Webb v. City of Waterloo

JOVAN WEBB, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF WATERLOO and MARK NISSEN, Defendants.

No. 17-CV-2001-CJW-MAR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA EASTERN DIVISION

March 10, 2020

ORDER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE ................................................ 4

A. Expert Testimony of D. Raymond Walton (Defendants' I) .................. 4

B. Media Coverage (Defendants' II) ................................................ 7

C. Personal Information (Defendants' VI) .......................................... 9

D. Violations of Departmental Policies or Guidelines (Defendants' VII) ..... 9

II. PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE ................................................ 10

A. Undisclosed Witnesses (Plaintiff's 1) ........................................... 10

B. Reference to Counsel as "Out of Town" (Plaintiff's 2) ..................... 11

C. Evidence of Plaintiff's Bad Acts (Plaintiff's 3) ............................... 11

D. Evidence of Prior Bad Acts, Arrests, and Convictions of Third-Party Witnesses (Plaintiff's 4) ........................................................... 12

E. Expert Testimony of Kenneth Wallentine (Plaintiff's 6) ..................... 12

F. Unjust Enrichment or Hitting the Lottery (Plaintiff's 7) .................... 15

G. Jurors as Taxpayers (Plaintiff's 8) .............................................. 15

H. Officer Nissen's Inability to Pay (Plaintiff's 9) ............................... 15

I. Adverse Employment Consequences to Officer Nissen (Plaintiff's 10) ... 17

J. Officer Nissen's Good Deeds (Plaintiff's 11) ................................. 18

K. Information Unknown to Officer Nissen at the Time of the Shooting (Plaintiff's 12) ........................................................... 18

III. OPPOSING MOTIONS IN LIMINE ................................................... 19

A. Plaintiff's Guilty Pleas and Convictions (Defendants' I, Plaintiff's 15) .. 19

B. Complaints and Investigations (Defendants' III, Plaintiff's 5 and 16) .... 21

1. Prior Complaints Against Officer Bose ................................ 23

2. Prior Complaints Against Officer Nissen .............................. 23

a. To Establish the City's Monell Liability ....................... 23

b. To Establish Officer Nissen's Knowledge, Opportunity, Lack of Mistake, or Character .................................. 25

3. Prior Lawsuits Against Officer Nissen ................................. 25

4. Subsequent Complaints/Investigation of Shooting .................... 26

C. Claims Previously Dismissed (Defendants' IV, Plaintiff's 14) ............. 28

D. Undisclosed Experts (Defendants' V, Plaintiff's 13) ......................... 28

IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 29

This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion in limine (Doc. 106) and plaintiff's motions in limine (Docs. 107, 112). Plaintiff filed separate briefs in support of some sections of his motions in limine. (Docs. 108-110). Plaintiff and defendants timely resisted each other's motions in limine. (Docs. 114, 115). The Court will first address defendants' motion in limine, then plaintiff's motions in limine, and finally the issues on which both parties moved in limine. For the following reasons, the parties' motions in limine are granted in part, denied in part, and held in abeyance in part.

I. DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE

A. Expert Testimony of D. Raymond Walton (Defendants' I)

Plaintiff entered guilty pleas under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970), to two misdemeanor offenses arising from his interactions with the Waterloo Police Department ("WPD") leading up to defendant Officer Mark Nissen ("Officer Nissen") shooting plaintiff. Plaintiff designated attorney D. Raymond Walton ("Walton") as an expert witness. Walton opines, based on his experience, that defendants generally enter Alford pleas to lesser charges because of the stress of facing criminal charges and the financial cost of fighting criminal charges through trial. (Doc. 115-1, at 4).

Defendants argue that Walton's testimony is not relevant because plaintiff's reasons for pleading guilty do not affect the preclusive effect of his guilty pleas. (Doc. 106, at 4-6). Defendants also argue that Walton's testimony does not meet the reliability standard for expert testimony adopted in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). (Id., at 6-7). Defendants further argue that Walton's testimony is an improper legal conclusion, and that Walton's testimony attempts to undermine the validity of plaintiff's convictions in violation of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Id., at 7-8).

