Webb v. Delaware

1

DAVID Q. WEBB, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, et al., Defendants.

C. A. No. 22-461-GBW

United States District Court, D. Delaware

October 31, 2022

David Q. Webb, Newark, Delaware. Pro Se Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAMS, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Plaintiff David Q. Webb commenced this action on April 6, 2022. (D.I 2) He appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.I. 4) Pending are Plaintiffs request for electronic notification and a motion for an emergency temporary restraining order against the State of Delaware. (D.I. 6, 8) The Court proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b).

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the Complaint and assumed to be true for screening purposes. See Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). The claims revolve around the DHSS-DSCC emergency hotel voucher program, housing provided Plaintiff, and his apparent termination under the program in late March 2022. (D.I. 2-1 at 6, D.I. 2-7 at 4) The Complaint names 16 defendants. They include the State of Delaware, state and county government employees and officials, and several hotels/motels. (D.I. 2 at 1-3; D.I. 2-1 at 2-7)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are either government entities or they contract with government entities; they are direct recipients of federal funding; they engaged in intentional discrimination based upon his race, color, and national origin as an African American male; and they violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He also alleges Defendants violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq., and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. He alleges deliberate ignorance and unlawful housing conditions under federal law. Finally, Plaintiff raises supplemental state claims under Delaware law for negligent retention of employment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and vicarious liability.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) if “the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).

A complaint is not automatically frivolous because it fails to state a claim. See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d. 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 331 (1989)); see also Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112 (3d Cir. 2002). “Rather, a claim is frivolous only where it depends ‘on an “indisputably meritless legal theory” or a “clearly baseless” or “fantastic or delusional” factual scenario.'” Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d at 374 (quoting Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (2003) and Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 32728).

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court must grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3dat 114.

A complaint may be dismissed only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that those allegations “could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).

Though “detailed factual allegations” are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Davis v. Abington Mem 'I Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Finally, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10(2014). A complaint may not be dismissed for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See id. at 10.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Title VI

Count I attempts to raise claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The count fails to set forth plausible claims. The claims are pled in a conclusory manner and there are no factual allegations that provide a plausible basis to conclude that Defendants State of Delaware, New Castle County (not a named defendant),^[1] or Matthew Meyer (in his official capacity) intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff because of Plaintiff's race, color and/or national origin as an African American male in violation of Title VI. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282-83 (2001). Therefore, Count I will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff will be given leave to amend this count.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Counts II, III, IV, V, and VI attempt to raise claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Counts II, III, IV, and VI are raised against the State of Delaware and individual State Defendants in their official capacities. In addition, Count II is raised against New Castle County Executive Meyer in his official capacity.

The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution protects an unconsenting state or state agency from a suit brought in federal court by one of its own citizens, regardless of the relief sought. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). “[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citations omitted); AU v Howard, 353 Fed.Appx. 667, 672 (3d Cir. 2009). Accordingly,§ 1983 claims for monetary damages against a state, state agency, or a state official in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See id.

As mentioned, Count II sues Meyer in his official capacity as County Executive. Plaintiff may sue Meyer in his official capacity under a § 1983 theory of liability only for acts implementing an official policy, practice, or custom. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978). To plausibly plead Monell liability, a plaintiff must identify the challenged policy or custom, attribute it to the municipality itself, or in this case, a policy established or implemented by Meyer, and show a causal link between execution of the policy and the injury suffered. See e.g., O 'Bryant v. New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 2022 WL 3339489, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2022). The Complaint contains no such allegations.

The Court will dismiss Counts II, III, IV, and VI based upon Defendants' immunity from suit and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff will be given leave to amend the claim raised against Meyer in Count II. Amendment is futile as to the claims raised against the State and State Defendant employees in their official capacities.

Count V attempts to raise a claim for violation of the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff cannot base § 1983 claims on an alleged violation of the federal Constitution's Ninth Amendment, because the Ninth Amendment “does not contain within itself any guarantee of a right or a proscription of an infringement. .. .” Nicolette v. Caruso, 315 F.Supp.2d 710, 718 (W.D. Pa. 2003). See also, Bamigbade v. City of Newark, 2005 WL 8175517 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2005) (“A person cannot claim a right that exists solely under the Ninth Amendment.”).

Section 1983 does not provide redress for violations of state law or the Ninth Amendment. Count V does not raise a cognizable claim and, therefore, will be dismissed. Amendment is futile as to Count V.

C. Deliberate Ignorance

Count VII alleges deliberate ignorance by State Defendants Magarik, Beaman, Hall, and Mixon.^[2] The claim is not cognizable under federal law. Count VII will be dismissed as frivolous. Amendment is futile.

D...