Waters v. Mitchell

600 F.Supp.3d 1177

Jonathan WATERS, Plaintiff,

v.Christopher MITCHELL, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. C21-0087JLR

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, at Seattle.

Signed April 28, 2022

George H. Luhrs, Law Offices of George H. Luhrs, Mountlake Terrace, WA, for Plaintiff.

ORDER

JAMES L. ROBART, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court is Plaintiff Jonathan Waters's motion for entry of default judgment against Defendants Christopher Mitchell and Jane Doe Mitchell (collectively, "the Mitchells") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) and Local Rule 55(b)(2). (Mot. (Dkt. # 6); Mot. Errata (Dkt. # 10); Waters Decl. (Dkt. # 7); Luhrs Decl. (Dkt. # 8).) The court has considered the motion, the declarations filed in support of the motion, the balance of the record, and the applicable law. Being fully advised, the court DENIES Mr. Waters's motion without prejudice and GRANTS Mr. Waters leave to file an amended complaint.

II. BACKGROUND

Mr. Waters initiated this action against the Mitchells on January 25, 2021. (See generally (Compl. (Dkt. # 1) ¶ 1.) The Mitchells allegedly "owned and/or operated" the F/V KULEANA (the "Vessel") and hired Mr. Waters to work as a seaman aboard the Vessel in 2018. (Id. ¶¶ 2-3.) On approximately June 28, 2018, Mr. Waters was "injured while performing crew work" on the Vessel.¹ (Id. ¶ 4.) He alleges that his injuries were caused by the Mitchells's negligence and the unseaworthiness of the Vessel. (Id. ¶ 5.) Mr. Waters brings claims for: (1) unpaid wages for crew work performed from June 17, 2018 to July 4, 2018; (2) a double wage penalty for willfully withheld wages pursuant to RCW 49.52.070 ; (3) negligence under the Jones Act, 46 USC § 30104 ; (4) unseaworthiness under general maritime law² ; (5) maintenance, cure, and unearned wages under general maritime law; and (6) punitive damages for callous and willful non-payment of maintenance and cure under general maritime law. (See id. ¶¶ 4-13.)

Although Mr. Waters timely served the Mitchells on February 1, 2021, they failed to respond to the complaint or appear in this action. (See generally Cert. of Service (Dkt. # 4); Dkt.) On April 16, 2021, the court granted Mr. Waters's motion for default and entered an order of default against the Mitchells. (4/16/21 Order (Dkt. # 5); Mot. for Default (Dkt. # 3).) Mr. Walters now asks the court to enter a default judgment in the amount of $207,474, itemized as follows:

 Unpaid Wages $14,123
Double Wage Penalty $28,246
Unearned Wages $14,123
Cure $2,612
Maintenance $7,720
Pain, Suffering, and Loss of Enjoyment $30,000
Punitive Damages $48,910
Lost Earnings to Date $45,396
Future Lost Earnings $11,094
Attorney's Fees3 $5,250

[Editor's Note: The preceding image contains the reference for footnote³ ].

(Mot. at 3, 6-7; Mot. Errata at 1.)

III. ANALYSIS

The court begins by discussing the relevant legal standard governing motions for default judgment before discussing the merits of Mr. Waters's motion.

A. Legal Standard

Entry of default judgment is left to the court's sound discretion. Aldabe v. Aldabe , 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Because granting or denying relief is within the court's discretion, a defendant's default does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment. Id. In exercising its discretion, the court considers seven factors (the " Eitel factors"): (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff if relief is denied; (2) the substantive merits of the plaintiff's claims; (3) the sufficiency of the claims raised in the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in relationship to the defendant's behavior; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the preference for decisions on the merits when reasonably possible. Eitel v. McCool , 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986).

Generally, default judgment is a two-step process: first, the court determines that a default judgment should be entered; then, it determines the amount and character of the relief that should be awarded. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal , 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987). At the default judgment stage, well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, except those related to damages, are considered admitted and are sufficient to establish a defendant's liability. Geddes v. United Fin. Grp. , 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) ; TeleVideo , 826 F.2d at 917-18. The court must ensure that the amount of damages is reasonable and demonstrated by the plaintiff's evidence.⁴ See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) ; TeleVideo , 826 F.2d at 917-18 ; LG Elecs., Inc. v. Advance Creative Comput. Corp. , 212 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("[T]he evident policy of [ Rule 55(b) ] is that even a defaulting party is entitled to have its opponent produce some evidence to support an award of damages."). And "[a] default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).