The Court finds that Walton's testimony is irrelevant, and thus inadmissible. As a general matter, "[i]rrelevant evidence is not admissible." FED. R. EVID. 402. "Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact [of consequence] more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. The rules governing expert opinions also include a relevance requirement. See Marmo v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 457 F.3d 748, 757 (8th Cir. 2006) ("District courts must ensure that all scientific testimony is both reliable and relevant.") (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580; FED. R. CIV. P. 702); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 702 (requiring that an expert's opinions "help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue").

Walton's testimony does not meet the general relevance requirement. The legal effects of plaintiff's Alford pleas are the same regardless of his motivation for entering the pleas. Thus, the reason that plaintiff accepted the Alford pleas does not make any fact of consequence more or less likely.

Also, Walton's testimony does not meet the relevance requirement for expert opinions. In some instances, it may be important for an expert to educate the jury "about general principles, without ever attempting to apply these principles to the specific facts of the case[.]" Thomas v. FCA US LLC, 242 F. Supp. 3d 819, 824 (S.D. Iowa 2017) (quoting United States v. Coutentos, 651 F.3d 809, 821 (8th Cir. 2011)). Although general principles may provide background for the expert's testimony, ultimately "the proponent must show that the expert's reasoning or methodology was applied properly to the facts at issue." Smith v. Bubak, 643 F.3d 1137, 1140 (8th Cir. 2011); see also Meridian Mfg., Inc. v. C & B Mfg., Inc., 340 F. Supp. 3d 808, 829 (N.D. Iowa 2018) ("An expert may rely on experience-based testimony if the expert also explains . . . how that experience is reliably applied to the facts." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Walton's report explains how his experience led to his conclusions but makesno attempt to apply his conclusion to the facts here. Thus, Walton's testimony does not meet the relevance requirement for expert testimony under Rule 702.

Separately, Walton's testimony is inadmissible because it does not meet the Daubert standard for reliability. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires, in part, that an expert's testimony be "the product of reliable principles and methods." FED. R. CIV. P. 702(c). The Supreme Court has provided four non-exclusive factors to assist courts in determining if an expert's opinions are sufficiently reliable:

(1) whether the scientific technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and/or publication; (3) the known rate of error for the technique or theory and the applicable standards for operation; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted.

Johnson v. Mead Johnson & Co., LLC, 754 F.3d 557, 562 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94). Under this standard, courts must exclude expert testimony that is "excessively speculative or unsupported by sufficient facts." Onyiah v. St. Cloud State Univ., 684 F.3d 711, 720 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, courts can reject "opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).

Here, Walton's opinion is not based on any data. He asserts that "sometimes" he sees signs of the overwhelming stress that facing criminal charges has on his clients, and "sometimes" the clients' family members advise Walton of their concerns about his clients' mental health. (Doc. 115-1, at 4). There is, however, no data tying Walton's observations to the fact that his clients ultimately accepted Alford pleas, other than Walton's say-so. Similarly, Walton avers that avoiding the stress of facing criminal charges is "overwhelmingly" the reason why his clients accept Alford pleas, but providesno data or technique that he applied to reach that conclusion. The Court finds that Walton's testimony is inadmissible under the Daubert standard. Section I of defendants' motion in limine is granted and Walton's testimony is excluded. The Court need not address the remaining arguments defendants raised in their motion in limine.

B. Media Coverage (Defendants' II)

Defendants move to exclude evidence of media coverage of the shooting giving rise to this case, as well as media coverage of other incidents of WPD officers using force. Defendants argue that media articles are not relevant because any facts in the articles can be presented directly at trial through witnesses, documents, and videos. (Doc. 106, at 8). Defendants also argue that the news articles may include opinions or commentary that would be unfairly prejudicial to defendants. (Id., at 8-9).

Plaintiff agrees that media coverage of the shooting at issue here is not admissible. (Doc. 115, at 9). Plaintiff argues, however, that general media coverage about the WPD is admissible because it is relevant to plaintiff's claim against the City...