Washington v. Raytheon Techs. Corp.

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TIFFANY V. WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. RAYTHEON TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 4:22-CV-00514

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division

December 15, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMOS L. MAZZANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendant Raytheon Technologies Corporation's Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #28). Having considered the motions and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #28) should be DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a series of investigations conducted by Defendant Raytheon Technologies Corporation (“Raytheon”) and the United States Air Force (“Air Force”) into the Air Force's cybersecurity posture surrounding certain classified programs. Plaintiff Tiffany V. Washington, Raytheon's former employee, alleges that Raytheon discriminated against her based on her race by misrepresenting to the Air Force for which programs she was managerially responsible, ultimately leading to the revocation of her access to these classified programs. Following her report of race discrimination Plaintiff alleges that Raytheon unlawfully retaliated against her, resulting in her forced resignation.

Raytheon is a contractor that provides cybersecurity services for the Air Force and other government agencies (see generally Dkt. #28-1).^[1] In 2010 Plaintiff (an African-American woman) began working for Raytheon as an Information System Security Officer (“ISSO”) (Dkt. #28-1 at pp. 2-3). As an ISSO, her job was to ensure cybersecurity compliance for classified government systems (Dkt. #28-1 at p. 3). Plaintiff obtained a top-secret security clearance during her employment with Raytheon (Dkt. #28-1 at p. 3).

In 2019, Plaintiff was transferred to one of Raytheon's job facilities in McKinney, Texas, where she began working as an Information System Security Manager (ISSM) (Dkt. #28-1 at p 11; Dkt. #28-2 at p. 2). As an ISSM, she was again responsible for the cybersecurity compliance of various classified government systems, including programs for the Air Force, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Navy, and Army (see Dkt. #28-1 at pp. 8-12). Most of these programs involved Special Access Programs (“SAP”), which were special projects containing classified information (Dkt. #28-1 at p. 13). Plaintiff was the designated ISSM for approximately thirty-five government programs (Dkt. #28-1 at pp. 13, 18). Thirty-four of them were SAPs (Dkt. #28-1 at pp. 13, 18). These included the DNET (DET-8^[2]) and IS-42 programs, which both belonged to the Air Force (Dkt. #28-1 at pp. 16-17, 18; Dkt. #32-1 at pp. 3, 8-9, 16; Dkt. #33-2 at pp. 11, 19). On October 13 2020, Plaintiff was appointed the ISSM for the IS-42 program (Dkt. #28-2 at pp. 2-3).

In early 2021, the Air Force conducted an onsite inspection of its systems to verify that proper cyber hygiene standards were being maintained (Dkt. #28-1 at pp. 25-26; Dkt. #32-1 at pp. 5-6). Employees from both the Air Force and Raytheon, including Plaintiff, participated in the inspection (Dkt. #28-1 at pp. 25-26; Dkt. #32-1 at pp. 5-6). The inspection resulted in unfavorable findings (Dkt. #28-1 at p. 26; Dkt. #32-1 at p. 6).

Plaintiff testified that after the inspection, in February of 2021, Raytheon had implemented organizational changes that made her no longer responsible for the IS-42 program (Dkt. #28-1 at pp. 21, 26-28, 30). According to Plaintiff, Raytheon's restructuring had shifted her down from the ISSM position into an ISSO capacity (Dkt. #28-1 at pp. 19-21, 28, 30, 44-45). Her ISSM appointment letter for the IS-42 program, however, was never rescinded in writing (Dkt. #28-1 at pp. 19-21). Plaintiff testified in a deposition that Raytheon had instructed her not to notify the Air Force of these changes, including that she was no longer responsible for the IS-42 program (Dkt. #28-1 at pp. 19-21, 28, 30).

