Wells v. McKoy

PETER WELLS, 07-A-0650, Plaintiff, v. JEFF McKOY, MARK BRADT, JAMES THOMPSON,LEANNE LATONA, and NOI CHAPLAIN JAMES CONNER, Defendants.

1:16-CV-00113 EAW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

December 27, 2018

DECISION AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff Peter Wells ("Plaintiff"), a prisoner currently incarcerated at the Coxsackie Correctional Facility, brings this action asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. Plaintiff, a former follower of the Nation of Islam ("NOI"), alleges that defendants Jeff McKoy ("McKoy"), Mark Bradt ("Bradt"), James Thompson ("Thompson"), Leanna Latona ("Latona"), and James Conner ("Conner") (collectively "Defendants") interfered with his ability to attend the Saviors' Day¹ event on March 1, 2013, while he was housed at the Attica Correctional Facility ("Attica"). (Dkt. 1). Specifically, Plaintiff challenges a policy implemented by the New York State Departmentof Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") regarding specially prepared meals for religious holidays. (Id. at 1-2).

Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 22). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from Defendants' Rule 56 Statement of Undisputed Facts (Dkt. 22-1) ("Defendants' Statement"), Plaintiff's Statement of Disputed Facts (Dkt. 25 at 20-33) ("Plaintiff's Statement"), and their supporting documents. All facts are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as is required when a defendant moves for summary judgment.

Plaintiff began residing at Attica on June 27, 2011. (Dkt. 22-3 at 19). At all relevant times, McKoy was the Deputy Commissioner for Program Services at DOCCS' Central Office. (Dkt. 22-1 at ¶ 2). During the Plaintiff's incarceration at Attica, Bradt was the Superintendent, Thompson was the Deputy Superintendent of Program Services, Latona was the Assistant Deputy Superintendent of Program Services, and Conner was the NOI Chaplain. (Id. at ¶ 3).

While housed at Attica, Plaintiff self-designated his religion as NOI. (Id. at ¶ 5; Dkt. 25 at 22). NOI followers adhere to special dietary restrictions for certain religious holidays. (See Dkt. 22-1 at ¶ 16; Dkt. 22-3 at ¶¶ 14-15).

DOCCS provides an alternative inmate diet system, called the cold alternative diet ("CAD") program, designed to accommodate certain religious dietary restrictions,including those of NOI followers. (Dkt. 22-1 at ¶¶ 8, 16). The CAD program costs more than twice the amount of a standard inmate diet. (Id. at ¶ 9).

McKoy delegates certain responsibilities for religious programming to DOCCS' Office of Ministerial, Family and Volunteer Services ("MFVS"). (Dkt. 22-1 at ¶ 11). On January 11, 2013, the director of MFVS issued a memorandum directing New York State prison facilities to require inmates to complete a CAD meal consent form ("CAD form"). (Id. at ¶ 12). Under the policy, inmates first had to sign the CAD form to get approval for receiving religious meals. (Dkt. 22-3 at ¶ 15). They would then separately sign up by a specific deadline for each religious event where they planned to consume a CAD meal. (Id. at 13). If an inmate signed up for a CAD meal and then voluntarily did not consume it, the inmate could potentially face disciplinary sanctions. (Dkt. 22-1 at ¶ 13). These sanctions would not apply if the inmate missed the meal for an "acceptable" reason such as admission to the infirmary, medical keeplock/confinement, disciplinary confinement, admission to the Special Housing Unit, a court trip, or draft status. (Id. at ¶ 14). All of the above information was included on the CAD form. (Dkt. 22-3 at 15).

Plaintiff was provided with the CAD form by mail and in person by Conner. (Dkt. 22-1 at ¶ 16). On February 26, 2013, Latona, who implemented the CAD form policy at Attica, attended an NOI gathering at the prison. (Id. at ¶ 17). She went to try and alleviate concerns raised by inmates about potentially facing discipline if they signed up for a CAD meal for the NOI holiday Saviors' Day. (Id.). Latona verbally communicated to the inmates at the NOI gathering that Attica did not intend to discipline them with respect to the new CAD form policy if they signed the form for the Saviors' Day feast. (Id. at ¶ 38;Dkt. 25 at 26-27). Plaintiff requested that Latona provide him with a written copy of that promise, which she refused to do. (Dkt. 25 at 26-27).

Plaintiff refused to sign the CAD form and did not register for the Saviors' Day meal, nor did he attend the Saviors' Day service. (Dkt. 22-1 at ¶ 18; Dkt. 25 at 27).

On May 28, 2013, McKoy rescinded the CAD form procedure because it "caused some concern among staff and the [prisoner] population." (Dkt. 22-3 at 17). McKoy asserts that DOCCS does not intend to reinstitute the CAD form policy or anything similar for special religious holiday feasts. (Id. at ¶ 45). Plaintiff was transferred from Attica on November 1, 2013. (Dkt. 22-3 at 19; Dkt. 25 at 21). On October 22, 2015, Plaintiff changed his designated religion to the Nation of Gods and Earth ("NOGE"). (Dkt. 22-1 at ¶ 6; Dkt. 25 at 22).

Plaintiff filed the instant action on February 8, 2016 (Dkt. 1). On August 26, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and allowed his RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief and his free exercise claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to proceed. (Dkt. 5 at 2-3).² Defendants answered the complaint on December 6, 2016 (Dkt. 11), and discovery in this matter closed on July 28, 2017 (Dkt. 13 at 3). On September 28, 2017,Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 22). Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants' motion on October 26, 2017. (Dkt. 25).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be granted if the moving party establishes "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court should grant summary judgment if, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no rational jury could find in favor of that party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).

"The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. . . ." Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 758 F.3d 473, 486 (2d Cir. 2014). "Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may meet its burden by showing the evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be insufficient to carry the non-movant's burden of proof at trial." Johnson v. Xerox Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 99, 103 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, and may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation." Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2dCir. 2011)). Specifically, the non-moving party "must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact." Brown, 654 F.3d at 358. Indeed, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

In addition, "[i]t is well-settled that pro se litigants generally are entitled to a liberal construction of their pleadings, which should be read to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001) (quotations and citation omitted); see also Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 687 (2d Cir. 2004) ("It is well-established that 'when [a] plaintiff proceeds pro se . . . a court is obliged to construe his pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations.'" (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Moreover, "a pro se litigant should be afforded every reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that he has a valid claim." Satchell v. Dilworth, 745 F.2d 781, 785 (2d Cir. 1984).

II. Plaintiff's RLUIPA Claims

"Section 3 of RLUIPA provides that '[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise [of an institutionalized person],' 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a), 'in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance,' id. § 2000cc-1(b)(1), or in a way that affects or would affect 'commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes,' id. § 2000cc-1(b)(2)." Washington v. Gonyea, 731 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2013) (alterations in original). While "RLUIPA does not authorize claims formonetary damages against state officers," an institutionalized person may bring a claim for injunctive relief under RLUIPA. Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 224 (2d Cir. 2014).

Defendants move for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief. (Dkt. 22-2 at 6-9). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief, and accordingly grants Defendants' motion.³

To establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution, "a plaintiff must, generally speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered 'injury in fact,' that the injury is 'fairly traceable' to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision." Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S....