Welch v. Cochise Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors

251 Ariz. 519

494 P.3d 580

David WELCH, Individually and on Behalf of All Citizens of Cochise County, Precinct Five, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.COCHISE COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, Patrick G. Call, Ann English, and Peggy Judd, Respondents/Appellees.

No. CV-20-0322-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed September 2, 2021

David L. Abney (argued), Ahwatukee Legal Office, P.C., Phoenix; and D. Christopher Russell, The Russell's Law Firm, PLC, Sierra Vista, Attorneys for David Welch

James M. Jellison (argued), Jellison Law Offices, P.L.L.C., Carefree, Attorneys for Cochise County Board of Supervisors, Patrick G. Call, Ann English, and Peggy Judd

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Joseph A. Kanefield, Chief Deputy and Chief of Staff, Brunn "Beau" W. Roysden, III, Solicitor General, Michael S. Catlett (argued), Deputy Solicitor General, Katherine H. Jessen, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorney General

Nicholas D. Acedo, Struck Love Bojanowski & Acedo PLC, Chandler, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Arizona Counties Insurance Pool, The County Supervisors Association of Arizona, and The Arizona School Risk Retention Trust, Inc.

CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL authored the opinion of the Court, in which VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, and JUSTICES BOLICK, LOPEZ, BEENE, MONTGOMERY, and JUDGE BAILEY joined.^*

CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, opinion of the Court:

¶1 Arizona's open-meeting and conflict-of-interest (collectively, "public accountability") laws grant "[a]ny person affected by" either "an alleged violation" or "a decision of a public agency" standing to enforce their respective requirements. A.R.S. §§ 38-431.07(A), -506(B). We hold that these provisions broadly confer standing based upon a claimant's interest in preserving the values of transparency and accountability that these laws enshrine, not because of a claimant's equitable ownership of tax revenues.

¶2 The open-meeting law also provides that "[a]ll legal action" taken in violation thereof is "null and void" unless the public body later takes the proper steps to "ratify" that action. A.R.S. § 38-431.05(A)–(B). We hold that ratification only validates the initially void action; it does not moot an open-meeting claim based upon the underlying violation.

¶3 Accordingly, we vacate those portions of the court of appeals’ opinion analyzing the laws’ enforcement provisions through the lens of taxpayer standing, affirm its reversal of the trial court, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

¶4 It all started with a judicial vacancy. Following the resignation of the Justice of the Peace for Justice Precinct Five, the Cochise County Board of Supervisors posted a public notice for a special meeting to decide on a selection process and to fill the vacancy. The agenda also included notice of a possible executive session.

¶5 During the meeting, the Board considered application and committee-driven appointment processes but eventually opted for a direct appointment. The Board then went into executive session, returned after half an hour, and voted 3–0 to table the matter and recess until later that morning. The Board did not reconvene, however, until the afternoon, nearly an hour after the noticed time. Supervisor Ann English immediately moved to appoint Supervisor Patrick Call to fill the vacancy, and the Board appointed Call as Justice of the Peace by a 2–0 vote, with Call abstaining.

¶6 Two days later, David Welch, a Precinct Five resident and taxpayer, brought a special action challenging Call's appointment as a violation of Arizona's public accountability laws. See A.R.S. §§ 38-431.01 to -431.09, -503. The Board responded ten days later by noticing a meeting to ratify Call's appointment, see § 38-431.05(B), to which Welch responded the next day by securing a temporary restraining order ("TRO") enjoining the Board from proceeding with Call's appointment. Nonetheless, Call was sworn in later that day.

¶7 Shortly after Welch amended his complaint to seek additional relief, including the removal of the Board's entire membership from office, the case was reassigned to a different judge¹ who vacated the TRO and denied Welch's motion for further injunctive relief. In the meantime, the Board noticed and held a ratification meeting and voted 2–0 to ratify Call's appointment.

¶8 The trial court subsequently dismissed Welch's amended complaint. Most relevant here, the court found Welch lacked standing to enforce Arizona's public accountability laws. Additionally, the court determined that the Board's ratification of Call's appointment had cured any open-meeting violation, thereby mooting Welch's corresponding claim. Welch appealed.

