Watkins v. Shriners Hosps. for Children, Inc.

KRISSI WATKINS, Plaintiff, v. SHRINERS HOSPITALS FOR CHILDREN, INC., Defendant.

No. 5:18-CV-548-REW-MAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY CENTRAL DIVISION LEXINGTON

May 8, 2020

OPINION AND ORDER*** *** *** ***

Defendant Shriners Hospitals for Children, Inc., moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff Krissi Watkins's disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as amended, and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA). The KCRA, more narrowly defining a qualifying disability, affords Watkins no relief as a matter of law. Material fact disputes, however, prevent summary judgment on the federal claims. The Court thus grants the motion in part and denies it in part.

Would a charitable hospital, known for its beneficence toward disabled children, intentionally pull a job from a woman newly hired but newly diagnosed with invasive breast cancer? Would a woman, jobless and just diagnosed with invasive breast cancer, voluntarily turn away from a new job featuring immediate health insurance coverage? These difficult questions hinge not on rhetoric or reputation, but instead on evidence of record. In this case, a jury must sift the proof and make credibility determinations in a dispute offering often binary options on key issues.

A. Factual and Procedural Background

The Court views all proof and draws supported inferences in the light most favorable to non-movant Watkins. Plaintiff worked in various administrative support positions at the University of Kentucky (UK) Hospital from 2007 until 2018; from roughly 2015 to 2018, she served as an insurance specialist in the UK Department of Anesthesiology's Interventional Pain Associates Clinic, under the supervision of Brian Howell. DE #26-2 at 3-4 (Watkins Dep.);¹ id. at 43 (Howell Dep.). On January 26, 2018, Watkins notified Howell of her resignation from UK, with her final day being February 22, to seek a position in her degree field with greater advancement opportunity.² Id.; DE #26-3 (Resignation Letter). Five days later, Plaintiff applied for the open Revenue Cycle Coordinator position at Shriners. DE #26-4 (Employment Application); DE #26-2 at 4 (Watkins Dep.). Watkins interviewed with Shriners Revenue Cycle Manager Ambra Knoche via telephone in early February, and she attended an in-person interview with Knoche shortly afterward. DE #29-3 at 8, 15 (Knoche Dep.); DE #26-2 at 8-9 (Watkins Dep.). Knoche ultimately offered the position to Watkins, and Watkins accepted it, on or about February 5, 2018. DE #26-2 at 10.

Concerned about a potential lapse in benefits during the employment transition, Watkins subsequently scheduled a routine mammogram. Id. at 12-13 (Watkins Dep.). Unfortunately, the mammogram revealed a likely cancerous mass. Id. at 12-14. Watkins approached Howell toinquire whether she had any option of remaining in her position at UK, to permit health benefit continuity; Howell informed her that he would discuss the matter with his superiors. Id. at 14. On February 14, 2018, Knoche provided Watkins with a Shriners start date of February 26. Id. at 30. Later that day, after receiving biopsy results, Plaintiff's healthcare provider confirmed the breast cancer diagnosis.³ Id. Watkins then followed up with Howell, who advised that Watkins could not remain at UK. Id. at 14; id. at 55-56 (Howell Dep.).⁴ Plaintiff immediately called Knoche to discuss the situation. Id. at 14 (Watkins Dep.). [Much of the Watkins-Shriners interaction is contested; the Court largely traces Plaintiff's version, per Rule 56.] Knoche, ostensibly sympathetic, noted that she was not sure of Watkins's options regarding benefits or attendance flexibility, but would consult Human Resources (HR) and get back in touch with Watkins. Id. at 15 ("She said she didn't know the benefits or as far as the attendance, how that would work with me having to have treatment, that she was going to reach out to HR."); id. at 16 ("She told me that she didn't know how it would work about my position as far as me having this diagnosis, needing treatment, or the benefits and that she would look into it and get back with me."); DE #29-3 at 19 (Knoche Dep.) ("And she asked about benefits and I did not feel comfortable having that conversation because that's not my area of expertise. But I was happy to get a call set up with HRand we would be able to do that the next day . . ."); id. ("This was definitely something that was beyond what I could give her information on . . ."). Though Watkins did not yet have a cancer treatment plan in place, she told Knoche that she had an appointment set for February 27 (after the Shriners start date of February 26) to discuss it; Knoche reiterated that she could not guarantee that Watkins would be permitted time off of work (for the February 27 appointment or any other treatment), but she would consult HR. DE #26-2 at 28-29 (Watkins Dep.). Watkins described Knoche has making a "heavy sigh" at mention of the February 27 treatment-planning appointment. Id. at 28.

