Washington v. Smith

BRUCE WASHINGTON, ET AL. v. RANDY SMITH, ET AL.

Civil Action No. 22-632

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

December 22, 2022

SECTION I

ORDER & REASONS

LANCE M. AFRICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is a motion^[1] by defendant Alexander Thomas (“Thomas”) for summary judgment as to plaintiff Bruce Washington's (“Washington”) claim of unlawful search.^[2] For the reasons that follow, the Court denies the motion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As discussed below, the parties' characterizations of the factual record differ. The facts set forth, in this section however, are undisputed.^[3]

This case arises out of a traffic stop that occurred on the evening of March 13, 2021.^[4] Washington was driving his car, with Gregory Lane as the passenger.^[5] Deputies from the St Tammany's Parish Sheriff's Office (“STPSO”), including Thomas, stopped Washington's vehicle for an alleged failure to use his turn signal and improper lane usage.^[6]

Thomas approached Washington's vehicle on the driver's side and asked for his license and registration.^[7] Washington asked Thomas why he had been stopped.^[8]Thomas asked Washington where he and Lane were coming from, and Washington further questioned the purpose of the stop.^[9] During this exchange, Thomas told Washington that Washington was “going to make this go a different way than it has to be.”^[10] Thomas then told Washington to exit the vehicle.^[11]

Thomas asked Washington if he had any weapons, to which Washington responded, “I don't tote weapons.”^[12] Thomas responded, “do you mind if I pat you down for officer safety.”^[13] Washington did not respond verbally.^[14] He turned around and put his hands in the air.^[15] Thomas responded, “thank you.”^[16]

The traffic stop continued for approximately fifteen minutes after Thomas patted Washington down, concluding with Washington receiving a traffic citation.

Subsequent to the traffic stop, plaintiffs allegedly attempted to lodge a complaint against Thomas, as well as Deputies Jackson Bridel and Shaun Wood, who were also present at the stop with the STPSO administrative office. The Court does not further recount these facts here as the only claim properly challenged in defendants' motion for summary judgment is Washington's claim against Thomas for unlawful search.^[17]

I. STANDARDS OF LAW

a. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper when, after reviewing the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits, a court determines that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment need not produce evidence negating the existence of a material fact; it need only point out the absence of evidence supporting the other party's case. Id.; see also Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1195-96 (5th Cir. 1986) (“There is no sound reason why conclusory allegations should suffice to require a trial when there is no evidence to support them even if the movant lacks contrary evidence.”).

Once the party seeking summary judgment carries that burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The showing of a genuine issue is not satisfied by creating “‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,' by ‘conclusory allegations,' by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,' or by only a ‘scintilla' of evidence.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists when the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

“Although the substance or content of the evidence submitted to support or dispute a fact on summary judgment must be admissible . . . the material may be presented in a form that would not, in itself, be admissible at trial.” Lee v. Offshore Logistical & Transp., L.L.C., 859 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). The party responding to the motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmoving party's evidence, however, “is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the nonmoving party's] favor.” Id. at 255. If the nonmovant fails to meet their burden of showing a genuine issue for trial that could support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, summary judgment must be granted. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075-76. B. Qualified Immunity

“Governmental officers sued in their individual capacity are entitled to qualified immunity insofar as their conduct ‘did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'” Schmidt v. Stassi, 250 F.Supp.3d 99, 102 (E.D. La. 2017) (Africk, J.) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show two things: first, that the defendant violated their constitutional rights and, second, that the defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2022); United States ex rel. Parikh v. Brown, 587 Fed.Appx. 123, 128 (5th Cir. 2014). A right is “clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity “when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of the violated right were sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” United States ex rel. Parikh, 587 Fed.Appx. at 128 (quotation and citation omitted).

“[T]he usual summary judgment burden of proof is altered in the case of a qualified immunity defense.” Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir.2005) (citing Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001)). Once the defense is raised, “the burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact issue as to whether the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). The plaintiff must likewise “adduce[ ] sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact suggesting [the defendant's] conduct violated an actual constitutional right.” Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008). Though the plaintiff bears the burden of negating the availability of qualified immunity, all inferences are still drawn in the plaintiff's favor. Brown, 623 F.3d at 253.

II. ANALYSIS

a. Unlawful Search Under the Fourth Amendment

In order to justify the frisk of Washington, Thomas must have had reasonable suspicion that Washington was armed and dangerous. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 332 (2009); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977). Reasonable suspicion must be supported by “specific and articulable facts suggesting actual physical risk to [the officer] or others.” United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, at 407 (5th Cir. 2006) (quotation and citation omitted). Reasonable suspicion is to be “determined by looking to ‘the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture.'” United States v. Jordan, 232 F.3d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989)).

A frisk that is not justified by reasonable suspicion may nevertheless be constitutional if there is consent to the search. United States v. Montgomery, 777 F.3d 269, 272-73 (5th Cir. 2015). However, “[c]onsent is valid only if voluntary.” United States v. Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d 350, 357 (5th Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 451 (2011). To determine if consent is voluntary, the Fifth Circuit considers six factors:

1) the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status; 2) the presence of coercive police procedures; 3) the extent and level of the defendant's cooperation with the police; 4) the defendant's awareness of his right to refuse consent; 5) the defendant's education and intelligence; and 6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found.

United States v. Hernandez, 279 F.3d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 2002). No factor is determinative. United States v. Guidry, No. 18-414, 2018 WL 6725372, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 2018) (Ashe, J.) (citing United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 438 (5th Cir. 1993)). Furthermore, “[i]t is well established that a defendant's mere acquiescence to a show of lawful authority is insufficient to establish voluntary consent.” United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968) (further citations omitted); see also Florida v Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (noting that consent is not established by a showing of “mere submission to a claim of lawful authority”).

“[W]hether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 412 U.S. 218, 227, (1973). “Voluntariness of consent is an objective inquiry that asks ‘what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange.'” United States v. Bogomol, No. 18-11486, 2021 WL...