Watson v. Annucci

CHARLES WATSON, Petitioner, v. ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, Acting Commissioner,New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision,¹ Respondent.

No. 9:14-cv-00638-JKS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

October 14, 2015

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Charles Watson, also known as Jean Bernier, a former New York state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On January 16,1992, a jury convicted Watson of first-degree robbery, second-degree robbery, second-degree criminal possession of a weapon, and third-degree criminal possession of a weapon, and the New York Appellate Division affirmed his conviction on appeal. People v. Watson, 613 N.Y.S.2d 613 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). At the time Watson filed his Petition and throughout briefing in this case, Watson was in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") and incarcerated at Auburn Correctional Facility. The DOCCS's inmate locator website (http://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/, Department ID Number 03-A-2302), indicates that Watson was discharged from state custody on June 18, 2015, the maximum expiration date of his state sentence. The record before this Court indicates that Watson is now in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons("BOP") and incarcerated at FCI Allenwood (BOP Register Number 29463-054). Respondent has answered, and Watson has replied.

I. BACKGROUND/PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

On October 1, 2011, while in state confinement, Watson was charged with using drugs in violation of Institutional Rule 113.24. According to the report and accompanying documents, Watson was randomly selected to provide a urine sample that subsequently tested positive for THC.

On October 17, 2011, Hearing Officer Claude Schneider conducted a Tier III disciplinary hearing.² Officer Schneider read the misbehavior report into the record, and Watson pleaded not guilty to the charge. He acknowledged that he had been served prior to the hearing with a copy of the misbehavior report, the request for urinalysis form, the urinalysis test procedure forms, the test results, and Appendix C for the drug testing system. He also confirmed that he understood that he could present witnesses and evidence at the hearing and that he could make procedural objections and defenses that would be considered by the hearing officer. He further stated that he waived assistance during the hearing.

When given the opportunity to make a statement, Watson indicated that, although his urinalysis request form listed the reason for his test as "random," it was the second time in two months that he had been subject to random urine testing and he had never previously been randomly tested during his 21 years of confinement. Watson requested documentation on the procedures used by the Albany Central Office for selecting inmates for random urinalysis testingas well as a list of inmates also asked to provide a urine sample. The hearing officer noted that some facilities may test more frequently than others but agreed to adjourn the hearing so that he could contact the Albany office to see if the requested documents were available to be turned over to Watson.

Roughly two hours later, the hearing was re-convened. Officer Schneider explained that he had contacted the Albany office and was told that inmates were not permitted to review the selection procedures used for random drug tests. Watson stated that he believed he was being harassed by prison staff and may have been deliberately subjected to the test. The hearing officer assured Watson that the test was ordered randomly through the Albany office and that prison staff had no control over the procedures utilized by the Albany office. Watson offered no further evidence or argument.

Shortly thereafter, Officer Schneider relied on the misbehavior report and the drug testing documents to find Watson guilty of drug use in violation of Rule 113.24. Officer Schneider imposed a penalty of 3 months' confinement in SHU, 3 months' loss of packages, 3 months' loss of commissary, and 3 months' loss of phone privileges. He also recommended 3 months' loss of good time credit.

Watson then filed a pro se administrative appeal to the Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS"), arguing that he was denied the opportunity to properly formulate a defense when the hearing officer erroneously denied him the requested documentary evidence. On December 2, 2011, the hearing officer's disposition was affirmed.

On December 12, 2011, Watson, proceeding pro se, initiated an Article 78 proceeding in county court, challenging the result of his Tier III hearing. Upon the People's request, thecounty court ordered the petition transferred to the Appellate Division. In his brief to the Appellate Division, Watson renewed his claim that DOCCS improperly denied him access to copies of their Performance Review Function Manual and the October 7, 2011, list of inmates selected for random drug testing.³ The Appellate Division affirmed the Tier III disciplinary determination in a reasoned opinion issued on July 3, 2013. In re Watson v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Comm. Supervision, 971 N.Y.S. 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). The appellate court held that, to the extent Watson's claim could be construed as challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, such claim was meritless because the misbehavior reports, hearing testimony, and relevant documentation supported the drug use charge. Id. The court likewise rejected Watson's procedural claim, finding no basis to disturb the hearing court's ruling that Watson was not entitled to copies of the Performance Review Function Manual and the list of inmates selected for random drug testing. Watson filed a pro se application for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals the denial of his procedural claim, which was summarily denied on May 6, 2014. In re Watson v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Comm. Supervision, 10 N.E.3d 191 (N.Y. 2014). Watson timely filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to this Court on May 28, 2014.

II. GROUNDS RAISED

In his pro se Petition before this Court, Watson challenges his prison disciplinary determination, arguing that his due process rights were violated because he was denied the rightto present a defense at his Tier III disciplinary hearing when the hearing officer refused his request for certain documentary evidence.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," § 2254(d)(2). A state-court decision is contrary to federal law if the state court applies a rule that contradicts controlling Supreme Court authority or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision" of the Supreme Court, but nevertheless arrives at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000).

To the extent that the Petition raises issues of the proper application of state law, they are beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 863 (2011) (per curiam) (holding that it is of no federal concern whether state law was correctly applied). It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism that the states possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (a federal habeas court cannot reexamine a state court's interpretation and application of state law); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (presuming that the state court knew and correctly applied state law), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Under the AEDPA, the state court's findings of fact are presumed to be correctunless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

In applying these standards on habeas review, this Court reviews the "last reasoned decision" by the state court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Jones v. Stinson, 229 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 2000). Where there is no reasoned decision of the state court addressing the ground or grounds raised on the merits and no independent state grounds exist for not addressing those grounds, this Court must decide the issues de novo on the record before it. See Dolphy v. Mantello, 552 F.3d 236, 239-40 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Spears v. Greiner, 459 F.3d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 2006)); cf. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 530-31 (2003) (applying a de novo standard to a federal claim not reached by the state court). In so doing, the Court presumes that the state court decided the claim on the merits and the decision rested on federal grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 740 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989); see also Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining the Harris-Coleman interplay); Fama v. Comm'r of Corr. Servs., 235 F.3d 804, 810-11 (2d Cir. 2000) (same). This Court gives the presumed decision of the state court the same AEDPA deference that it would give a reasoned decision of the state court. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784-85 (2011) (rejecting the argument that a summary disposition was not entitled to § 2254(d) deference); Jimenez, 458 F.3d at 145-46.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Mootness

Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution requires the existence of a case or controversy through all stages of federal judicial proceedings. This means that, throughout...