B. Whether the Eitel Factors Favor Default Judgment

As a threshold matter, the court notes that Mr. Waters fails to address or even mention the Eitel factors in his motion for default judgment. (See generally Mot.)

While the court could deny his motion based on that failure,⁵ it declines to do so and will consider whether the Eitel factors favor default judgment. The court begins with the second and third Eitel factors and concludes that these two factors alone justify denying Mr. Waters's motion for default judgment.

The second and third Eitel factors—the substantive merits of the plaintiff's claim and the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint—are frequently analyzed together. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans , 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002). For these two factors to weigh in favor of default judgment, the complaint's allegations must be sufficient to state a claim for relief. Danning v. Lavine , 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978). A complaint satisfies this standard when the claims "cross the line from the conceivable to plausible." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 680, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ("A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ " (citations omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) )); In re Singh , Bankruptcy No. 10-42050-D-7, 2013 WL 5934299, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2013) (stating that "a complaint [that] is well-pleaded and sets forth plausible facts—not just parroted statutory or boilerplate language" supports granting default judgment). In evaluating the plaintiff's claims, the court "takes ‘the well-pleaded factual allegations’ in the complaint ‘as true’ "; however, a "defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law." DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh , 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (first quoting Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. , 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that "necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default"); and then quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hous. Nat'l Bank , 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) ). "As a result, where the allegations in a complaint are not ‘well-pleaded,’ liability is not established by virtue of the defendant's default and default judgment should not be entered." See Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Tilley , No. C09-1085 PJH, 2010 WL 309249, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2010).

Before turning to Mr. Waters's claims, the court notes that while Mr. Waters sets forth additional factual allegations relevant to his claims in his motion for default judgment and supporting declaration (see, e.g. , Waters Decl. ¶¶ 2-4), he cannot use such allegations "to supplement his complaint." See Love v. Mustafa , No. 20CV02071PJHAGT, 2021 WL 7286006, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2021), report and recommendation adopted , No. 20CV02071PJHAGT, 2021 WL 7287626 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2021) (citing Danning , 572 F.2d at 1388 ). Accordingly, the court's analysis will only consider the allegations in Mr. Waters's complaint.

1. Jones Act Negligence Claim

The Jones Act permits a "seaman injured in the course of employment" to recover damages against their employer. 46 U.S.C. § 30104. To establish a cause for negligence under the Jones Act, a claimant must establish "duty, breach, notice and causation." Ribitzki v. Canmar Reading & Bates, Ltd. P'ship , 111 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (June 5, 1997); see also Ili v. Am. Seafoods Co., LLC , 357 F. App'x 807, 808-09 (9th Cir. 2009). "The employer of a seaman owes the seaman a duty under the Jones Act" to use reasonable care to ensure that the seaman has a "safe place to work." Ribitzki , 111 F.3d at 662-63 ; see also MacDonald v. Kahikolu, Ltd. , No. CIV. 02-00084 LEK, 2007 WL 4547552, at *7 (D. Haw. Dec. 26, 2007), aff'd , 581 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2009). "To recover on his Jones Act [negligence] claim, [the plaintiff] must establish that his employer ..., or one of [their] agents, was negligent and that this negligence was a cause, however slight, of his injuries." Ribitzki , 111 F.3d at 662 (quoting Havens v. F/T Polar Mist , 996 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1993) ). "The ‘quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of Jones Act negligence is less than that required for common law negligence, ... and even the slightest negligence is sufficient to sustain a finding of liability.’ " Id. (quoting Havens , 996 F.2d at 218 ). Moreover, "[a]n employer is only liable under the Jones Act if the employer or its agents either knew or should have known of the dangerous condition." Id. at 663-64 (citing Havens , 996 F.2d at 218 ("[T]he employer...