Watts v. State

1

Terrell Maurice Watts v. State of Alabama

No. CR-2023-0820

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

September 27, 2024

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court (CC-22-1881)

KELLUM, Judge.

Terrell Maurice Watts was convicted of murder made capital because it was committed by or through the use of a deadly weapon fired or otherwise used within or from a vehicle. See § 13A-5-40(a)(18), Ala. Code 1975.

The State did not seek the death penalty, and the trial court sentenced Watts to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

The evidence adduced at trial indicated the following. In the early morning hours of October 8, 2021, Marcus Nevel and Anthony Grayson were driving around drinking alcohol in Grayson's automobile and decided to purchase drugs. Grayson drove them to "Eastlake," where they purchased crack cocaine, which they then ingested as they continued drinking. (R. 162.) Around 1:30 a.m., after consuming all the alcohol and cocaine they had, Grayson let Nevel drive Grayson's vehicle because Grayson had "already been drinking" before he had picked up Nevel and was too intoxicated to continue driving. (R. 164.) Nevel drove them to a Shell gasoline station and convenience store to purchase beer, where they saw Watts, who Nevel knew as a fellow drug user. Watts was wearing a dark blue or black hoodie and dark jeans, he had a backpack with him, and his hair was in "long dreads." (R. 167.) Watts asked Nevel and Grayson to drive him somewhere to buy drugs, and they agreed. After Nevel purchased the beer, Watts got into the backseat of the vehicle behind Grayson, who was seated in the front passenger seat.

Nevel drove them back to Eastlake, where they purchased more crack cocaine and split it between the three of them. Nevel described Watts as "real balanced" until "that first hit of dope," at which point, he said, Watts became "paranoid" and began "hopping" around the backseat, moving from the passenger side of the vehicle to the center of the vehicle and back again. (R 169-70.) Watts also asked Nevel and Grayson if they had a gun in the car, and Nevel told Watts that they did not and that he should calm down. When asked if there were only three people in the vehicle at that point in time, Nevel said "That's all it was all night." (R. 170.) After consuming the cocaine they had purchased, Watts wanted more and Nevel drove them back to Eastlake, where they purchased more cocaine and, again, split the cocaine between the three of them. After that cocaine was gone, Watts asked if Nevel knew where he could purchase more cocaine with the $7.00 he had left. At this point, it was around 4:30 a.m. Nevel then drove to an apartment complex where he knew someone who might sell a small amount of cocaine at that hour.

When they arrived, it was still dark, but the parking lot had lights. Watts gave Nevel his money and Nevel got out of the vehicle. Nevel said that the light inside Grayson's vehicle did not illuminate when he exited the vehicle. Nevel walked inside a breezeway to the apartment where his contact lived, but no one answered when he knocked on the door. Nevel returned to the vehicle and Watts asked Nevel to try again; Nevel did so, but again, no one answered. When he returned to the vehicle, Nevel, without looking, reached into the backseat and handed the money back to Watts. According to Nevel, Grayson was "out of it" in the front passenger seat at the time. (R. 174.) Nevel testified that only he, Grayson, and Watts were in the vehicle and that he saw no one walking in the area at any point while they were at the apartments.

As Nevel put the key in the ignition, he heard a "boom" and Grayson "jerked." (R. 175.) Nevel said that the shot "was real loud" and left his "ears ringing." (R. 179.) Despite seeing a flash in the backseat of the vehicle at the same time he heard the gunshot (R. 179), Nevel was unsure exactly where the shot had originated because he was "spooked" (R. 175) and "confused" (R. 181), so he began looking around, initially thinking that someone outside the vehicle had fired into the vehicle. (R. 175.) He saw no one. But he did see that the window of the front passenger-side door had shattered,^[1] and he then looked in the backseat. According to Nevel, Watts was the only person in the backseat and he had "a dumb look on his face" and was saying, "Yeah, yeah." (R. 176.) At that point, although he did not see a gun and had not seen Watts shoot Grayson, Nevel realized that Watts must have been the shooter, and Nevel became "scared for [his] life," not knowing if Watts was "going to shoot [him] in the back of the head." (R. 176.) But Nevel refused to leave Grayson, so he turned the key in the ignition and sped away, with Watts still in the backseat.

Nevel drove to a nearby gasoline station and convenience store and, when he turned on his blinker to make the turn into the parking area, Watts told Nevel to keep driving. Nevel refused and drove to the front of the convenience store, got out of the vehicle, and telephoned emergency 911. Watts took his backpack, exited the vehicle, and fled the scene. When officers arrived at the gas station, Nevel was "in a state of shock" (R. 195.) and was still intoxicated, and he indicated to police that he was not sure whether the gunshot had come from inside or outside the vehicle, while simultaneously indicating that it "had" to have come from the backseat passenger. (R. 199.) Nevel gave police a description of Watts and later identified Watts in a photographic lineup (as well as at trial) as the backseat passenger.

Ashanti McKinney, a sergeant with the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, was traveling to the gas station in response to the 911 call when he saw a man matching the description he had received over the radio about three blocks away from the gas station. Sgt. McKinney attempted to stop the man and question him, but the man ran away. A few hours later, around 9:00 a.m., police apprehended Watts about seven blocks from the gas station. At that time, Watts did not have any weapons and he was not carrying a backpack. Watts was transported to the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office, where he gave a statement. The statement was recorded and played for the jury, and this Court has reviewed that recording. Watts denied shooting Grayson, claiming that, while Nevel was away from the vehicle, a fourth man had entered the backseat of the vehicle on the driver's side and attempted to sell him a gun. Watts described the man as "chubby" with light brown skin and hair similar to Watts's own, and Watts said he had previously seen the man around the apartment complex. (R. 512.) Watts said that it was this fourth man who shot and killed Grayson, after which the man fled.

Police recovered a 9mm shell casing from the backseat of Grayson's vehicle, but the murder weapon was never found. Grayson's blood was found on the jeans Watts was wearing at the time of his arrest. It was determined that the bullet that killed Grayson had been fired from inside the vehicle and had exited through the front passenger-side window. Grayson died from a gunshot wound to the head. The autopsy revealed that the bullet entered Grayson's head in the upper, back, left side of his skull and exited at his right temple. The trajectory of the bullet was "left to right and slightly downward and ... slightly back to front." (R. 436.) Stippling around the entrance wound indicated the shot had been fired from between 3 and 18 inches away. Grayson had both alcohol and cocaine in his system at the time of his death.

Watts testified on his own behalf at trial. His testimony was substantially similar to the statement he gave to police. He also testified that he was right-handed.

After both sides rested and the trial court instructed the jury on the applicable principles of law, the jury found Watts guilty of capital murder as charged in the indictment. This appeal follows.

I.

Watts first contends, as he did in the trial court, that the legislature intended § 13A-5-40(a)(18), Ala. Code 1975, to apply to drive-by shootings and not to shootings where the shooter happens to be inside a vehicle and the vehicle itself is not an instrumentality or otherwise involved in the murder. Therefore, he maintains, § 13A-5-40(a)(18) does not apply to the facts of his case and he should not have been convicted of capital murder. In support of his claim, Watts relies on Act No. 2006-642, Ala. Acts 2006, a joint resolution of the legislature, in which the Alabama Legislature indicated that its intent in passing § 13A-5-40(a)(18), Ala. Code 1975, was to prohibit gang-related "drive-by shootings" or those murders in which the vehicle is an instrumentality in the murder, and he argues that § 13A-5-40(a)(18) should be construed in accordance with the legislature's intent as expressed in the joint resolution and not the plain language of the statute, which he concedes would place his crime squarely within its effect, because, he says, to do otherwise "makes no sense." (Watts's brief, p. 39.) We disagree.

The Alabama Supreme Court has held that "'[a] resolution is not a law but merely the form in which the legislature expresses an opinion. The Legislature has no power to make laws by resolution.'" Wright v. Childree 972 So.2d 771, 780 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Gunter v. Beasley, 414 So.2d 41, 43 (Ala. 1982)). A statute cannot be amended by a joint resolution of the legislature, see Opinion of the Justices No. 265, 381 So.2d 183, 185 (Ala. 1980), and "[i]t is a well established principle of statutory interpretation that '[w]here the meaning of the plain language of the statute is clear, it must be construed according to its plain language.'" Crawford v. State, 100 So.3d 610, 614-15 (Ala.Crim.App.2011) (quoting Ex parte United Serv....