After the purported reorganization, Plaintiff alleges that Raytheon, over the course of several months, misrepresented to the Air Force that she still managed those programs, in an effort to “intentionally have her charged with security infractions and violations” (Dkt. #18 at p. 5). In May 2021, Raytheon initiated an investigation into the loss of audit logs for the DNET (DET-8) program (Dkt. #32-1 at p. 8). Despite Raytheon's apparent initial determination that Plaintiff was not culpable, Plaintiff received a security violation for the incident (Dkt. #32-1 at pp. 8-13, 15). According to John Meehan^[3], the Raytheon employee who conducted the initial inquiry, Air Force representative Jack Baker^[4] ordered him on June 7, 2021, to “issue security violations to Plaintiff and Mike Jackson, another Raytheon ISSM, as a result of lost audit logs and mismanagement” (Dkt. #28-3 at p. 2). Tom Palmer, a Special Agent in Charge with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, testified that Raytheon specifically stated in its report that Plaintiff was found culpable (Dkt. #33-2 at p. 5).

Plaintiff also received security violations resulting from a separate investigation relating to the IS-42 program (Dkt. #32-1 at p. 17-18; Dkt. #32-5 at p. 3). Some hard drives in the IS-42 program had been disconnected from the network, which resulted in them not being audited (Dkt. #32-1 at p. 17-18). Raytheon conducted an initial investigation into the matter, which did not find Plaintiff or anyone else culpable (Dkt. #32-1 at p. 17-18; Dkt. #32-2 at p. 7). The Air Force then conducted its own investigation and determined culpability on the part of Plaintiff (Dkt. #32-2 at p. 7; Dkt. #32-5 at p. 3). According to Jack Baker, Raytheon could have disputed the Air Force's findings because the government recommends security violations but does not issue them (Dkt. #32-5 at p. 3). However, Raytheon allegedly concurred with the findings and then submitted security violations in July of 2021 (Dkt. #32-2 at p. 7; Dkt. #32-4 at pp. 4-5; Dkt. #32-5 at p. 3; Dkt. #33-2 at pp. 6-7).

Based on the totality of the two incidents, Tom Palmer recommended the suspension of Plaintiff's SAP access (Dkt. #33-2 at p. 7). The Air Force then suspended Plaintiff's SAP access through a memorandum dated July 29, 2021, which Plaintiff received on August 10, 2021 (Dkt. #28-3 at p. 3; Dkt. #28-5 at p. 2).

Sometime after August 10, 2021, Plaintiff reported an allegation of race discrimination to Raytheon^[5](see Dkt. #28-1 at pp. 68-69; Dkt. #28-3 at p. 3). Plaintiff had not reported an allegation of race discrimination to Raytheon prior to August 10, 2021 (Dkt. #28-1 at pp. 68-69). Plaintiff alleges that individuals outside of her protected class, who were actually responsible for the security violations, were not issued SAP suspensions (Dkt. #18 at p. 7).

Plaintiff continued working for Raytheon until November 15, 2021, when she took a medical leave of absence (Dkt. #28-1 at pp. 58-59). During the period in which she still worked, Plaintiff was only permitted to work on tasks involving unclassified information (see Dkt. #28-1 at p. 57). She testified that, despite never receiving a suspension for non-Air Force SAPs, she performed the kind of work that Raytheon would give a seasonal intern (Dkt. #28-1 at p. 57). Plaintiff never returned from her leave of absence and submitted her resignation on May 16, 2022 (Dkt. #28-1 at pp. 61-62). She testified that, prior to resigning, Raytheon had offered her a “demotion” to a Department of Defense collateral job position (Dkt. #28-1 at pp. 65-66).

On February 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed a charge with the Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights Division and U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against Raytheon, alleging race discrimination and retaliation claims in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Dkt. #32-9 at p. 4).

On June 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against Raytheon (Dkt. #1). On November 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint (Dkt. #18), the live pleading, asserting claims for race discrimination, reprisal, and workplace harassment in violation of Title VII, and a claim for race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. On April 27, 2023, Raytheon filed its Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #28). On June 19, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Response (Dkt. #32). On June 26, 2023, Raytheon filed its Reply (Dkt. #33).

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). “Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Further, parties may raise objections to subjectmatter jurisdiction at any time. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011). Courts analyze a Rule 12(h)(3) motion to dismiss under the same standards governing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Shenzhen Tange Li'an E-Commerce Co., Ltd. v. Drone Whirl LLC, 2021 WL 3474007 at *2 (W.D. Tex. August 6, 2021).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the district court lacks statutory and constitutional power to adjudicate the case. Home Builders Ass'n of Miss Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). If a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction...