Watson v. Borough of Susquehanna

LAURA WATSON Plaintiff

v.BOROUGH OF SUSQUEHANNA, et al., Defendants

3:09-CV-294

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Filed: October 23, 2012

(JUDGE MARIANI)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Before the Court is Defendants' renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. 134) and all accompanying briefs. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion.

II. Procedural History

Trial commenced in this case on April 30, 2012. At the close of Plaintiffs case-in-chief, Defendants' attorney, Mr. Murphy, moved for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL"), but the Court deferred ruling on the motion. At the close of the Defendants' case-in-chief and at the close of all the evidence, Attorney Murphy renewed the motion, and again, the Court deferred ruling on it. Following the jury's return of a verdict, Defendants' attorney once more renewed the motion and alternatively requested a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. (Doc. 134).

On May 7, 2012, a jury rendered a verdict in favor of Defendant Matis and Defendant Borough of Susquehanna, but rendered a partial verdict against Defendant Perry, Jr. on Plaintiff's claim of First Amendment retaliation with respect to her testimony against Defendant Perry, Jr.'s father at an unrelated criminal hearing. The jury awarded Plaintiff $5,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive damages with respect to this constitutional violation.

III. Statement of Facts¹

Until her termination in September 2008, Plaintiff Laura Watson had been a police officer with the Borough of Susquehanna since September 2006. (Watson testimony, Tr. Trans., Doc. 145, 114:14-115:5). On July 14, 2008, as part of her duties, she testified against Defendant Perry, Jr.'s father at a preliminary hearing in a criminal case. (Id. at 139:3-16). Defendant Perry, Jr. was present for at least a portion of the preliminary hearing. (Id. at 139:12-16). Following the charges being bound over for trial (id. at 139:18-19), Perry, Sr. pled guilty to the charge of false reports on August 28, 2008. (Watson testimony, Tr. Trans., Doc. 146, 8:9-11).

Shortly afterwards, on September 9, 2008, Plaintiff learned that her Section 8 housing assistance form had been "passed . . . around" at a "special" Council meeting. (Id. at 12:6-9). The next day, she found that same form "right on the phone [at the station], open to any police officer to view." (Id. at 12:18-19). She confronted the BoroughSecretary-Treasurer, Ann Stewart, about the disclosure of this "private" information. (Id. at 13:11-14:13). Stewart testified that the reason for this "disclosure" was that Plaintiff's time card indicated she was on duty when she was at the Housing Authority office attending to personal business, and because part of Stewart's duties as Secretary-Treasurer involved payroll, she brought the matter to Defendant Matis's attention. (Stewart testimony, Tr. Trans., Doc. 147, 15:16-20; 16:23-17:13; 18:11-24:24). Multiple witnesses testified that this confrontation grew heated and angry, including threats by Plaintiff against Stewart and Stewart's husband. (Id. at 27:7-28:22; see also Collier testimony, Tr. Trans., Doc. 146, 111:25-113:18; Def. Ex. 23). At another special meeting of the Council on September 17th, Plaintiff again protested the distribution of her form to Borough Council members. (Watson testimony, Tr. Trans., Doc. 146, 15:3-5; 54:1-55:10). Again, multiple witnesses testified that Plaintiff was extremely angry and threatened Council members. (See, e.g., Scales testimony, Tr. Trans., Doc. 147, 87:1-88:7; Dewitt testimony, 115:21-116:11; Iveson, Jr. testimony, 225:23-226:14). She was terminated by letter later that month. (Watson testimony, Tr. Trans., Doc. 146, at 56:10-15).

Plaintiff argued that because of these two instances of protected free speech,² the Borough Council, acting on behalf of Defendant Borough of Susquehanna, Defendant Michael Matis (President), and Defendant William Perry, Jr. (Vice-President) retaliated against her by terminating her employment in violation of her First Amendment rights. Shealso alleged that she was terminated in violation of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law. 43 P.S. §§ 1421-1428.

After hearing all the evidence, the jury found that Defendant Matis had been aware of Plaintiff's testimony against William Perry, Sr. and had been influenced by that knowledge when he voted to terminate Plaintiff's employment with the Borough. (Sp. Verd. Form, Doc. 122, ¶¶ 1-2). However, the jury further found that he would have made the same decision regardless of whether Plaintiff had testified against William Perry, Sr. (Id. at ¶ 3). The jury also found that none of the other four Borough Council members who had voted to terminate Plaintiff's employment had been aware of Plaintiff's testimony against Perry, Sr. (Id. at ¶ 21). Thus, the jury found that of all the Council members who had voted to terminate Plaintiff's employment, only Defendant Perry, Jr. had been motivated by retaliatory reasons (for Plaintiff's testimony against his father), and that he would not have made the same decision to vote to terminate her in the absence of such protected speech. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-13). The jury found in favor of all Defendants on Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim with respect to her report of the disclosure of her private financial information, as well as Plaintiff's state law whistleblower claim. (See id.).

IV, Analysis

Standard of Review

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1):

If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiarybasis to find for the party on that issue, the court may: (A) resolve the issue against the party; and (B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.

If a court declines to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a), a party may renew its motion after trial under Rule 50(b), wherein "the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion." A motion for judgment as a matter of law "should be granted only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no question of material fact for the jury and any verdict other than the one directed would be erroneous under the governing law." McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359,364 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Although judgment as a matter of law should be granted sparingly, it is appropriately granted when "the record is critically deficient of the minimum quantum of evidence in support of the verdict. The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the unsuccessful party, but whether there is evidence upon which a reasonable jury could properly have found its verdict." Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426, 433 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In conducting its inquiry, the court "must refrain from weighing the evidence, determining the credibility of witnesses, or substituting our own version of the facts for that of the jury." Id.

First Amendment Retaliation Claim

To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) that she engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the governmentresponded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity caused the retaliation. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139,147 (3d Cir. 2010) It is only intuitive that for protected conduct to be a substantial or motiving factor in a decision, the decisionmakers must be aware of the protected conduct." Ambrose v. Twp. of Robinson, 303 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2002).

Previously, Judge Munley held that Plaintiff's testimony at Defendant Perry, Sr.'s preliminary hearing constituted protected activity. (Doc. 47, at 10) (citing Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1291 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996) ("courtroom testimony . . . raises the speech to a level of public concern regardless of its content, which in turn affords otherwise unprotected speech First Amendment protection.").³ Furthermore, it is undisputed that Plaintiff suffered an adverse action in the form of termination from her employment. However, the jury expressly found that of the six Borough Council members who voted to terminate Plaintiff's employment, four members⁴ were unaware that she had testified against Perry, Sr. (Sp. Verd. Form, ¶ 21). That is, only Defendants Matis and Perry, Jr. were found to have been aware of Plaintiff's protected speech. Furthermore, though the jury found that Defendant Matis was aware of Plaintiff's protected speech and was substantially motivated by it when voting to terminate Plaintiff's employment, he would have made the same decision even if the protected speech had never occurred. (Id. at ¶¶ 1-3). Therefore, the jury determined that only Defendant Perry, Jr. was aware of Plaintiff's protected speech, was substantiallymotivated by it, and would not have made the same decision to vote to terminate her in the absence of such protected speech. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-13).

Therefore, the critical question becomes whether Plaintiff established a causal link between her protected speech and subsequent termination through Defendant Perry, Jr.'s vote to terminate her employment. Though there does not appear to be controlling Third Circuit precedent,⁵ the Second Circuit has provided valuable guidance on this precise issue. "[I]f a majority of defendants prove that their individual votes against the plaintiff would have been the same" regardless "of the plaintiff's protected conduct, then the defendants as a group cannot be held liable, and no individual defendant, even one whose proof falls short, can be so held...