Watson v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

1

BENJAMIN WATSON, JR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, Defendant.

No. 3:21cv329-MCR-ZCB

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Pensacola Division

March 30, 2024

ORDER

M CASEY RODGERS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This suit arises out of a terrorist attack at Naval Air Station Pensacola (“NAS Pensacola”) on December 6, 2019. On that date, Mohammad Saeed Al-Shamrani, a Second Lieutenant in the Royal Saudi Air Force (“RSAF”), went on a shooting rampage murdering three United States Navy servicemembers and severely injuring four United States Navy servicemembers, a Navy civil servant, seven Escambia County Sheriff's deputies plus a member of the Department of Defense Police Force, and injuring other first responders as well. The shooting rampage stopped only after Al-Shamrani was shot and killed by the return gunfire and bravery of the responding officers.

Plaintiffs-the surviving victims of the attack and representatives of the deceased servicemembers-brought this 19-count suit under various federal and state terrorism-related statutes and Florida common law against Defendant Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (“Saudi Arabia”) and unnamed officials.^[1]Saudi Arabia filed a motion to dismiss invoking its sovereign immunity by asserting both facial and factual challenges to the Amended Complaint. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1); ECF No. 46. As a foreign state, Saudia Arabia is presumed immune from suit in United States' courts under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), see 28 U.S.C. § 1604, and consequently, a specific statutory exception to immunity must apply in order for federal jurisdiction to exist. Plaintiffs asserted four FSIA statutory exceptions in the Amended Complaint and in response to the motion to dismiss: (1) the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”) exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605B; (2) noncommercial torts exception, § 1605(a)(5); (3) commercial activity exception, § 1605(a)(2); and (4) the exception for waiver, § 1605(a)(1). ECF No. 39. Plaintiffs also requested jurisdictional discovery. See ECF No. 43.

The undersigned referred the motion to dismiss to the assigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) and referred the request for jurisdictional discovery for disposition by order. The Magistrate Judge held oral argument and entered an R&R recommending that the undersigned grant the motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity and deny discovery. See Watson v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Case No. 3:21cv329/MCR/ZCB, ECF No. 54, 2023 WL 4047586, at *1 (N.D. Fla. May 11, 2023). Plaintiffs objected, and Saudi Arabia has responded. See ECF Nos. 57, 65.

When reviewing a magistrate judge's R&R on a dispositive matter, the Court reviews de novo all aspects to which a party has specifically objected and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny's, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1245 (11th Cir. 2007) (“the district court is generally free to employ the magistrate judge's findings to the extent that it sees fit”). Objections to a nondispositive order, such as the denial of the request for discovery, are reviewed for clear error. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). The undersigned has made a de novo determination of all timely filed objections to the R&R and reviewed objections to the denial of discovery for clear error.^[2] For reasons that follow, the undersigned agrees that the motion to dismiss should be granted and discovery denied.

I. Factual Background

The Magistrate Judge's Summary of Factual Allegations accurately lays out the events leading up to the attack, the attack itself, and subsequent events and is adopted without objection and incorporated into this Order by reference. Nonetheless, to facilitate a discussion of the parties' objections, this Order provides an overview of the allegations stated in the Amended Complaint.

At the time of Al-Shamrani's attack, he was a member of the RSAF. He was also, as United States officials later determined, affiliated with al Qaeda^[3]in the Arabian Peninsula (“AQAP”), an organization designated by the United States Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Al-Shamrani carried out the attack wearing his RSAF uniform and while attending military and flight training at NAS Pensacola. Plaintiffs allege that this training was provided through a Security Cooperation Education and Training Program and is critical to Saudi Arabia's purchase of military defense equipment from the United States.^[4] The Amended Complaint alleges that this is a standard “commercial contract” between the United States and a foreign state, as shown by the terms of a standard form Letters of Request, Offer, and Acceptance (“LOA”), which states that United States' laws and regulations apply and that the foreign country agrees to indemnify and hold the United States Government and its agents or officers harmless from any loss or liability (in tort or contract) that might arise in connection with the agreement. ECF No. 5 ¶¶ 50-54. According to the Amended Complaint, Saudi Arabia is the United States' largest foreign purchaser of military equipment.

