Way v. Johnson

893 F.Supp.2d 15

John L. WAY, Sr., Plaintiff,

v.Isaac JOHNSON, et al., Defendant.

Civil Case No. 11–1182 (RJL).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Sept. 26, 2012.

John L. Way, Sr., Washington, DC, pro se.

Daniel P. Struck, Jennifer L. Holsman, Struck, Wieneke & Love, PLC, Chandler, AZ, Emily Kathryn Tyler, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICHARD J. LEON, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on defendants' motions to dismiss. For the reasons discussed below, the motions are GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

On August 24, 2010, plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the United States Parole Commission (“Commission”). Compl. [Dkt. # 1] at 5. A hearing examiner found probable cause to believe that plaintiff had violated three conditions of his parole: he had used dangerous and habit-forming drugs (Charge No. 1), he failed to submit to drug testing (Charge No. 2), and he failed to participate in a drug treatment program (Charge No. 3). D.C. Probable Cause Hearing Digest dated Aug. 31, 2010, Exs. B–1 B–4 to Compl. [Dkt. # 1–1]. Revocation proceedings were suspended, however, so that plaintiff could participate in a residential drug treatment program:

Your final revocation hearing has been postponed for you to participate and successfully complete the secure portion of the treatment program. If the Commission is informed by the treatment program that you have been discharged unsuccessfully from the program, you will be scheduled for a final revocation hearing within 21 days of receipt of such notification. If you successfully complete the secure portion of the treatment program, the Commission will issue a separate Notice of Action ordering that you be reinstated to supervision.

Notice of Action dated Sept. 15, 2010, Ex. A to Compl. [Dkt. # 1–1]. On October 1, 2010, plaintiff was admitted to the 180–day Secure Residential Treatment Program (“SRTP”), a program “overseen exclusively” by employees of the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia (“CSOSA”) and housed in a unit of the Correctional Treatment Facility (“CTF”), a facility “privately owned and operated by the Corrections Corporation: of America (‘CCA’).” Mem. of P. & A. (“Johnson Mem.”) [Dkt. # 21] at 4–5; Aff. of Rebecca Richards (“Richards Aff.”), Ex. 1 to Johnson Mem. [Dkt. # 21–2], ¶ 3 (“CCA owns and operates CTF pursuant to an operations and management agreement with the District of Columbia to house inmates designated by the D.C. Department of Corrections at CTF.”).

Plaintiff was deemed ineligible to continue the SRTP following an incident which occurred on January 21, 2011. Mem. dated Jan. 28, 2011, Ex. C to Compl. [Dkt. # 1–1]. Plaintiff was transferred to a Special Management Unit at the CTF, and was “place[d] on lock down in the mental health unit on suicide watch.” Compl. at 6–7. He was transferred from the CTF to the District's Central Detention Facility (“D.C. Jail”) on or about January 28, 2011. Id. at 7.

On January 30, 2011, plaintiff filed an inmate grievance, Inmate Complaint—Informal Resolution, Ex. D to Compl. [Dkt # 1–1], which Simon T. Wainwright, Warden of the D.C. Jail, forwarded to the Office of Internal Affairs for the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (“DOC”), Mem. dated Feb. 4, 2011, Ex. E to Compl. [Dkt. # 1–1]. According to plaintiff, Warden Wainwright “considered [the matter] resolved.” Id., see Compl. at 7–8. Plaintiff also wrote letters to the Commission's Chair, Isaac Fulwood, id. at 8, to CSOSA officials, id., and to DOC officials, id. at 9. See also Letter dated Mar. 8, 2011 & Letter date Mar. 17, 2011, Exs. F & J to Compl. [Dkt. # 1–1].

Had plaintiff successfully completed the SRTP, he states that he would have been released from custody on March 30, 2011. Compl. at 5. He contends “that the defendants in this case [have] violated [his] Constitutional[ly] Protected Rights, when they discharged [him] from the [SRTP based on] a false allegation by another [SRTP participant] who claimed to have problems with homosexuals.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff avers that the defendants failed to investigate the allegedly false allegation prompting plaintiff's discharge from the SRTP and disciplinary transfer to the D.C. Jail. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants' actions were biased and discriminatory because of plaintiff's homosexuality and HIV+ status, id., and that defendants “acted with malice, vindictiveness, intolerance and prejudice,” id. at 4.¹ For these alleged violations of plaintiff's right to due process, id. at 13, he is “seeking judgment for compensatory damages in the amount of $ 500,000.00 and punitive damages in the amount of $500,000.00.” Id. at 3, 14.

DISCUSSION²

I. The Court May Treat Defendants' Motions As Conceded

All defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, and certain defendants moved alternatively for summary judgment. See Warden Simon T. Wainwright's Mot. to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 19]; Def. Isaac Johnson's Mot. to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J. [Dkt. 21, 22]; Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 29]. On February 2, 2012, the Court issued Orders [Dkt. # 30–31] advising plaintiff of his obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules of this Court to respond to the motions, and specifically warned plaintiff that, if he did not file oppositions by February 29, 2012, the Court would treat the motions as conceded.

Local Civil Rule 7(b) of this Court provides:

Within 14 days of the date of service or at such other time as the Court may direct, an opposing party shall serve and file a memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the motion. If such a memorandum is not filed within the prescribed time, the Court may treat the motion as conceded.

LCvR 7(b) (emphasis added). A motion for summary judgment may be granted as conceded if the non-moving party fails to file a timely opposition. FDIC v. Bender, 127 F.3d 58, 67–68 (D.C.Cir.1997) (upholding the treatment of the plaintiff's summary judgment motion as conceded because the defendant filed its opposition late). “It is understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.” Buggs v. Powell, 293 F.Supp.2d 135, 141 (D.D.C.2003) (citations omitted); Stephenson v. Cox, 223 F.Supp.2d 119, 121 (D.D.C.2002).

Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants['] Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. # 32], though timely filed, sets forth no substantive arguments in response to defendants' motions. In this circumstance, the Court treats defendants' motion as conceded, and GRANTS each motion. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the Court briefly addresses defendants' arguments.

II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) in relevant part provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion requirement is mandatory and “applies to all prisoners seeking redress for prison circumstances or occurrences.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002); see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) (“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.”). Exhaustion under the PLRA requires “proper exhaustion,” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006), meaning that a prisoner must comply with the procedural rules of the prison grievance process, including filing deadlines, as a precondition to filing a civil suit in federal court, regardless of the relief offered through the administrative process, id.;Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001). Thus, a prisoner may file a civil action concerning conditions of confinement under federal law only after he has exhausted the prison's administrative remedies. Jackson v. District of Columbia, 254 F.3d 262, 269 (D.C.Cir.2001). All the defendants argue that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this action, and the motions may be granted on this basis.³

There are inmate grievance processes at both the CTF and the D.C. Jail. See generally Affidavit of Joyce Allen (“Allen Aff.”), Ex. 2 to Johnson Mem. [Dkt. # 21–3]; see Inmate/Resident Grievance Procedures effective July 9, 2007, Attach. A to Allen Aff.; D.C. Dep't of Corrections Program Statement 4030.1G, Inmate Grievance Procedures (IGP) dated Mar. 9, 2010, Ex. A to Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Warden Simon T. Wainwright's Mot. to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summ. J. (“Wainwright Mem.”) [Dkt. # 19–1]. The grievance process at the CTF is a five-step process beginning with the submission of an Informal Resolution Form (Step One) and culminating with an appeal of the Warden's response (obtained in Step Four) to the Contract Monitor (Step Five). Allen Aff. ¶ 8. “If an inmate fails to follow this procedure or omits any part of it, he has not exhausted the administrative remedies available.” Allen Aff. ¶ 9. Similarly, the District's IGP process begins with the submission of a grievance and ends with an appeal to the DOC Director. See generally DOC Program Statement, Ex. A to Wainwright Mem., ¶¶ 20–23.

The CTF's Facility Grievance Officer is responsible for coordinating “the grievance procedure at CTF, assigning a number to each grievance, coordinating the investigation of grievances relating to CCA, ... and maintaining all grievance records and documents, including the permanent grievance log.” Allen ...