Watkins v. Oakes

318 So.3d 1125

Richard C. WATKINS, Appellant

v.John OAKES, Appellee

NO. 2019-CA-01482-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

October 6, 2020

Rehearing Denied January 19, 2021

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JIM WAIDE, Tupelo, JOHN H. DANIELS III, Greenville

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: SILAS W. McCHAREN, ABBEY ADCOCK REEVES, Jackson

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ.

CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Richard Watkins filed a complaint alleging constructive discharge by his employer, Farmers Grain Terminal Inc. (Farmers Grain), and intentional interference with his employment by Farmers Grain's "vice president of rice," John Oakes. The Washington County Circuit Court dismissed Watkins's claim against Farmers Grain¹ and also granted summary judgment in favor of Oakes.

¶2. Watkins now appeals from the trial court's order granting summary judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Oakes is liable to Watkins for intentional interference with Watkins's at-will employment. Watkins also asserts that by granting summary judgment, the trial court violated Watkins's constitutional right to a jury trial.

¶3. After our review, we find that Watkins failed to meet his burden of proving each element of intentional interference with his contract by a preponderance of the evidence. Watkins therefore failed to show that a genuine issue of material fact existed. As a result, we affirm the trial court's order granting Oakes's motion for summary judgment.

FACTS

¶4. Farmers Grain employed Watkins as the Chief Financial Officer (CFO). On July 26, 2016, Watkins resigned from his position at Farmers Grain, claiming that he endured multiple instances of mistreatment and harassment at the hands of Oakes, the vice president of rice at Farmers Grain. Watkins asserted that this mistreatment and harassment by Oakes created a hostile work environment. The record reflects that Watkins reported his complaints about Oakes's conduct to Farmers Grain's Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Steve Nail. According to Watkins, Nail failed to take adequate remedial action. Watkins claimed that as a result of Farmers Grain's failure to provide him with a safe work place, he had no other choice but to resign.

¶5. On January 9, 2017, Watkins filed a complaint against Farmers Grain and Oakes.² In his complaint, Watkins asserted a claim of intentional interference with employment against Oakes, claiming that Oakes is individually liable to him because Oakes intentionally interfered with his employment. Watkins specifically alleged that Oakes "engaged in bizarre threatening behavior toward [Watkins], causing [Watkins] to fear for his safety." Watkins also asserted a claim of constructive discharge against Farmers Grain, stating that although he reported Oakes's threats to the CEO of Farmers Grain, Nail "failed to take any action to protect [Watkins]." Watkins claimed that he therefore "had no alternative but to leave his employment" because of fear of violence from Oakes.

¶6. Farmers Grain filed a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion seeking to dismiss Watkins's complaint for failing to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The trial court granted Farmers Grain's motion. As stated, Watkins is not appealing from the trial court's order dismissing Farmers Grain.

¶7. On April 23, 2019, Oakes filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Watkins could not make a prima facie case for intentional interference with his employment because Watkins could not show that his employment contract with Farmers Grain would have been performed but for Oakes's alleged interference. Oakes asserted Watkins's employment was not terminated by Farmers Grain; rather, Watkins voluntarily resigned from his position. Oakes also argued that as an individual co-employee, he could not be liable to Watkins under the legal theory of "hostile work environment" because that theory imposes liability on employers, not employees.

¶8. On September 9, 2019, the trial court entered an order granting Oakes's motion for summary judgment. The trial court explained that it found no evidence that Oakes's behavior prevented Farmers Grain from performing its duties under the contract. The trial court stated that the evidence showed that Farmers Grain "was not only willing to allow Watkins to retain his employment, but wanted him to stay." The trial court accordingly held that because Watkins "voluntarily left his employment, Oakes cannot be held liable for interfering with his at-will employment contract" with Farmers Grain. The trial court further stated that "the hostile work environment was not hostile within the meaning of employment law."

¶9. Watkins filed his notice of appeal from the trial court's order granting summary judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10. We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Ladnier v. Hester , 98 So. 3d 1025, 1027-28 (¶9) (Miss. 2012). We recognize that when presented with a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he trial court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id . at 1028 (¶9). "If there is any doubt regarding the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the benefit goes to the nonmovant." Id .

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment

¶11. Watkins argues that because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Oakes is liable for intentional interference with Watkins's at-will employment, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Oakes. Watkins claims that Oakes's threats and his instructions to other Farmers Grain employees prevented Watkins from performing the functions of his job and amounted to a constructive discharge. Watkins also argues that "it was for the jury, not the court, to decide whether Watkins['s] leaving his employment was voluntary or whether it was reasonable based on Oakes's possibly taking violent action against Watkins." Watkins maintains that a jury could find that Watkins could not properly perform his duties because he could not stay after hours if Oakes was present.

¶12. Oakes asserts, however, that in order to succeed on his claim, Watkins must show (among other things) that Oakes acted in such a way to cause Farmers Grain to stop performing under its contract with Watkins. Oakes argues that Watkins cannot show that Oakes induced or caused Farmers Grain to not perform its contract with Watkins, and therefore Watkins cannot show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Oakes intentionally interfered with Watkins's employment contract. Oakes also argues that no genuine issue of material fact exists "as to whether Watkins was constructively discharged because (1) a reasonable person in his circumstances would not have felt compelled to resign; and (2) Oakes was not Watkins['s] employer and did not have the power or authority to actually or constructively discharge Watkins." Oakes submits that the trial court therefore correctly granted summary judgment after finding that Oakes could not be liable for intentional interference with Watkins's at-will employment.

¶13. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that tortious interference with at-will contracts of employment is a viable claim. Levens v. Campbell , 733 So. 2d 753, 760 (¶27) (Miss. 1999). The supreme court explained that "[a]n action for tortious interference with [a] contract ordinarily lies when a party maliciously interferes with a valid and enforceable contract, causing one party not to perform and resulting in injury to the other contracting party." Id . ; see also Jones v. Mullen , 100 So. 3d 490, 497 (¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) ("Mississippi law recognizes a claim for interference ‘with the performance of a contract between another and a third party’ by one ‘who intentionally and improperly interferes,’ and this interference causes ‘the third party not to perform.’ " (quoting Morrison v. Miss. Enter. for Tech. Inc ., 798 So. 2d 567, 574 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) ). To succeed on a claim of tortious interference with a contract, a plaintiff must prove the following elements:

(1) intentional and willful acts, (2) calculated to cause damage to the plaintiff in his lawful business, (3) done with the unlawful purpose of causing damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the defendant (which constitutes malice), and (4) resulting in actual damage or loss.

Grice v. FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc. , 925 So. 2d 907, 910 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) ; Levens , 733 So. 2d at 760-61 (¶27) (citing Collins v. Collins , 625 So. 2d 786, 790 (Miss. 1993) ); see also Scruggs, Millette, Bozeman & Dent P.A. v. Merkel & Cocke P.A. , 910 So. 2d 1093, 1099 (¶26) (Miss. 2005) (acknowledging the requirement of an "additional element" of "showing that the defendant's acts were the proximate cause of the loss or damages suffered by the plaintiff"). We recognize that "[t]hese various elements need be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence." Collins , 625 So. 2d at 791.

¶14. Relevant to the case before us, we also note that the party alleging intentional interference with contract must prove "that the contract would have been performed but for the alleged interference." Levens , 733 So. 2d at 761 (¶27) (citing Par Indus. Inc. v. Target Container Co. , 708 So. 2d 44, 48 (¶8) (Miss. 1998) ). "A party to a contract cannot be charged with interfering with his own contract"; rather, "it is accepted that the wrongdoer is a ‘stranger’ to the contract which was interfered with—an outsider." Gulf Coast Hospice LLC v. LHC Grp. Inc ., 273 So. 3d 721, 745 (¶89) (Miss. 2019) (quoting Cenac v. Murry , 609 So. 2d 1257, 1269 (Miss. 1992) ). In the present case, Watkins must show that Oakes acted in such a way to cause Farmers Grain to stop performing under its employment contract with Watkins.

¶15. As stated, the trial court found that Watkins failed to meet his burden of showing that his at-will employment...