Waters v. City of Laurel

PATRICIA WATERS and SCOTT NOVAK, Plaintiffs v. CITY OF LAUREL, Defendant.

Civil No. 8:19-cv-01979-PWG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND Southern Division

August 24, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Patricia Waters and Scott Novak bring this action against the City of Laurel for allegedly discriminating against religious institutions through its zoning and land use laws. Waters and Novak contend that Laurel's municipal code prevented them from leasing their property to a church, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5. Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. They assert five causes of action: violation of RLUIPA's Equal Terms provision, infringement of their constitutional right to assembly, and three counts seeking declaratory judgment that the City's code violates Maryland law and the U.S. Constitution. The City of Laurel now moves to dismiss the claims against it.¹ As discussed herein, Plaintiffs' allegations regarding a rental inquiry from a church do not suffice to confer constitutional standing under RLUIPA, and the dispute regarding whether the City's zoning laws infringe on religious organizations hadalready been resolved in separate litigation.² Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and there is no justiciable Article III case or controversy, the City's motion to dismiss is granted, and the Amended Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice.

Background

For purposes of considering Defendant's motion, this Court accepts the facts that Plaintiffs alleged in the Amended Complaint as true. See Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). Since 2004, Plaintiffs have owned 604 Main Street, a townhouse-turned-business in downtown Laurel. Pls.' Resp. 2, ECF No. 19. Waters initially used it to operate an edible fruit arrangement store but later leased it for general commercial use. Id. One commercial tenant turned the premises into a cigar lounge. Am. Compl. ¶ 16. Due to land use restrictions in Laurel's downtown commercial zone, the cigar-lounge tenant applied for and received a "special exception" permit from the city. Id. ¶ 23. In 2015, Plaintiffs evicted the cigar-lounge tenant for overdue rent. Id. ¶ 17.

In 2016, a church pastor's realtor inquired about the possibility of renting Plaintiffs' empty property to the congregation, Shadow of the Almighty Ministries. Id. ¶¶ 28, 29. When the pastor's realtor began making inquiries, Christian Pulley, the City's assistant director of economic development, allegedly told the realtor that a church could not be located at 604 Main Street. Id. ¶ 33. Pulley allegedly informed Waters that the prospective tenant would need to apply for a "special exception" permit and that she would oppose the request given the minimal on-site parking spots. Id. ¶ 38. But Plaintiffs do not accept this explanation, and allege that Ms. Pulley's true motivation was her sympathy for, and allegiance to, the evicted cigar-lounge tenant. Id. ¶¶ 18, 19. AfterPulley's warning, the pastor took no further action to secure a lease from Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 39. Waters and Novak allege that the City's parking requirements and then-existing "special exception" process for houses of worship, in addition to Pulley's opposition, caused the pastor and his church to walk away from leasing their property. Id. ¶¶ 41, 42.

The City's Zoning Code specifies which types of commercial uses—everything from bakeries and poetry readings to gun shops and karaoke—are permitted in which parts of Laurel. Def.'s Ex. C 83-94, ECF No. 16-5. An ice cream parlor, for instance, is "permitted," "permitted with a special exception," or "prohibited" depending on the commercial zone. Id. at 89. To obtain a special exception, applicants must pay a fee and demonstrate that their proposed use meets five conditions, including that it will not adversely affect the welfare of residents and workers in the area. Id. at 211. The City's Board of Appeals may then grant the exception after a public hearing. Id. at 211, 213.

Previously, houses of worship, convents, and monasteries were only permitted with a special exception in Laurel's commercial zones. Def.'s Ex. G, ECF No. 16-10. But in 2018 (after the events that form the basis of this lawsuit), the City Council amended the code to make religious institutions simply "permitted" across those districts, without requiring a special exception. Id. The revision came in response to a different RLUIPA lawsuit, which the City settled. Am. Compl. ¶ 46. In that case, the plaintiff was a church, which brought both facial and as-applied challenges to the special exception permitting process. Redemption Cmty. Church v. City of Laurel, 333 F. Supp. 3d 521 (D. Md. 2018).

Separately, under the Zoning Code—both the 2016 version and the one that remains in effect today—houses of worship must have one off-street parking space for every four auditorium seats, so a church with a 100-seat auditorium would be required to have twenty-five parkingspaces, unless it receives a waiver from the City's Planning Commission. See Def.'s Mem. 9, ECF. No 16-1; Pls.' Resp. 9. Even so, a house of worship that falls within the City's "parking modification zone" is entitled to a reduction of 50 percent, meaning a 100-seat church would need just thirteen on-site parking spaces. See Def.'s Ex. C 179; Pls.' ECF No. 19-2. As noted, the Zoning Code provisions on parking requirements, waivers, and reductions that existed in 2016 remain in place today, unaffected by the 2018 amendments. Def.'s Mem. 6; Pls.' Resp. 3. Given Waters and Novak's five parking spaces, they could rent to a forty-seat church at any time, without the church needing a parking waiver from the Planning Commission or a special exception from the Board of Appeals. See Pls.' Resp. 6-7. Still, Plaintiffs complain that while churches can reduce their parking requirements by half, certain secular establishments such as retail stores can get a 60 percent reduction. Id.

Plaintiffs' prospective tenant found a different location for Shadow of the Almighty Ministries in late 2016, several months after inquiring about 604 Main Street. Am. Compl. ¶ 40. At the time, the church had to apply for a special exception at that site too. See id. at 3. According to Defendants, the space was more than ten times larger and had more parking spaces than Plaintiffs' property. Def.'s Mem. 16 n.3. Neither the pastor nor the congregation is a party to this suit. Waters and Novak eventually found a different tenant, who currently operates another cigar lounge. Am. Compl. ¶ 26. Plaintiffs seek $54,000 from the City for the eighteen-month period between the two cigar-lounge tenants during which their property sat empty.

In its motion to dismiss, the City argues that Plaintiffs lack standing, the claims for declaratory judgment are moot because of the 2018 Zoning Code amendment, the City official who allegedly dissuaded the pastor had no decision-making authority, RLUIPA's "Equal Terms"provision only applies to religious institutions, and Plaintiffs' constitutional claims assert mere conclusory allegations.

Standard of Review

Defendant moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Even if Waters and Novak can demonstrate that subject matter jurisdiction exists, the City argues that the case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

"Standing is a jurisdictional issue . . . ." Gen. Tech. Applications, Inc. v. Exro Ltda, 388 F.3d 114, 118 (4th Cir. 2004). When plaintiffs lack standing or their claims have become moot, there is no Article III case or controversy, and the court must dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See, e.g., Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 78-79 (2013); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1998). A court may grant a Rule 12(b)(1) motion "if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Evans v. B.F. Perkins, Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999). It is the plaintiff's burden to prove subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

When, as here, a defendant makes a facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, "the plaintiff, in effect, is afforded the same procedural protection as he would receive under a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration." Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192 (quoting Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982)). The district court takes the facts alleged in the complaint as true and only grants the motion to dismiss if the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to invoke subject matter jurisdiction. Id. This standard requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although a court will accept factualallegations as true, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.

When reviewing the motion, a court may consider documents outside the complaint if they are "integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint" and their authenticity is not challenged.³ E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Kolon Indus., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Phillips v. LCI Int'l Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1999)). Where the allegations in the complaint conflict with an attached written instrument, "the exhibit prevails." Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir. 1991); see Azimirad v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., No. DKC-10-2853, 2011 WL 1375970, at *2-3 (D. Md. Apr. 12, 2011). A court's consideration of such integral documents does not convert the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. White Tail Park, Inc. v....