id. at ¶ 1]. He claims he was thanked by “corporate” for reporting the safety concern. [Id.].

On June 22, 2019, during the Sabbath, Plaintiff received notices on his phone from co-workers communicating in a group chat. [Id. at ¶ 3]. In the group chat, he complained about receiving notifications during the Sabbath. [Id.]. He also questioned how “the product” could be kosher if “they” are working on the Sabbath. [Id.]. Plaintiff asked to speak with the Mashgiach who would have to explain how the products were kosher as labeled. [Id. at ¶ 4]. Plaintiff states that it is customary in the Hebrew law for a Rabbi to bring to the attention of another Rabbi if there is a problem. [Id. at ¶ 5]. Plaintiff claims that “managers” “basically” told him the kosher labeling had nothing to do with being kosher and it had to do with making money. [Id.]. Plaintiff found this to be disrespectful to his beliefs. [Id.].

Plaintiff claims that the day after the June 22, 2019 confrontation, he was removed from the Monday shift. [Id. at ¶ 6]. When Plaintiff returned to work the following Wednesday, he posted “the whistle-blower law” on the corkboard. [Id.]. Defendant Cherkasova handed Plaintiff two checks and terminated him. [Id.]. Plaintiff objected, pointed to the whistle blower law he placed on the corkboard and stated Cherkasova could not fire him. [Id.]. Plaintiff alleges Cherkasova then looked to her attorney, who nodded yes. [Id.]. However, Plaintiff was still terminated. [Id.]. Plaintiff called the police. [Id.]. Police officers arrived and assessed the situation after which they concluded it was a civil matter and declined to make an arrest. [Id.]. One officer handed Plaintiff Attorney Sean Clark's business card, stating the attorney represented Cherkasova, and advised Plaintiff to consult him concerning his termination. [Id.].

Plaintiff states he was wrongfully terminated “over a religious matter” and CT Scoop Shops failed to uphold their bi-laws. [Id. ¶¶ 1, 7]. Plaintiff claims that he complained that his talents were being exploited. [Id. at ¶ 2]. Plaintiff indicates prior to his termination he was a good employee in that he arrived early, stayed late, was given responsibilities early on, and had no marks against him. [Id. at ¶ 7].

Defendants filed a renewed Motion to Strike and Motion to Dismiss, which incorporates the arguments raised in the first Motion to Strike/Dismiss in addition to raising new arguments in light of Plaintiff's second amended complaint. [Second Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 51].

II. MOTION TO STRIKE

Included in Plaintiffs original and first amended complaint was a copy of the franchise agreement between Ben & Jerry's, Inc. and CT Scoops (the “Franchise Agreement”). Plaintiff's second amended complaint contains a damages analysis detailing his “actual damages.” Defendants have moved to strike the Franchise Agreement and the damages analysis as impertinent and immaterial.

Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: “The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. . . .”

In deciding whether to strike a Rule 12(f) motion on the ground that the matter is impertinent and immaterial, it is settled that the motion will be denied, unless it can be shown that no evidence in support of the allegation would be admissible. . . . The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have long departed from the era when lawyers were bedeviled by intricate pleading rules and when lawsuits were won or lost on the pleadings alone. Thus the courts should not tamper with the pleadings unless there is a strong reason for so doing.

Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976). Thus, “[t]o prevail in such a motion, defendants must demonstrate that (1) no evidence in support of the allegations would be admissible; (2) that the allegations have no bearing on the issues in the case; and (3) that to permit the allegations to stand would result in prejudice to the movant.” Tucker v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 936 F.Supp.2d 1, 16 (D. Conn. 2013). “Inappropriately hyperbolic allegations, ill-conceived attempts at levity, and other similar manifestations of bad judgment in drafting pleadings, by themselves, fall short of the threshold that Rule 12(f) contemplates.” Id.

Here, Defendants first seek to strike the Franchise Agreement. Plaintiff did not attach this exhibit to the operative second amended complaint. The Court sees no need to strike what is not in issue. It should be noted that Defendants have not sought, or explained the legal basis supporting, sealing of the franchise agreement they seek stricken. Defendants simply argue it should be stricken from the Court's consideration. Since the Franchise Agreement is not part of the operative complaint, it is not within the Court's consideration on the pending motions. In addition, Defendants fail to show how they are prejudiced by the inclusion of the Franchise Agreement in the public record. The Court denies Defendants' motion to strike the Franchise Agreement.

Defendants also seek to strike Plaintiff's damages analysis in his Second Amended Complaint because it need not be submitted to the Court, is immaterial to plaintiff's underlying claims ostensibly because the amount sought exceeds the amount of damages allowed by law, rendering them impertinent and/or scandalous. While it is true Plaintiff is not required to submit a damages analysis to the Court and the law limits the damages that may be awarded, the Court is also mindful that Plaintiff is pro se. Defendants state without analysis or explanation that the inclusion of the damages analysis is scandalous. The Court finds the damages analysis is superfluous at worse. The Court denies Defendants' motion to strike the damages analysis.

To prevent any conceivable prejudice, the Court would not submit the complaint or any exhibit thereto to the jury, if the case was to proceed to trial. But, as detailed below, the case will be dismissed.

III. MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint in...