Washington v. Gulf States Toyota, Inc.

NELSON WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. GULF STATES TOYOTA, INC., Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-CV-02511

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

July 7, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is the defendant's, Gulf States Toyota, Inc. (the "defendant"), motion for summary judgment and brief in support (Dkt. No. 50). The plaintiff, Nelson Washington (the "plaintiff"), has filed a response in opposition to the motion (Dkt. No. 55), to which the defendant has filed a reply (Dkt. No. 57). After having carefully considered the motion, response, reply, the record and the applicable law, the Court determines that the defendant's motion for summary judgment should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case concerns an employment discrimination dispute. The plaintiff, an African-American male, began working as an Operations Team Leader for the defendant on March 18, 2013, at its Spring, Texas location. During his employment with the defendant, the plaintiff was responsible for managing installation operations and overseeing associates in the defendant's Vehicle Processing Center ("VPC"). The plaintiff reported directly to Ayanna Betts ("Betts"), the defendant's Operations Manager. The plaintiff worked alongside a fellow Operations Team Leader, Christopher St. James ("St. James"), a white man who had the same duties and responsibilities as the plaintiff.

According to the plaintiff, in April 2013, Myrisha Thomas ("Thomas"), one of the installation associates who reported directly to the plaintiff began making sexual comments and gestures towards him. Specifically, Thomas: (1) made a sexual inference about the plaintiff having small feet; (2) pressed her breast against the window of the plaintiff's cubicle to get his attention; (3) in her workout attire, Thomas sat on a desk behind the plaintiff with her legs "cocked open"; and (4) made a sexual innuendo about needing more lubrication to attach a centerpiece on a tire assembly. The plaintiff reported Thomas' conduct to Betts as well as Kendace Culbreth ("Culbreth"), the defendant's Human Resources Manager and gave Thomas a verbal warning.

In September 2013, the plaintiff complained to Betts that he was being treated less favorably than St. James. Specifically, the plaintiff complained that he received a lower salary than St. James and was required to conduct certain functions that were contrary to protocol while St. James was not. After making his complaints, the plaintiff claims he began noticing that he was placed under increased surveillance and scrutiny by the defendant. On September 30, 2013, the defendant placed the plaintiff on a Performance Improvement Plan ("PIP")¹ because of perceived deficiencies with his communication skills.

On October 1, 2013, the plaintiff raised concerns regarding the perceived discriminatory nature of the PIP—that he was not being treated like St. James.² On November 6, 2013, theplaintiff confronted Thomas regarding installation assignments that were incomplete. During the encounter, Thomas became outrage and instructed the plaintiff to "shut up talking to her." Following the encounter, the plaintiff recommended Thomas' termination to Betts citing insubordination. Subsequently, the defendant commenced an investigation regarding Thomas' behavior. During the investigation, the plaintiff was informed that Thomas raised allegations of sexual harassment against him. Specifically, Thomas alleged that the plaintiff: (1) instructed her to open her legs; (2) sexually harassed her; and (3) hit her in her face with a paycheck. The plaintiff denied Thomas' allegations. On November 14, 2013, the plaintiff was placed on paid leave pending the investigation. On November 21, 2013, the defendant terminated the plaintiff's employment citing that the plaintiff was untruthful during the course of the investigation³ and had not demonstrated sufficient improvement in accordance with the PIP.

On December 17, 2013, the plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Texas Workforce Commission and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (collectively, "EEOC") alleging claims against the defendant for sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII").

On May 30, 2014, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights Letter to the plaintiff. (Id., Ex. A-2). On September 2, 2014, the plaintiff filed the instant action against the defendant alleging claims of race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII as well as a claim for race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Subsequently, on September 16, 2014, the plaintiff amended his complaint to include a Title VII sex discrimination claim. On December 16, 2014, the plaintiff sought leave from this Court to amend his complaint to include two additional claims, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") against thedefendant relative to his employment application. On December 22, 2014, the Court entered an Order granting the plaintiff's motion for leave to file his Second Amended Complaint. (See Dkt. No. 19). On June 16, 2015, the Court granted the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on the plaintiff's Title VII race discrimination claim due to his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (See Dkt. No. 30). On May 2, 2016, the Court granted the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on the plaintiff's FCRA claim. (See Dkt. No. 49).

The defendant now moves for summary judgment on the plaintiff's remaining claims of race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII. The plaintiff asserts federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

III. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

A. The Defendant's Contentions

With respect to the plaintiff's section 1981 race discrimination claim, the defendant argues that the plaintiff cannot establish the he was subjected to adverse action or was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee. In addition, the defendant contends that the plaintiff cannot rebut their proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Moreover, the defendant contends that record evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff cannot meet his prima facie case on his Title VII sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation claims. Thus, the defendant avers that summary judgment is appropriate dismissing the remaining claims in this action.

B. The Plaintiff's Contentions

In response, the plaintiff argues that the record demonstrates that the defendant's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions were a pretext for discriminationfor purposes of his section 1981 claim. In addition, the plaintiff argues that the record presents evidence that creates a sufficient issue of material fact with respect to his Title VII sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation claims. Thus, the plaintiff urges the Court to deny the defendant's motion.

IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes summary judgment against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing of the existence of an element essential to the party's case and on which that party bears the burden at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The movant bears the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion" and identifying those portions of the record "which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; see also Martinez v. Schlumber, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

If the movant meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to "go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 656 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075). "To meet this burden, the nonmovant must 'identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the 'precise manner' in which that evidence support[s] [its] claim[s].'" Stults, 76 F.3d at 656 (citing Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S. Ct. 195, 130 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1994)). It maynot satisfy its burden "with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Instead, it "must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a 'genuine' issue concerning every essential component of its case." Am. Eagle Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intern., 343 F.3d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998)).

"A fact is material only if its resolution would affect the outcome of the action, . . . and an issue is genuine only 'if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the [nonmovant].'" Wiley v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 585 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact has been established, a reviewing court is required to construe "all facts and inferences . . . in the light most favorable to the [nonmovant]." Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Armstrong v. Am. Home...