Webster v. Gray

STEVEN WEBSTER, Petitioner, v. DEAN GRAY, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 19-11788-FDS

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

September 1, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

F. DENNIS SAYLOR IV CHIEF JUDGE

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner Steven Webster is an inmate at the Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center. Dean Gray is the current superintendent of that facility.

In 2016, Webster was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and other related charges. He was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment and now seeks habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. His petition alleges that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support a guilty verdict and that his continued incarceration violates his right to due process.

For the following reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be denied.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”). See Commonwealth v. Webster, 480 Mass. 161, 162-66 (2018).

On July 11, 2012, the victim, Andrew Stanley, was shot and killed in his Hyannis home during an armed robbery and home invasion. Id. at 162. At approximately 1:20 p.m., police responded to reports of gunfire from the victim's address. Id. Arriving on the scene, the officers heard moaning and yelling coming from the house. Id. One officer saw a man he recognized as Keiko Thomas peer out a window. Id. The officers then heard gunfire and saw three men flee the house, one of whom an officer recognized as Eddie Mack. Id. The officers gave chase, apprehending Thomas, Mack, and another individual, David Evans. Id. During that time, a witness saw a fourth man run back toward the victim's house. Id. That man eluded arrest. Id.

The police found the victim unresponsive on the floor, his arms and legs bound with duct tape and zip ties. Id. He had been beaten, and there were “marks on his body consistent with the use of a stun gun.” Id. He died from a gunshot wound to the torso. Id.

Several pieces of evidence were recovered from the crime scene. After finding Mack hiding beneath an air conditioning unit outside a nearby store, police discovered marijuana inside the air conditioning unit and $14, 300 in cash beneath an adjacent pallet. Id. at 162-63. Police also found four cell phones in the surrounding area-two from under the pallet and two from a nearby alley. Id. at 163. Of those four cell phones, one each belonged to Mack, Thomas, and the victim. Id.

Investigators found Mack's fingerprints on a piece of duct tape and his palm print on a window at the victim's house. Id. The police also executed a search warrant for Thomas's house, located approximately one mile from the crime scene. Id. There, they found a roll of duct tape, handcuffs, and a round of ammunition. Id.

The police recovered from a parking lot beside the victim's house a backpack containing two guns (including a loaded .45 caliber Colt handgun), gloves, a stun gun, an aerosol can, and duct tape consistent with that used to bind the victim. Id. The Colt handgun was consistent with both a shell casing recovered by police and the bullet retrieved from the victim's body. Id. Also in the backpack was a black face mask with traces of Webster's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). Id.

In the subsequent investigation, police examined the defendants' cell phone records for the days leading up to the murder. The records showed frequent exchanges of calls and text messages: Webster called or messaged Evans 231 times between July 1 and the day of the murder, July 11. Id. Webster also communicated with Mack seven times between July 10 and July 11. Id. Communications were frequent between the other defendants, too. From July 7 to July 11, Mack and Thomas exchanged 45 calls and texts. Id. Mack and Evans communicated multiple times during that period. Id.

On July 3, Webster sent Evans a message that said, “Got some heat lined up.” Id. Webster messaged Evans again on July 7: “cuz if you chillen im bout, I am to go snatch my lil heat by Norfolk and cum back.” Id. On July 8, Mack messaged Evans: “Gotta come down so I can explain it better bro so we can get better understandin feel me.” Id. On July 9, Evans messaged Webster asking, “So what about mack?” Id. Webster responded, “We out their what time was u tryna head out their?” Id. Evans asked, “what you trying to do?” Id. Webster replied, “stressing fam.” Id. On July 10, Mack messaged Evans: “Yal good?” Id. Evans responded “Yup. We out there tomorrow night cuz.” Id. On the morning of July 11, Webster did not message either Evans or Mack, although both were communicating with each other until 12:10 p.m. From 12:10 to 2:21 p.m., approximately an hour before and after the murder, none of the defendants messaged each other. Id. at 165.

The police also examined cell site location information (CSLI), which placed Webster's phone in the vicinity of Barnstable on July 10 and 11. Id. at 164.^[1] An hour after the murder, both Webster's and Evans's phones were tracked moving from Barnstable toward Boston. Id.^[2]At 2:21 p.m., Webster called Mack's phone “using a calling feature to block the caller's identification.” Id. Moments later, Mack received a message from Evans's phone that read, “What up bro its [me, Webster] hit me back.” Id. By 4:00 p.m., Webster's and Evans's cell phones were in the vicinity of Boston. Id.

At the victim's house in Hyannis, police discovered tire impressions consistent with the tires of a Chevrolet Impala rented by Evans prior to the murder. Id. Police later found the Impala on July 13 in Boston, about a mile from Webster's home. Id. Webster's DNA was discovered in the car. Id.

The police arrested Webster in February 2013. Id. In the police interview following his arrest, Webster told police he had never been to Cape Cod, was unfamiliar with Barnstable, and did not know Evans. Id. at 166. Webster later admitted to knowing Evans by a street name but claimed to have met him only once. Id.

B. Procedural Background

Webster was charged with first-degree murder on a theory of felony murder, armed robbery, home invasion, armed assault in a dwelling, and carrying a firearm without a license. Id. at 162. In September 2016, he was tried alongside Eddie Mack before a jury. Id. at n.2.^[3]Webster argued at trial that he had not been present at the crime scene. Id. at 164. Nevertheless, a jury convicted him of all charges. Id. at 162.^[4] The trial judge sentenced Webster to a term of life imprisonment for the murder. He was also sentenced to minimum terms of 25 years for home invasion, 25 years for armed assault in a dwelling, and four years and six months for carrying a firearm without a license, all to run concurrently with the life sentence.

Webster appealed his conviction to the Supreme Judicial Court on the grounds that (1) there was insufficient evidence to convict him; (2) the judge should have excluded the tire impression evidence; (3) the Commonwealth did not sufficiently show that one of the phone numbers introduced at trial belonged to Evans; and (4) the judge should have provided a “consciousness of guilt” instruction to the jury or, alternatively, that Webster's counsel was ineffective for not requesting such an instruction. Id. at 164. He also requested that the SJC grant relief based upon its extraordinary powers under state law to review convictions of capital crimes. Id. at 171-72; see Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 278, § 33E. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court judgment and declined to invoke its statutory authority to alter that judgment. Webster, 480 Mass. at 171-72.

II. Standard of Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal court may not issue a habeas petition “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state court decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, ” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A state-court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it (1) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases” or (2) resolves a case differently from the Supreme Court on a set of “materially indistinguishable” facts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). In either scenario, the state-court decision must be “substantially different, ” “diametrically different, ” “opposite in character or nature, ” or “mutually opposed” to Supreme Court precedent. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405.

A state-court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of federal law if the state court identified the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but applied it in an objectively unreasonable manner. See Lockyer v Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 409). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “[a]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. The state court's application of federal law must be “more than incorrect or erroneous.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 412); see also Teti v. Bender, 507 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2007) (“A decision can still be reasonable even if the reviewing court thinks it is wrong; ‘unreasonable' here means something more than incorrect or erroneous.”). Furthermore,

if it is a close question whether the state decision is in error, then the state decision

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