Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Shields

201 A.D.3d 1007

162 N.Y.S.3d 129

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., respondent,

v.Neishanette SHIELDS, et al., appellants, et al., defendants.

2019–04268

Index No. 1048/14

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—November 30, 2021

January 26, 2022

Petroff Amshen, LLP, Brooklyn, NY (Serge F. Petroff, James Tierney, and Steven Amshen of counsel), for appellants.

Gross Polowy, LLC, (Reed Smith, LLP, New York, NY [Andrew B. Messite and Michael V. Margarella ], of counsel), for respondent.

COLLEEN D. DUFFY, J.P., FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, LARA J. GENOVESI, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendants Neishanette Shields and Heather Ortiz appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Noach Dear, J.), dated January 29, 2019. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against those defendants and for an order of reference.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Neishanette Shields and Heather Ortiz and for an order of reference are denied.

On June 30, 2010, Neishanette Shields and Heather Ortiz (hereinafter together the defendants) executed a note whereby they promised to repay the sum of $542,691. As collateral security for the note, the defendants executed a mortgage encumbering certain real property. On or about July 28, 2011, the mortgage was assigned to the plaintiff. The plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose the mortgage by summons and complaint dated January 7, 2014. The complaint alleged that the defendants failed to make the payment that was due on January 1, 2011, and subsequent payments thereafter.

The plaintiff moved, inter alia for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants and for an order of reference. The defendants opposed the plaintiff's motion. By order dated January 29, 2019, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion. The defendants appeal.

"[I]n a residential [mortgage] foreclosure action, a plaintiff moving for summary judgment must tender sufficient evidence demonstrating ... its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304" ( Everbank v. Greisman, 180 A.D.3d 758, 759, 119 N.Y.S.3d 231 [internal quotation marks omitted]). RPAPL 1304(1) provides that, "at least ninety days before a lender, an assignee or a mortgage loan servicer commences legal action against the borrower ... including mortgage foreclosure, such lender, assignee or mortgage loan servicer shall give notice to the borrower." The statute requires that the notice be sent by registered or certified mail, and also by first-class mail, to the last known address of the borrower (see RPAPL 1304[2] ). "Strict compliance with RPAPL 1304 notice to the borrower or borrowers is a condition precedent to the commencement of a foreclosure action" ( AXIOM Bank v. Dutan, 190 A.D.3d 672, 674, 135 N.Y.S.3d 912 ; see Citibank, N.A. v. Conti–Scheurer, 172 A.D.3d 17, 20, 98 N.Y.S.3d 273 ).

"A plaintiff demonstrates its compliance with the statute ‘by proof of the requisite mailing, which can be established [by] proof of the actual mailings, such as affidavits of mailing or domestic return receipts with attendant signatures, or proof of a standard office mailing procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed, sworn to by someone with personal knowledge of the procedure’ " ( U.S. Bank N.A. v. Pickering–Robinson, 197 A.D.3d 757, 759, 153 N.Y.S.3d 179, quoting Citibank, N.A. v. Conti–Scheurer, 172 A.D.3d at 21, 98 N.Y.S.3d 273 ). "There is no requirement that a plaintiff in a foreclosure action rely on any particular set of business records to establish a prima facie case, so long as the plaintiff satisfies the admissibility requirements of CPLR 4518(a), and the records themselves actually evince the facts for which they are relied upon" ( U.S. Bank N.A. v. Pickering–Robinson, 197 A.D.3d at 759, 153 N.Y.S.3d 179, quoting Citigroup v. Kopelowitz, 147 A.D.3d 1014, 1015, 48 N.Y.S.3d 223 ).

Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that it strictly complied with RPAPL 1304. The plaintiff relied primarily on an affidavit from Sherri W. McManus, its vice president of loan documentation. While McManus did not state in the affidavit that she was charged with actually mailing the notices, her affidavit purported to establish that the plaintiff's office mailing procedure was designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed. "Evidence of an established and regularly followed office procedure may give rise to a rebuttable presumption that such a notification was mailed to and received by [the intended recipient]" ( CIT Bank N.A. v. Schiffman, 36 N.Y.3d 550, 556, 145 N.Y.S.3d 1, 168 N.E.3d 1138 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Gonzalez [Ross], 47 N.Y.2d 922, 923, 419 N.Y.S.2d 488, 393 N.E.2d 482 ; Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Donnelly, 22 N.Y.3d 1169, 1170, 985 N.Y.S.2d 470, 8 N.E.3d 847 ). "[I]n order for the presumption to arise, [the] office practice must be geared so as to ensure the likelihood that [the] notice ... is always properly addressed and mailed" ( CIT Bank N.A. v. Schiffman, 36 N.Y.3d at 556, 145...