The following day (February 15), Knoche, Watkins, and Shriners HR Director Debra Felder had a three-way telephone conversation. DE #26-2 at 18 (Watkins Dep.). Knoche advised that she had discussed Watkins's diagnosis and situation with Felder and cautioned that, because Watkins would not qualify under Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) guidelines for ninety days and was hired for a "unique" position, she would not be permitted absences during that period; thus, per Knoche and Felder, if Watkins "needed to take more than three times off," Shriners "could not secure [her] position." Id. at 19; id. at 20 ("Debra [restated] the fact that the position was unique and that because of the FMLA guidelines and treatments that I wouldn't be allowed to take off without getting on probationary action."); id. ("I asked her what my options were. I said, I know that people work with cancer treatments all the time . . . And she reiterated the fact that if I had more than three occurrences that . . . she wouldn't feel comfortable telling me that I would be able to work there because of the disciplinary action."); see also id. at 22 ("I asked them how my treatments would affect my schedule, if I had to have treatments, how would it affect my schedule, what are their guidelines and rules."); id. at 40 (". . . I asked if I had to miss doctor's appointments and if I was going to treatments if I could still work for Shriners. And I was told thatif I missed more than three occurrences for appointments that . . . I could not have my position secured.").

After this discussion, Felder left the call, and Knoche and Watkins talked further about how to proceed. Id. at 20. Though Knoche suggested Watkins consider it overnight, Watkins, per her testimony, felt that she would be unable to comply with the three-absence policy—an unwavering requirement, as she understood it, of the job—given her upcoming expected treatment needs. Id. at 20-21 ("And then she said . . . [would] I think about it overnight? And I said, you are telling me that there's nothing else that I can do; your human resources person is telling me there's nothing else I can do.").⁵ Watkins, thus certain that Shriners would be unable to "secure" herposition in light of the cancer treatment, asked Knoche for advice on next steps. Knoche told her that, to be considered for positions at Shriners in the future, Watkins would need to formally rescind her acceptance of the Revenue Cycle Coordinator job offer. Id. at 37 ("She told me in the conversation with her when I asked her what I needed to do since she could not secure my position, her words were, you will have to rescind [acceptance of] the offer."); see also id. at 38. Based on this conversation, immediately following the February 15 call, Watkins emailed Knoche rescinding acceptance of the position. DE #26-7 (titled "Rescinding my position for Revenue Cycle Coordinator"). The email evinces Plaintiff's understanding that, due to her cancer treatments, she would not be able to keep the Revenue Cycle Coordinator position. Id. ("Per our conversation, I have recently been diagnosed with Invasive Ductal Carcinoma of my breast and will unfortunately need a series of treatments to overcome the diagnosis . . . I truly am saddened I will not get to work with you right away and represent the Shriner's Hospital brand."). Watkins further noted her interest in consideration for future Shriners positions. Id.

The cheery email tone did not last. Watkins soon filed an EEOC complaint over the alleged treatment by Shriners. Upon receipt of a right to sue letter, see DE #1-1 at 15, Plaintiff sued Shriners in Fayette Circuit Court, see id. at 5 (Complaint). Though Shriners argues otherwise, and the Complaint lacks ideal structural clarity, Watkins fairly asserted three causes of action, each under both the ADA and the KCRA—disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation.⁶ Shriners timely removed the case. DE #1 (Notice of Removal). Defendant now seekssummary judgment on all claims. DE #26 (Motion). Watkins responded in opposition, see DE #29, and Defendant replied, see DE #31.

B. Summary Judgment Framework

Summary judgment is proper where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court must construe the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from the underlying facts in favor of the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986); Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407, 414 (6th Cir. 2009). Courts may not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter" at the summary judgment stage. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). "The relevant inquiry is 'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so...