Weeks v. Department of Human Services

222 A.3d 722

Jasmine WEEKS, Vanessa Williams, Arnell Howard, Patricia Shallick, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Appellants

v.DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee

No. 22 EAP 2019

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: October 16, 2019

Decided: December 18, 2019

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR

This is a direct appeal in the context of a process-based constitutional challenge to legislation which amended certain aspects of Pennsylvania's Human Services Code. Most notably for our purposes, the enactment terminated a cash assistance program for certain low-income individuals, which was administered by Appellee, the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services ("DHS") (formerly known as the Department of Public Welfare). Appellants requested that the Commonwealth Court, sitting as trial court, issue a preliminary injunction to prevent that aspect of the law from taking effect until a final merits determination as to the constitutionality of the act as a whole could be reached. The Commonwealth Court denied the request, and this appeal followed.

At the heart of this dispute is the cash-assistance component of a DHS program known as General Assistance (hereinafter, "Cash Assistance"). Until it was terminated by the present enactment, Cash Assistance had authorized DHS to disburse up to $215 per month to individuals meeting certain eligibility criteria as outlined in Section 432(3) of the Human Services Code. See 63 P.S. § 432(3) (predicating eligibility on factors such as receiving treatment for substance abuse, being unable to work, being a victim of domestic violence, or caring for an unrelated child).¹

In June 2019, Act 12 of 2019 was passed by the General Assembly and signed into law by the Governor. See Act of June 28, 2019, P.L. 42, No. 12 ("Act 12"). Act 12 began in January 2019 as House Bill 33, Printer's No. 47. The bill in its initial form made three substantive changes to the Public Welfare Code. First, it amended Article IV's definitional section by defining "General assistance-related categorically needy medical assistance," 63 P.S. § 402, to signify medical assistance for certain types of needy persons as set forth under Section 432(3). See id. § 432(3) (listing criteria for certain types of persons to be considered "needy" for purposes of eligibility for public assistance). Second, it re-enacted Section 403.2, which had been part of Act 80 and, as such, had been invalidated by the Washington Court. See supra note 1. That provision ended Cash Assistance while clarifying that the medical assistance component of General Assistance would continue. See id. § 403.2. Finally, it deleted Section 442.1(a)(3)(i), which had specified that a person was automatically considered "medically needy" if that person received Cash Assistance benefits.

H.B. 33 was sent to the House Appropriations Committee where it was amended for the first and only time. When it emerged from that committee, it was assigned Printer's No. 2181 and contained the same items as appeared in Printer's No. 47,² as well as several additional provisions which made further changes to the Public Welfare Code. The added sections included text which: (a) increased from $8 million to $16 million the state medical assistance funds available to certain non-public nursing facilities that provide care to low-income individuals as an incentive for such homes to accept more Medicaid patients; (b) amended definitions which apply to the Statewide Quality Care Assessment, a program which generates revenue to pay for health-care services for low-income individuals; (c) allowed assessments levied by municipalities upon hospitals to be used for Medical Assistance managed care organizations providing health care services within the municipality; (d) re-authorized and extended to June 30, 2024, an assessment program on high-volume Medicaid hospitals which is used to generate funding for low-income individuals; and (e) altered the definition of a high volume Medicaid hospital from a hospital providing over 90,000 days of care to Pennsylvania medical assistance patients to one providing over 60,000 days of inpatient acute care to such patients. The bill as thus amended was passed by both Houses of the Legislature, and it was signed by Governor Wolf on June 28, 2019.

On July 22, 2019, Appellants, being aggrieved by the termination of Cash Assistance, filed in the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction a Class Action Petition for Review on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated (the "Petition"). In the Petition, Appellants requested class certification as well as declaratory relief in the form of a determination that Act 12 is unconstitutional under Article III, Sections 1 and 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See PA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 3 (stating, respectively, that "no bill shall be so altered or amended, on its passage through either House, as to change its original purpose," and "[n]o bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except a general appropriation bill or a bill codifying or compiling the law or a part thereof"). They also asked that the court enjoin the Department and other state officials from implementing Sections 1, 2, or 3 of the enactment – i.e., the items that appeared in Printer's No. 47 and remained substantively unchanged in the final bill.

Together with the Petition, Appellants filed an Application for Special Relief in the Nature of a Preliminary Injunction (the "Application"). In the Application, Appellants sought expedited consideration in view of the upcoming effective date of the termination of Cash Assistance, as well as a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo – that is, to prevent Cash Assistance from being ended – pending a final determination of the merits of their constitutional challenge.

The Commonwealth Court granted expedited consideration and, on August 1, 2019 – the same day Cash Assistance was terminated – it disposed of Appellants' request for preliminary relief in a memorandum opinion and order. See Weeks v. Dep't of Human Servs. , No. 409 M.D. 2019, slip op. (Pa. Cmwlth. Aug. 1, 2019). Initially, the court noted that, to obtain a preliminary injunction, the petitioner must establish six prerequisites: (1) relief is necessary to prevent irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated by a monetary award; (2) greater injury will occur from the denial of the injunction than from its issuance; (3) the injunction will restore the parties to their status quo as it existed before the alleged wrongful conduct; (4) the petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits; (5) the injunction is reasonably suited to abate the offending activity; and (6) the injunction will not adversely affect the public interest. See id. at 3 (citing Summit Towne Ctr., Inc. v. Shoe Show of Rocky Mount, Inc. , 573 Pa. 637, 645, 828 A.2d 995, 1000 (2003) ). The Commonwealth Court ultimately held that Appellants failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm. See id. at 4, 6. As this meant that they were unable to prevail under the governing standard, the court denied the requested preliminary injunction. See id. at 6.³

Appellants appealed, and this Court noted probable jurisdiction. See Weeks v. Dep't of Human Servs. , No. 22 EAP 2019 (Pa. Aug. 20, 2019) (per curiam); Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4) (relating to appeals from orders granting or denying an injunction).

This Court exercises a highly deferential standard of review when considering a trial court's ruling on a request for a preliminary injunction. Under that standard, we review for an abuse of discretion, see Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. , 646 Pa. 482, 500, 185 A.3d 985, 995 (2018), and will affirm the denial of preliminary relief if the trial court had any apparently reasonable grounds for its action. Such grounds exist when the court properly found that any one of the prerequisites was not satisfied. See Warehime v. Warehime , 580 Pa. 201, 209, 860 A.2d 41, 46 (2004). "Only if it is plain that no grounds exist to support the decree or that the rule of law relied upon was palpably erroneous or misapplied will we interfere with the decree." Marcellus Shale Coal. , 646 Pa. at 500, 185 A.3d at 995-96 (brackets omitted) (quoting Brayman Constr. Crop. v. PennDOT , 608 Pa. 584, 602, 13 A.3d 925, 935-36 (2011) ); accord Shenango Valley Osteopathic Hosp. v. Dep't of Health , 499 Pa. 39, 50, 451 A.2d 434, 439 (1982) (quoting Bell v. Thornburgh , 491 Pa. 263, 267, 420 A.2d 443, 445 (1980) ). We begin with the question of whether the Commonwealth Court appropriately held that Appellants failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, that is, a likelihood that they would prevail on their claim that Act 12 was passed in violation of Article III, Sections 1 and 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

As an initial matter, every enactment of the General Assembly is presumed valid – a presumption that extends to the manner in which it was passed, see Commonwealth v. Neiman , 624 Pa. 53, 67, 84 A.3d 603, 611 (2013) – and will only be stricken if the challenger demonstrates that it "clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution." Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Zogby , 574 Pa. 121, 135, 828 A.2d 1079, 1087 (2003) (quoting Purple Orchid, Inc. v. Pa. State Police , 572 Pa. 171, 178, 813 A.2d 801, 805 (2002) ); cf . 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(3) (directing courts to assume the Legislature does not intend to violate the state or federal constitutions). "The party seeking to overcome the presumption of validity bears a heavy burden of persuasion." W. Mifflin Area Sch. Dist. v. Zahorchak , 607 Pa. 153, 163, 4 A.3d 1042, 1048 (2010).

In evaluating the Commonwealth Court's conclusion as to the validity of Act 12, it is helpful to review this Court's decisions addressing challenges based on Article III, Sections 1 and 3, in the...