Weiss v. Arunsi

184 A.D.3d 606

123 N.Y.S.3d 498 (Mem)

Steven M. WEISS, Appellant,

v.Okuji O. ARUNSI, Defendant,Leo Yanjkilevich, et al., Respondents.

2019–03343

Index No. 504014/12

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—January 30, 2020

June 3, 2020

Leav & Steinberg, New York, N.Y. (Edward R. Averbuch of counsel), for appellant.

Karen L. Lawrence (Sweetbaum & Sweetbaum, Lake Success, N.Y. [Joel A. Sweetbaum and Brian J. Daly ], of counsel), for respondent Leo Yanjkilevich.

McCabe, Collins, McGeough, Fowler, Levine & Nogan, LLP, Carle Place, N.Y. (Patrick M. Murphy of counsel), for respondents Eric J. Geredien and Daniel S. Paluszek.

James G. Bilello, Hicksville, N.Y. (Patricia McDonagh of counsel), for defendant Okuji O. Arunsi.

REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., SHERI S. ROMAN, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with one bill of costs to the plaintiff payable by the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs, and those branches of the separate motions of the defendant Leo Yanjkilevich and the defendants Eric J. Geredien and Daniel S. Paluszek which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them are denied.

The instant action involves a four-vehicle, chain reaction accident. The plaintiff, who was operating the lead vehicle, commenced this action against the defendants Eric J. Geredien and Daniel S. Paluszek, the owner and operator of the second vehicle, respectively, the defendant Leo Yanjkilevich, the operator of the third vehicle, and the defendant Okuji O. Arunsi, the operator of the fourth vehicle. After discovery, Yanjkilevich moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. Thereafter, Geredien and Paluszek moved, among other things, for the same relief as to them. The Supreme Court granted those branches of the motions. The plaintiff appeals, and we reverse.

" ‘A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle’ " ( Jimenez v. Ramirez , 171 A.D.3d 902, 903, 98 N.Y.S.3d 131, quoting Nsiah–Ababio v. Hunter , 78 A.D.3d 672, 672, 913 N.Y.S.2d 659 ; see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a] ). Hence, a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision (see Tutrani v. County of Suffolk , 10 N.Y.3d 906, 861 N.Y.S.2d 610, 891 N.E.2d 726 ; Mihalatos v. Barnett , 175 A.D.3d 492, 106 N.Y.S.3d 165 ). " ‘Evidence that a vehicle was struck in the rear and propelled into the vehicle in front of it may provide a sufficient non-negligent explanation’ " ( Williams v. Sala , 152 A.D.3d 729, 729, 59 N.Y.S.3d 108, quoting Ortiz v. Haidar , 68 A.D.3d 953, 954, 892 N.Y.S.2d 122 ).

A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing his...