¶9 The court of appeals reversed, holding that Welch's status as a Precinct Five resident and taxpayer made him a "person affected by" expenditures made in violation of Arizona's public accountability laws, see §§ 38-431.07(A), -506(B), and thus gave him standing to enforce them here, Welch v. Cochise Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors , 250 Ariz. 186, 192 ¶¶ 13–15, 477 P.3d 110, 116 (App. 2020). Those expenses included the salary paid to a justice of the peace. In that court's view, a taxpayer's interest rests not in the initial decision to spend taxpayer dollars, but in the legality of those funds’ expenditure and the value they reap. Id. at 193 ¶¶ 16–17, 477 P.3d at 117. Nor did the court find Welch's open-meeting claim moot. Although the Board's decision to ratify Call's appointment had ensured its effectiveness against a charge that the original appointment was null and void, sanctions for the original violation remained available. Id. at 195 ¶ 25, 477 P.3d at 115 (citing §§ 38-431.05, -431.07(A)). This petition followed.²

¶10 We granted review to clarify private claimants’ standing to challenge alleged violations of Arizona's public accountability laws and to decide what effect statutory ratification has on a private claimant's open-meeting claim. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24.

II. DISCUSSION

¶11 The parties’ dispute boils down to whether taxpayer standing suffices to enforce Arizona's public accountability laws and whether statutory ratification moots an open-meeting claim. We review such legal questions de novo. State v. Hansen , 215 Ariz. 287, 289 ¶ 6, 160 P.3d 166, 168 (2007). As ever, our aim in statutory interpretation is "to effectuate the legislature's intent." Stambaugh v. Killian , 242 Ariz. 508, 509 ¶ 7, 398 P.3d 574, 575 (2017). Absent ambiguity or absurdity, our inquiry begins and ends with the plain meaning of the legislature's chosen words, read within the "overall statutory context." Rosas v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 249 Ariz. 26, 28 ¶ 13, 465 P.3d 516, 518 (2020). Otherwise, we turn to "secondary" factors, such as subject matter, history, purpose, and consequences. Id.

A. Standing

¶12 The Arizona Constitution omits a "case or controversy" requirement akin to the one contained in its federal counterpart. City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n , 246 Ariz. 206, 209 ¶ 8, 437 P.3d 865, 868 (2019). For this reason, we are "not constitutionally constrained to decline jurisdiction based on lack of standing." Id. Still, Arizona courts do "exercise restraint to ensure they ‘refrain from issuing advisory opinions, that cases be ripe for decision and not moot, and that issues be fully developed between true adversaries.’ " Id. (quoting Bennett v. Brownlow , 211 Ariz. 193, 196 ¶ 16, 119 P.3d 460, 463 (2005) ). Standing may be conferred by a statute. See id. at 209–10 ¶ 9, 437 P.3d at 868–69.

¶13 Both the open-meeting and the conflict-of-interest law contain similarly worded enforcement provisions that confer standing. "Any person affected by" either "an alleged violation" of the open-meeting law, § 38-431.07(A), or "a decision of a public agency," § 38-506(B), has standing to file suit. Though the scope of suitable claimants under each depends upon a distinct event—for the open-meeting law, its violation; for the conflict-of-interest law, a decision—we, like the court of appeals, see "no principled reason" to adopt dissimilar meanings for their common terminology. See Welch , 250 Ariz. at 192 ¶ 15, 477 P.3d at 116 ; accord Qasimyar v. Maricopa County , 250 Ariz. 580, 587 ¶ 19, 483 P.3d 202, 209 (App. 2021) ("[A] word or phrase used in related statutes should be construed to bear the same meaning throughout."). Accordingly, we construe the use of the phrase "[a]ny person affected by" uniformly.³

¶14 No doubt, "any person" includes Welch. See Person , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("A human being."). The only question, then, is whether the Call appointment's impact on Welch's status as a Precinct Five resident and taxpayer permits us to conclude that he was "affected by" the Board's actions. We find that it does not.

¶15 Neither law defines "affected by," and dictionaries circularly define "affect" as meaning "to produce an effect on" or "to influence in some way." Affect , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); accord Affect , Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/affect (last visited Aug. 31, 2021); see also State v. Pena , 235 Ariz. 277, 279 ¶ 6, 331 P.3d 412, 414 (2014) ("Absent statutory definitions, courts apply common meanings and may look to dictionaries." (internal citations omitted)). Such breadth plausibly encompasses any articulable relationship. But such a broad definition would invite absurd results. Indeed, to define "affected by" without any concrete limitation would be to ignore its limiting role. The practical result would be a grant of standing to "any person," thereby reducing the legislature's presumably intentional inclusion of "affected by" to mere surplusage. See Nicaise v. Sundaram , 245 Ariz. 566, 568 ¶ 11, 432 P.3d 925, 927 (2019) ("A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered...