Watkins v. State

SHABAZZ WATKINS v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 104

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2019

June 30, 2020

Circuit Court for Howard County

Case No. C-13-CR-18-00478

UNREPORTED

Fader, C.J. Shaw Geter Greene, Clayton, Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Greene, J.

* This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 20, 2018, two officers of the Howard County Police Department, Stephen Vinias and John Beamer, observed several individuals, including Appellant, Shabazz Watkins, enter a red Dodge Charger in the parking lot of a Red Roof Inn on Route 1 in Jessup, Maryland. After leaving the parking lot, the vehicle headed northbound on Route 1 towards an "intersection." Prior to entering the intersection, the officers observed the vehicle cross the double yellow line into the southbound travel lanes of Route 1 in attempt to reach the left-hand turn lanes at the upcoming intersection.

In response, the officers activated the siren and lights on their patrol vehicle and performed a traffic stop on the Charger. Officer Vinias approached the driver side window of the vehicle and began talking to Ms. Stinson, the driver. Including Ms. Stinson, five individuals were inside the Charger. Mr. Watkins was sitting in the rear driver side passenger seat behind Ms. Stinson. Officer Vinias requested identification from Ms. Stinson, the front passenger, and Mr. Watkins.

In response to Officer Vinias' request for identification, Mr. Watkins produced a Division of Corrections ("DOC") identification card. While Officer Vinias was obtaining identification from those passengers, Officer Beamer received identification from the two remaining passengers. During the stop, the officers began to notice the smell of marijuana emanating from the Charger.

After obtaining identification from the occupants of the vehicle, Officer Beamer returned to the patrol vehicle and ran checks on the occupants' identities to ascertainwhether any of them had outstanding warrants, and Officer Vinias requested a marked patrol unit for assistance with the stop. Based on the checks Officer Beamer ran on the identities of the occupants of the Charger, he discovered that Ms. Stinson's license was suspended, and Mr. Watkins had a criminal record. Officer Beamer later testified that Mr. Watkins "had an extensive record [with regard] to firearm crime convictions and the like." In contrast, Officer Vinias testified that Officer Beamer told him that Mr. Watkins has a prior conviction for "robbery" or "armed robbery." Officer Vinias did not conduct his own independent checks into Mr. Watkins' background and relied on Officer Beamer's representations concerning Mr. Watkin's prior involvement with the criminal justice system.

Thereafter, the officers exited the patrol vehicle and returned to the Charger to conduct their investigation. The officers first asked Ms. Stinson to get out of the vehicle. According to the officers' later testimony, they intended to arrest Ms. Stinson for driving on a suspended license and to search the vehicle based on the smell of marijuana emanating from it. After Ms. Stinson got out of the vehicle, the officers had her sit at the nearby curb and, a uniformed police officer, Pfc. Girard, arrived at the scene. While Pfc. Girard stayed with Ms. Stinson, Officers Vinias and Beamer asked the remaining occupants to leave the Charger, and the occupants complied.

After removing the individual from the front passenger seat, Officer Vinias asked Mr. Watkins out of the vehicle and Mr. Watkins complied with his request. When Mr. Watkins exited the vehicle, Officer Vinias asked Mr. Watkins if he could pat him down forweapons. In response, Mr. Watkins exhaled making what the suppression court characterized as a "p-f-f-t-t" sound and raised or extended his arms.¹ While patting down Mr. Watkins, Officer Vinias felt an object tucked into Mr. Watkins' waistband that he believed to be a handgun. Upon further investigation by Officer Vinias, he realized that the object was—in fact—a handgun. Therefore, the officers seized the firearm and arrested Mr. Watkins. The officers searched the vehicle but did not recover any marijuana. The officers did not pat-down any other passengers and cited Ms. Stinson for driving on a suspended license but did not arrest her.

