Watley v. Dep't of Children & Families

JOSEPH WATLEY and KARIN HASEMANN, Plaintiffs, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, JOETTE KATZ, andVANNESSA DORANTES, Defendants.

CASE NO. 3:13-cv-1858(RNC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

December 23, 2019

RULING AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Joseph Watley and Karin Hasemann bring this action against the Connecticut Department of Children & Families ("DCF), former DCF Commissioner Joette Katz, and current Commissioner Vanessa Dorantes, claiming that DCF took custody of their children, and ultimately obtained a final court order terminating their parental rights, in violation of federal laws protecting persons with disabilities. The action has been remanded following sua sponte dismissal of the original complaint, which was filed pro se. See ECF Nos. 9 (dismissing case), 22 (order of Second Circuit vacating and remanding). The amended complaint, prepared by counsel, alleges violations of the plaintiffs' rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134; the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), 29 U.S.C. § 794; and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, made enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs seek money damages to redress DCF's alleged intentional discrimination and failure to provide reasonable accommodations. In addition, they seek injunctive relief requiring DCF to adopt certain institutional reforms.¹

Plaintiffs commenced this action in federal district court after more than a decade of litigation in the trial and appellate courts of Connecticut, including five neglect trials, four termination of parental rights ("TPR") trials, and three appeals. Published decisions of state trial and appellate courts in the underlying proceedings frame the present action.See In re Joseph W., Jr., 53 Conn. Supp. 1 (2013)(describing procedural history in detail).² The decisions show the following:

- DCF obtained orders of temporary custody with regard to plaintiffs' children soon after each was born on the ground that the children would be in immediate physical danger if they were left in plaintiffs' care;

- DCF's subsequent actions affecting plaintiffs' parental rights were undertaken in conjunction with court ordersrequiring plaintiffs to take certain specific steps to regain custody;

- the court-ordered steps and their implementation took account of the requirement in the applicable state statute that DCF make "reasonable efforts" to reunite a parent and child, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-112(j);

- the reasonable efforts requirement in state law aligns with federal law, which prohibits a state from seeking to terminate parental rights without first making reasonable efforts to preserve the family, as required by the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1980), and the Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1997);

- the reasonable efforts requirement under state law requires DCF to consider a parent's disabilities, including mental disabilities;

- in the course of the proceedings leading to termination of plaintiffs' parental rights ("TPR proceedings"), both plaintiffs denied having any disability and resisted having to cooperate with DCF and comply with court-ordered specific steps;

- plaintiffs asserted that the removal of the children from their custody constituted discrimination based on their perceived disabilities in violation of the ADA, that their lawyers were ineffective in failing to adequately presentdefenses under the ADA, and that an "ADA coordinator" should be present throughout court proceedings;

- plaintiffs were not given an ADA coordinator but they were given additional time and other assistance to meet the court-ordered steps and, on this basis, DCF was found to have met the reasonable efforts requirement before plaintiffs' parental rights were terminated.

Pending for decision is defendants' motion to dismiss all the claims in the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). Defendants contend that the claims for damages are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,³ collateral estoppel, the statute of limitations, sovereign immunity and qualified immunity. They further contend that plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief. Discovery has been stayed at the request of the defendants over plaintiffs' objection pending a determination of whether plaintiffs have any legal basis on which they can proceed.

In opposing dismissal of the amended complaint, plaintiffs emphasize that before their parental rights were terminated, they were denied the assistance of an ADA coordinator. They contend that the denial violated Title II of the ADA, which provides, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, byreason of such disability, be excluded from participation or denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. When plaintiffs requested an ADA coordinator, DCF took the position that Title II of the ADA did not apply in child protection proceedings, which was a common view, if not the prevailing view, at the time. See Michael Lanci, Note, In the Child's Best Interests? Rethinking Consideration of Physical Disability in Child Custody Disputes, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 875, 883 n.51 (2018) (citing In re Adoption of Gregory, 747 N.E.2d 120, 124 (Mass. 2001); In re Doe, 60 P.3d 285, 290-91 (Haw. 2002)).⁴ The state trial court agreed with DCF that the ADA did not "create[] special obligations in a child protection proceeding." In re Joseph W., 2011 WL 5842570, at *5. Plaintiffs sought appellate review of this issue without success. In re Joseph W., 305 Conn. at 653 ("[W]e reject the ADA claim of the father . . . ."); In re Joseph W., 146 Conn. App. at 476 (rejecting the ADA claim of the mother).

In the amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that during the period 2002 to 2013, DCF violated the antidiscrimination provision of the ADA by removing their children, and laterseeking termination of their parental rights, based on discredited stereotypes about the parenting ability of persons with mental disabilities. They also contend that DCF violated the ADA by failing to provide them with reasonable accommodations enabling them to regain custody. Because no state court squarely addressed these claims in the underlying proceedings, plaintiffs submit that they should be able to litigate them here.

Defendants argue that plaintiffs cannot obtain relief on the claims in the amended complaint without asking this court to review and reject decisions made by the state courts. Defendants' assessment is accurate. A final termination of parental rights cannot occur unless a state court makes certain findings, including the crucial finding that "reasonable efforts" to achieve reunification have been made by the state with due regard for the parent's disabilities. A claim in federal court that parental rights have been unlawfully terminated due to discrimination on the basis of disability necessarily asks the federal court to review the state court's decision and either vacate it or award damages or both. But few principles are as firmly established as the rule that prohibits federal district courts from reviewing decisions of state courts. In our system of state and federal courts, the only federal court empowered to review state court decisions is theUnited States Supreme Court. This rule applies even when the state court has incorrectly decided an issue of federal law.

I recognize the profoundly serious nature of the harm for which plaintiffs seek redress. I also appreciate the role and responsibility of the federal district court in ensuring access to a federal trial proceeding for persons whose federal rights have been violated by state officials. Nevertheless, I conclude that the amended complaint must be dismissed.

The primary obstacle to adjudication of the claims in the amended complaint is the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which provides that federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review state court judgments. Plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating that subject matter jurisdiction exists, notwithstanding Rooker-Feldman. To meet this burden, it must be shown that they can obtain relief on the claims in the amended complaint without this court effectively reviewing and rejecting a state court decision. Unquestionably, had the state courts squarely confronted the claims in the amended complaint and rejected them on the merits, this court would lack jurisdiction to review those decisions. It is no different when, as here, the state courts rejected the ADA claims in substance.

Not all of DCF's actions were undertaken pursuant to a court order, so Rooker-Feldman is not a complete bar to the claims in the amended complaint. But other obstacles preventplaintiffs from proceeding on these claims: collateral estoppel bars relitigation of issues decided in state court; most of the actions complained of fall well outside the three-year statute of limitations; plaintiffs' claim for damages under § 1983 is unsupported by allegations necessary to state a claim for relief against former Commissioner Katz and cannot be maintained in any event because of qualified immunity; and plaintiffs lack standing to pursue injunctive relief. Accordingly, the amended complaint will be dismissed.

I. Background

Plaintiffs are the biological parents of two sons, Joseph Jr. and Daniel. Ms. Hasemann is also the biological mother of a daughter, Kristina. DCF is the state agency responsible for responding to reports of child abuse and neglect, providing substitute care, and making efforts to reunite families before resorting to termination proceedings. Defendant Katz served as Commissioner of DCF from February 2011 to January 2019. Defendant Dorantes has been Commissioner of DCF since February 2019.⁵

Between 2002 and 2013, DCF pursued neglect and termination proceedings against the plaintiffs, ultimately resulting in thetermination of Ms. Hasemann's parental...