Plaintiffs allege that Al-Shamrani “underwent extensive vetting” when he joined the RSAF in 2015 and by then, he was already radicalized in his religious jihadism and anti-American and anti-Jewish ideology.^[5]They further allege that Saudi Arabia knew of Al-Shamrani's anti-American sentiments because he was active on Twitter and “regularly posted his radical fundamental ideology on his social media accounts” but nevertheless allowed him to join the RSAF and sent him to the United States for flight training. ECF No. 5 at ¶¶ 134-150. The Amended Complaint also alleges that Al-Shamrani told friends when he joined the RSAF that he had been chosen to undergo a “special mission.” ECF No. 5 at ¶ 134.

Al Shamrani began his aviation training at NAS Pensacola in May 2018. John Doe 1 was the RSAF Country Liaison Officer (“CLO”) responsible for supervising Al-Shamrani at NAS Pensacola. It is alleged that in July 2019, while in the United States, Al-Shamrani purchased the weapon used in the December 2019 attack and possessed it on base in violation of the policies of both countries. The Amended Complaint alleges in conclusory terms that the CLO “was aware that Al-Shamrani had a weapon on base in violation” of policy and “was aware of Al-Shamrani's planned attack.”^[6]On September 11, 2019, Al-Shamrani announced on social media that “the countdown has begun.”^[7] ECF No. 5 at ¶ 160. According to the Amended sponsored indoctrination into jihadism, but there is no allegation that the Saudi government is engaged in terrorist activities or actively recruits terrorists for such activity.

Complaint, within a matter of days after Al-Shamrani's social media “countdown” statement, the CLO “abandoned his post” (approximately three months before the attack) and returned to Saudi Arabia. ECF No. 5 ¶¶ 39(b), 157. The CLO position was not filled again until January 2020-after the December 2019 attack. On February 2, 2020, AQAP took responsibility for the attack.^[8]

The United States Navy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) each conducted investigations after the attack and issued reports with findings within a short period, some of which are referenced in the Amended Complaint. Namely, Plaintiffs state that the FBI had determined by January 13, 2020, that Al-Shamrani's December 6 attack was an act of terrorism motivated by jihadist ideology.^[9]And they point to the Navy Command Investigation Report (“Navy Report”) (February 21, 2020), which found that the CLO had a duty to be present on base, and his absence from the base and failure to supervise Al-Shamrani was a “contributing factor” leading to the operational success of the attack. Id. at ¶¶ 173, 183. According to the Navy Report, had the CLO been present from September to December 2019, he “may have provided 2nd Lt. Al-Shamrani with better oversight and resulted in proactive intervention by [Saudi Arabia] prior to the attack.”^[10]Id. at ¶ 184. On May 18, 2020, the Attorney General announced publicly that the FBI had successfully unlocked Al-Shamrani's phones, which revealed that he had been radicalized years before joining the RSAF and had been in direct communication with AQAP up until the night before the attack.^[11]

Following the incident, twenty-one Saudi trainees were found to have possessed “derogatory material”^[12]unbecoming an officer and were immediately returned to Saudi Arabia on assurance to the Attorney General that he would have “full access” to anyone he wanted to interview in the investigation and the cadets would be returned for trial if charged. Id. at ¶ 324. It is further alleged that during discussions between the United States and Saudi Arabia after the incident, Saudi Arabia agreed to “cooperate fully in the investigation and compensate the victims for its employees' attack.”^[13]Id. at ¶ 594. Plaintiffs characterize these statements as an oral contract between the two countries requiring Saudi Arabia to fully cooperate in legal proceedings in the United States and to compensate victims, which they say Saudi Arabia allegedly breached by failing to even engage with Plaintiffs.

II. DISCUSSION

The Magistrate Judge recommended finding that Plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie case as to any one of the FSIA exceptions raised and also denied Plaintiffs' request for jurisdictional discovery. Plaintiffs object on numerous grounds, arguing that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly shifted the burden of production to them, which in turn led to him to improperly deny them jurisdictional discovery, and also erred in various...