As a result, Mr. Watkins was charged in the Circuit Court for Howard County with several offenses relating to his possession of a firearm.² Before the circuit court, Mr. Watkins moved to suppress the firearm recovered by Officer Vinias, arguing that he did not consent to the pat-down and, alternatively, the officers lacked a reasonable articulatable suspicion that Mr. Watkins was armed and dangerous. After a hearing on Mr. Watkins' motion to suppress, presided over by the Honorable John J. Kuchno, the circuit court ("suppression court") denied Mr. Watkins' motion to suppress. The suppression courtfound that Mr. Watkins' conduct, in response to Officer Vinias' request to pat him down, constituted implied consent to the pat-down. The suppression court also found the pat down was supported by Officer Vinias' reasonable suspicion that Mr. Watkins was armed and dangerous.

The trial court found Mr. Watkins guilty of possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person and sentenced him to five years incarceration without the possibility of parole.³ Mr. Watkins appeals the circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the suppression court erred in finding that he consented to the search, and that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Watkins was armed and dangerous to justify the pat-down.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a suspect consented to a search is a question of fact. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2014, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). In the federal system, appellate courts review a trial court's findings of consent for clear error. United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010). Although the State maintains that we should affirm the trial court's finding of consent absent clear error, the applicable standard of review on this issue in Maryland is slightly more nuanced than that in the federal courts. Particularly, although we defer to the trial court's factual findings and accept those findings unless clearly erroneous, "we exercise free review over the lowercourt's determination of the constitutional significance of those facts." Turner v. State, 133 Md. App. 192, 202, 754 A.2d 1074, 1080 (2000).

Furthermore, where "the Fourth Amendment is implicated by State action, this Court makes an independent determination of whether the State has violated an individual's constitutional rights by applying the law to the facts." Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282-83, 753 A.2d 519, 525 (2000). We have explained that, under this standard,

when we say that we have the obligation to make an independent, reflective constitutional judgment on the facts whenever a claim of a constitutionally-protected right is involved [we mean] that, although we give great weight to the findings of the hearing judge as to specific, first-level facts (such as the time an interrogation began, whether a meal was or was not served, whether a telephone call was requested, etc.) we must make our own independent judgment as to what to make of those facts; we must, in making that independent judgment, resolve for ourselves the ultimate, second-level fact—the existence or non-existence of voluntariness.

Turner, 133 Md. App. at at 202-03, 754 A.2d at 1080 (alterations in original) (quoting Walker v. State, 12 Md. App. 684, 280 A.2d 260, 265-66 (1971)). When reviewing a circuit court's denial of a defendant's motion to suppress, "we consider the facts as found by the trial court, and the reasonable inferences from those facts, in the light most favorable to the State." Cartnail, 359 Md. at 282, 753 A.2d at 525 (citing Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999)). Therefore, we review these facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the State.

ANALYSIS

Mr. Watkins Consented to the Pat-down

Mr. Watkins first argues that the circuit court erred in finding that he consented to the pat-down. He contends that his conduct, responding to Officer Vinias' request to pat him down by emitting a "p-f-f-t-t" sound and raising his arms, was merely an expression of resignation that demonstrates his submission to Officer Vinias' commands. In contrast, the State contends that the suppression court was not clearly erroneous in finding that Mr. Watkins impliedly consented to the pat-down. Mr. Watkins does not contest the legality of his detention prior to the pat-down.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States' Constitution, applicable to the states through incorporation by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]" See also Sellman v. State, 449 Md. 526, 539-40, 114 A.3d 771, 779 (2016) (discussing the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the states (citing Holt v. State, 435 Md. 443, 458, 78 A.3d 415, 523 (2013)). Under the exclusionary rule, "a judicially imposed sanction for violations of the Fourth Amendment[,]" a trial court must generally suppress evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261, 282, 909 A.2d 1048, 1060 (2006); Sizer v. State, 456 Md. 350, 364, 174 A.3d 326, 334 (2017) ("courts are required to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search or seizure."). The rule is intended to deter law enforcement officers from engaging in unconstitutional searches and seizures. Myers, 395 Md. at 282, 909...