Webb v. City of Maplewood

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CATHERINE D. PERRY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The parties in this civil rights class action move to exclude the reports and testimony of the other side's damages-related economics expert under Rule 702, Federal Rules of Evidence, and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). For the reasons that follow, I will deny the defendant's motion and deny in part and grant in part the plaintiffs' motion. A separate order is entered today ruling plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The factual and procedural background of the case is set out in that order and will not be repeated here.

Plaintiffs have designated Dr. William Rogers, an economist from John Ward Economics, to testify to the measure of economic damages sustained by a person unlawfully detained. Rogers proffers two methods to measure such damages: 1) the Market Hourly Price Valuation, which is measurable as the hourly market compensation rate that a city must pay to staff its jails with jailors; and 2)

the Value of Statistical Life (or Willingness-to Pay) valuation, which is measurable as the amount that persons are willing to pay to be able to perform their activities of daily living without impediment. Although defendant City of Maplewood does not challenge the validity of these methods in calculating economic damages in general, it argues that the methodologies are inapplicable in a class action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful detention, given that damages in a § 1983 action are intended to redress personal injury and are necessarily individual in nature. The City also contends that plaintiffs seek to apply these methodologies to measure the value of hedonic damages, that is, the loss of enjoyment of life, and that economic principles cannot apply to such damages. The City therefore moves to exclude Rogers' expert report and testimony.

The City's proffered expert, Dr. Thomas R. Ireland, is an economics professor at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. In his report, Ireland criticizes Dr. Rogers for his attempt to assign an economic value to the loss of enjoyment of life, or hedonics. Ireland contends that the intangible, non-economic nature of hedonics cannot be measured using economic theories, and that several courts have barred purported expert testimony attempting to measure hedonic damages. In his report here, Ireland accuses Rogers of providing “would-be expert guidance” that is based on pure speculation and is “puffed up” by a list of “irrelevant references to arcane publications.” Ireland contends that Rogers' opinion is not based on

economic expertise but instead was formed only to “pander to a jury.” (See ECF 159-4, Ireland Report.) Arguing that Ireland's criticisms are based on false assumptions and his own personal opinions instead of any expertise, plaintiffs move to exclude Ireland's expert report and testimony.

Legal Standard

“Expert testimony is admissible if it is reliable and will help the jury understand the evidence or decide a fact in issue.” Cole v. Homier Distrib. Co., Inc., 599 F.3d 856, 865 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court must act as a “gatekeeper” to “insure that the proffered expert testimony is both relevant and reliable.” Wagner v. Hesston Corp., 450 F.3d 756, 758 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. The purpose of motions to exclude expert testimony is to ensure that only reliable and relevant expert testimony is presented to a jury. Russell v. Whirlpool Corp., 702 F.3d 450, 456 (8th Cir. 2012).

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides the standard for this Court's admission of expert testimony:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.^[1] A party's mere disagreement with an expert's assumptions and methodologies does not warrant exclusion of that expert's testimony. David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, 668 F.3d 1008, 1015 (8th Cir. 2012). If a party thinks other assumptions and methodologies are more appropriate, it may make this apparent through cross-examination and its own expert witnesses. Id. “[Q]uestions of conflicting evidence must be left for the jury's determination.” Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 930 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted).

I have substantial discretion in determining whether expert testimony should be allowed. Russell, 702 F.3d at 456. If I am satisfied with the expert's knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, and the expert's testimony is reasonably based on that expertise, admitting the testimony is not an abuse of discretion. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-91; Weitz Co. v. MH Washington, 631 F.3d 510, 527 (8th Cir. 2011).

Although I should resolve doubts regarding an expert's testimony in favor of admissibility, Marmo v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 457 F.3d 748, 758 (8th Cir. 2006), it is well settled that I may not permit an expert to offer an opinion on legal issues involved in a case. In re Acceptance Ins. Cos. Sec. Litig., 423 F.3d 899, 905

(8th Cir. 2005). Nor may an otherwise qualified expert simply offer conclusory opinions without providing a basis for the conclusions. See Aviva Sports, Inc. v. Fingerhut Direct Mktg., Inc., 829 F.Supp.2d 802, 826-27 (D. Minn. 2011), cited approvingly in Jaycox v. Terex Corp., No. 4:19-CV-02650 SRC, 2021 WL 2438875, at *4 (E.D. Mo. June 15, 2021). Finally, an expert may not testify on a question that the jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert's help. See American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Omega Flex, Inc., 783 F.3d 720, 725 (8th Cir. 2015).

Discussion

Persons who are subject to unlawful incarceration are deprived of their liberty and are entitled to compensatory damages. Betances v. Fischer, 403 F.Supp.3d 212, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). General damages for loss of liberty may be, and indeed have been, calculated on a class-wide basis. See Betances v. Fischer, 304 F.R.D. 416, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).

“The damages recoverable for the loss of liberty for the period spent in a wrongful confinement are separable from damages recoverable for such injuries as physical harm, embarrassment, or emotional suffering. . . .” General damages for the loss of liberty “‘need not be specifically proved-it may be inferred from the circumstances of the arrest or imprisonment' and ‘would include at least the value of the time lost by the plaintiff during the period of detention.'” Thus, these damages do not turn on any individual characteristics of any class members.

Id. (quoting Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 125 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting

McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages, § 107 at 376)). Cf. Orvis v. Spokane Cty., 281 F.R.D. 469, 475 (E.D. Wash. 2012) (court-approved § 1983 class-wide settlement providing for payment of per diem rate for each day that a class member was incarcerated without judicial inquiry into ability to pay); McFarlane v. Carothers, No. 4:15-cv-00176-SEB-DML, 2017 WL 9533071, at *7 (S.D....