Washington v. D.C. Hous. Auth., Civil Case No. 15-1144 (RJL)

170 F.Supp.3d 234

Keith Washington, Plaintiff,

v.District of Columbia Housing Authority, and Richard White, Defendants.

Civil Case No. 15-1144 (RJL)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed March 21, 2016

Martin F. McMahon, Martin F. McMahon & Associates, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Kishka-Kamari Ford McClain, Venable LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(March 21st, 2016) [Dkt. #6]

RICHARD J. LEON, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Keith Washington filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (“D.C. Superior Court”) against the District of Columbia Housing Authority (“DCHA” or “the agency”) and Richard White, alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act of 1977 (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code §§ 2-1401.01 et seq. Notice of Removal Ex. 1 ¶¶ 1-2 [Dkt. #1] [hereinafter “Complaint”]. Additionally, plaintiff asserts District of Columbia common law claims against defendants regarding his separation from the DCHA. Compl. 1. Currently before the Court is defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. #6]. Upon consideration of the parties' pleadings, the relevant law, and the portions of the record identified below, the Court GRANTS partial summary judgment in favor of defendants and GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, defendants' Motion to Dismiss for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Keith Washington worked for the DCHA as a photographer from March 15, 1998 to March 11, 2015. Compl. ¶¶ 10-11, 63. In February 2014, defendant Richard White became the DCHA's director of public affairs and plaintiff's supervisor. Compl. ¶ 34. On June 10, 2014, plaintiff filed a complaint with the DCHA's human resources office alleging defendant White had created a hostile work environment by repeatedly disregarding, disrespecting, and verbally abusing plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 3; Defs.' Reply Ex. 1-A, at 2 [Dkt. #10-1]. The DCHA then underwent a reduction in force (“RIF”) and reorganization. Compl. ¶ 47(d)-(e). On February 9, 2015, plaintiff was notified that his position was to be abolished. Compl. ¶ 27. Plaintiff declined an offer to move to a different position within the agency that came with a lower salary, Compl. ¶ 48, and was accordingly separated from the DCHA, Compl. ¶ 52. Plaintiff was 47 years old at the time. Compl. ¶ 61. On March 6, 2015, plaintiff filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Charge of Discrimination with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, alleging age discrimination in violation of the ADEA. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 7.

Plaintiff filed this Complaint in D.C. Superior Court on June 8, 2015. Notice of Removal ¶ 1. On July 17, 2015, defendants removed this case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the grounds that plaintiff had alleged violations of federal law—namely Title VII and the ADEA. Notice of Removal ¶¶ 2-3. Counts I through IV are common law claims over which the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Count I is promissory estoppel, alleging plaintiff would not have stayed at the DCHA had he not been led to believe his job was secure. Compl. ¶¶ 16-25. Count II is constructive discharge, claiming plaintiff chose not to accept reassignment because he could no longer tolerate defendant White's pervasive harassment. Compl. ¶¶ 26-39. Count III is intentional and malicious interference with an implied employment contract; plaintiff alleges defendant White carried out a successful campaign to terminate plaintiff's employment, which was waged using tactics such as refusing to allow plaintiff the resources necessary to do his job, verbally abusing plaintiff, misleading superiors into thinking plaintiff was not performing well, and ultimately by ensuring plaintiff's position was eliminated in the RIF. Compl. ¶¶ 40-52. In Count IV, retaliatory discharge, plaintiff claims defendant White had his position abolished in the RIF. Compl. ¶¶ 53-59. Throughout his common law claims, plaintiff alleges defendant White's conduct was motivated by a “personal vendetta” against plaintiff and by a desire to eliminate plaintiff's salary from the department of public affairs' budget, giving defendant White additional funds to employ his own friends. Compl. ¶¶ 43, 48, 55, 57.

In Count V, plaintiff alleges age discrimination in violation of the ADEA, claiming defendants used the RIF as a means to discriminate against him on the basis of his age. Compl. ¶¶ 60-70. Outside of the Complaint's enumerated counts, plaintiff also claims defendants discriminated against him because of his age in violation of the DCHRA and Title VII. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A motion to dismiss is warranted when a complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must dismiss a plaintiff's complaint if it does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. ; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]”). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ).

When analyzing a plaintiff's claims, the Court must “treat the complaint's factual allegations as true” and “grant plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C.Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). But “the court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff [ ] if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint. Nor must the court accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp. , 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). Finally, the Court “may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” E . E . O . C . v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C.Cir.1997).

II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

When a defendant presents a non-jurisdictional argument that a plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies, that argument is an affirmative defense. Bowden v. United States , 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C.Cir.1997) (citing Brown v. Marsh , 777 F.2d 8, 13 (D.C.Cir.1985) ). The defendant bears the burden of producing evidence demonstrating non-exhaustion. Id. The plaintiff must then rebut the defendant's evidence or “prov[e] facts supporting equitable avoidance of the defense.” Id. If a district court refers to materials outside the pleadings in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion alleging non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it must convert the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment and may provide the parties an opportunity to present evidence in support of their positions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ; Kim v. United States , 632 F.3d 713, 719 (D.C.Cir.2011) ; see also Mackinac Tribe v. Jewell, 87 F.Supp.3d 127, 139 (D.D.C.2015) (even without providing notice of potential conversion, “where both parties have cited documents or provided evidence outside the pleadings with respect to the issue of exhaustion, a court may fairly convert a motion to dismiss for lack of exhaustion to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 ”) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] district court can consider a summary judgment motion when it is satisfied that the parties are not taken by surprise or deprived of a reasonable opportunity to contest facts averred outside the pleadings and the issues involved are discrete and dispositive.” Hamilton v. Geithner , 743 F.Supp.2d 1, 8 (D.D.C.2010) (quotations and citation omitted).

Summary judgment is proper where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Although the burden is on the movant to show that there is no dispute of material fact, the non-moving party also bears the “burden of producing in turn evidence that would support a jury verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The non-moving party “may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. The court must accept as true the evidence of, and draw “all justifiable inferences” in favor of, the party opposing summary judgment. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A genuine issue exists only where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

DISCUSSION

I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants argue plaintiff was required to pursue his common law claims...