Watson v. Morris

SPARKY D. WATSON PETITIONER

v.TIMOTHY MORRIS, et al. RESPONDENTS

NO. 3:10CV106-M-A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI WESTERN DIVISION

Dated August 1, 2011

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This cause comes before the court on the petition of Sparky D. Watson, inmate number 131771, for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After due consideration, the court finds that petition should be denied.

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Sparky Watson was convicted of the sale of marijuana (Count I) and the sale of cocaine (Count II) in the Circuit Court of Grenada County. He was sentenced in Count I to serve three years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections and, in Count II, to a term of twenty years to be served concurrently. The Mississippi Supreme Court denied Watson's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Watson then sought a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court which was denied on March 1, 2010. Next, Watson filed an application for permission to seek post-conviction collateral relief in the Mississippi Supreme Court which was denied on August 4, 2010. Finally, Watson filed this, his federal habeas petition asserting six grounds for relief.¹

In his own words, Watson argues:

Ground One The state courts' erred in their review of Watson's case on the merits because there was insufficient evidence to support the state courts' decisions.

Ground Two Watson was denied a fair trial when information about a crime not charged in the indictment was released.

Ground Three Watson was denied a fair trial when state's witness was allowed to testify regarding a later "P.C." buy.

Ground Four Watson's counsel was ineffective during trial.

Ground Five Watson's indictment was defective in that it failed to correctly identify the purchaser of the drugs and contained false statements.

Ground Six Watson was denied due process and a right to a fair trial based on evidence that the detectives in his case were unreliable.

B. Limitations on Review

Consideration of a federal petition for habeas corpus is a two-tiered procedure. Before considering the merits of any claim the court must first determine if all procedural steps necessary to preserve each issue raised for federal review have been taken. First, the petition must be timely filed. Secondly, each claim in the petition must have been exhausted. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A claim is deemed exhausted if it has been presented to the highest court in the state, here the Mississippi Supreme Court, either on direct appeal or by post-conviction proceedings. If the claim is exhausted the court generally proceeds to the merits. If the claim is not exhausted and state postconviction relief is no longer available, the claim will be finally dismissed. Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 416 (5th Cir. 1995).

Petitioners must also meet state requirements in the state court proceedings. If the state court, pursuant to its regularly enforced rules and procedures, refuses to consider an issue on the merits because of a procedural violation, the federal courts will almost never consider the procedurally defaulted claim. Sayre v. Anderson, 238 F.3d 631, 634 (5th Cir. 2001). To avoid the bar of aprocedural default, the petitioner must show "cause and prejudice" or that a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" will result if the court refuses to entertain the petition. Moawad v. Anderson, 143 F.3d 942, 947 (5th Cir. 1998). If all the procedures have been followed in state court, the federal courts will then address issues affecting substantial federal constitutional rights.

The federal courts do not function as super appellate courts over the states and hold no supervisory authority over those courts. The federal courts may not correct errors of state law unless they also violate the constitutional rights of an accused. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221, 102 S.Ct. 940, 948, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78 (1981); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 121, n.21, 102 S.Ct. 1558, n.21, 71 L. Ed. 783 (1982).

Even in matters affecting fundamental constitutional rights the federal courts have a very limited scope of review. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:

(D) An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

The federal courts may not disturb the legal holdings of the state courts even if convinced they are erroneous. The federal courts may intervene only if the application of federal law is also objectively unreasonable. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000). The statute presumes each factual finding by the state court is correct. These findings can be disturbed only if the petitioner rebuts the presumption with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

C. Discussion

Ground One: Insufficient Evidence

In support of Ground One, Watson argues that the trial court erred in its review of his case on the merits because its decision was not supported by accurate facts. Specifically, Walker claims that conflicts between a witness's testimony and other reports confused the jury and prejudiced his case.

Watson admits that he did not exhaust this claim by presenting it to the Mississippi Supreme Court, either on direct appeal or post-conviction proceedings. If a claim is not exhausted and state post-conviction relief is no longer available, the claim will be finally dismissed. Sones, 61 F.3d at 416. By failing to raise the allegations on appeal or post-conviction proceedings, Watson waived the opportunity to have the state courts review the claim. Watson, therefore, has defaulted on this claim and it will be dismissed.

Ground Two: Introduction of Crime Not Charged in Indictment

Watson claims that he was denied a fair trial when videotape evidence regarding an attempted sell of drugs² - which was not charged in the indictment- was allowed to be presented. He further complains that a cautionary instruction should have been given.³

The first claim to be considered is the videotape depicting an earlier attempt to sell drugs which was not charged in the indictment. The Mississippi Court of Appeals considered this claim on direct appeal and held that the trial court did not commit any error by admitting that portion of the videotape. Watson v. State, 19 So.3d 747, 749-50 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). The Due Process Clause only affords relief in habeas cases where the state's rulings on state law are "so egregious that they render the trial fundamentally unfair." Gonzales v. Thaler, 10-20019, 2011 WL 2305960 (5th Cir. June 13, 2011).

Reviewing this claim, the Mississippi Court of Appeals held that state law allows for admission of evidence of another crime when "the offense charged and that offered to be proved are so interrelated as to constitute a single transaction." Watson, 19 So.3d at 749(quoting Jones v. State, 920 So.2d 465, 474 (Miss.2006) (citations omitted)). Despite the evidence of another crime-the attempted sell of drugs- it was part of the same transaction as the marijuana sale for which Watson was charged and convicted. The trial court's decision was in accordance with state law. But in any event the admission of the tape is not so "egregious" that it makes the outcome of Watson's trial "fundamentally unfair." As such, habeas relief may not be granted and this claim will be dismissed.

Watson next argues that, if the objectionable segment of the videotape was properly allowed, the court should have given a cautionary instruction. This issue was considered by the Mississippi Supreme Court on appellate review and was denied.

Generally, challenges to jury instructions do not form a basis for federal habeas relief. Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 113 S.Ct. 2112, 124 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1993). In order to warrant habeas relief, the jury instruction must be erroneous and have caused harm. Galvan v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 760, 764-64 (5th Cir. 2002). Constitutional errors cause harm when they have a "substantialor injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Id.

Watson has failed to prove that the exclusion of a cautionary instruction had a "substantial or injurious" impact on the outcome of his case. Furthermore, the state courts held that it was not error for the videotape to be introduced and this court agrees. There being no sustainable objection to the admission of the surveillance tape, there is logically no basis to require a cautionary instruction. This claim will also be dismissed.

Ground Three: Witness Testimony

Watson argues that he was denied a fair trial when Agent Peeples was allowed to testify about a "P.C." buy of cocaine. The record shows that Agent Peeples was only asked by the prosecution to clarify about the "P.C." buy after defense counsel admitted a crime report that detailed two cocaine submissions. S.C.R., Vol. 2, pg. 65. The Mississippi Court of Appeals found Watson's complaint to be without merit. Citing state law, the court held that a "defendant may not, himself, introduce evidence at trial and then assert on appeal that the admission of the evidence constituted reversible error." Watson, 19 So.3d at 751(quoting Hobson v. State, 730 So.2d 20, 24-25 (Miss.1998)).

Admission of evidence is a matter of state law. Generally, federal courts can not rule that a state incorrectly interpreted its own law. Charles v. Thaler, 629 F.3d 494, 500-01 (5th Cir. 2011). Even if the state incorrectly interpreted its law, the error must have "infused the trial with unfairness as...