Wells v. Rhodes

928 F.Supp.2d 920

William WELLS, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Brandon RHODES, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:11–CV–00217.

United States District Court,

S.D. Ohio,

Eastern Division.

Feb. 12, 2013.

Alexander Morris Spater, Spater Law Office, C. Raphael Davis–Williams, The Law Office of Spater & Davis–Williams, LLC, Columbus, OH, Adam C. Stone, Bucyrus, OH, for Plaintiffs.

Lisa A. Wafer, Saia & Piatt, Inc., John Alan Yaklevich, Moore Yaklevich & Mauger, Columbus, OH, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR., District Judge.

Plaintiffs, William Wells, Priscilla Wells, Jalisa Gibson, Shanay Gibson, J.W., and J.D.W. (collectively “Plaintiffs”), bring this action against Defendants, including Defendant Brandon Rhodes (“Rhodes”), alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 3617 of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), and Ohio Revised Code § 2307.70. This matter is before the Court for consideration of Rhodes' Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of Plaintiffs' claims. (ECF No. 94.) At this time, the Court will also consider Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability against Rhodes.¹ (ECF No. 96.) For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED and Rhodes' Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Facts

During March 2011, Plaintiffs William Wells and Priscilla Wells lived in Marengo, Ohio with their four children: Plaintiffs Jalisa Gibson, Shanay Gibson, J.W., and J.D.W. ( See W. Wells Dep. 7, ECF No. 92.) Plaintiffs are African Americans. Marengo is a rural area and the record indicates that few African Americans live there. ( See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 2; Rhodes Dep. 37, ECF No. 93.) In March 2011, Shanay Gibson, J.W., and J.D.W. were each attending Highland High School. ( See, e.g., S. Gibson Dep. 9, ECF No. 91.) Defendants Rhodes and D.G. also lived in Marengo during March 2011. (Rhodes Dep. 5, 7.) Rhodes graduated from Highland High School in 2009. ( Id. at 5–6.) D.G. was still attending Highland High School during the time in question. ( See D.G. Dep. 10, ECF No. 95.) Both Rhodes and D.G. are white.

The facts surrounding the underlying March 2011 incident are largely undisputed. During the evening of March 2, 2011, and into the early morning of March 3, 2011, Rhodes and D.G. were drinking at D.G.'s home. ( See Rhodes Dep. 15, 43.) According to Rhodes, he and D.G., together with D.G.'s cousin, consumed approximately a thirty—pack of beer between the three of them. ( Id.) Rhodes stated that while they were drinking D.G.—after discussing a relationship between Rhodes' sister and J.W.—constructed a cross out of wood. ( See Rhodes Dep. 16–19, 22.) D.G. wrote “KKK will make you pay” and “Nigger” with a permanent marker on the cross. (D.G. Dep. 47.) During his deposition, Rhodes estimated that the cross was five feet tall and four feet wide. (Rhodes Dep. 23.)

Rhodes and D.G. loaded the cross into Rhodes' truck. ( Id. at 25.) D.G. then grabbed a can of gasoline and put it into the truck. (D.G. Dep. 54.) Rhodes drove—accompanied by D.G.—to Plaintiffs' residence, which he estimated was three to four miles from D.G.'s house. (Rhodes Dep. 25–26.) According to D.G., they traveled a longer route to avoid main roads. (D.G. Dep. 58.) Rhodes parked between 50 to 100 yards from Plaintiffs' house. (Rhodes Dep. 27.) D.G. and Rhode carried the cross and laid it on Plaintiffs' front lawn. ( Id. at 26–27.) They then poured gasoline on the cross and D.G. lit the cross on fire with a lighter.² ( Id. at 27; D.G. Dep. 63.) Rhodes and D.G. then ran from the scene. (Rhodes Dep. 28.)

Rhodes denies that D.G. and he had any specific purpose in burning the cross, stating that they were “being stupid” and that “[i]t just happened.” (Rhodes Dep. 15, 18.) Nevertheless, both Rhodes and D.G. testified to having a general understanding of the Ku Klux Klan; the Ku Klux Klan's hatred for African Americans; and the threatening, or hateful, message typically associated with a burning cross. ( See Rhodes Dep. 10–12, 33–38; D.G. Dep. 18–20.) Moreover, Rhodes was aware that Plaintiffs were an African American family and that the messages D.G. wrote on the cross indicated hatred against African Americans. ( See Rhodes Dep. 36–37.) Likewise, D.G. admitted that he would not have written the messages on the cross if Shanay Gibson had not been African American. (D.G. Dep. 93.)

In November 2012, Rhodes signed a plea agreement to criminal charges stemming from his conduct in March 2011. The plea agreement stated “that the purpose of burning the cross at the residence was to intimidate an African–American juvenile who lived at the residence and interfere with the juvenile's housing rights.” (Plea Agreement ¶ 3, ECF No. 102–1.)

Although the facts of the underlying event are largely undisputed, the parties dispute what, if any, injury Plaintiffs sufferedas a result of Defendants' actions. The record evidence suggests that William Wells, Priscilla Wells, J.W., and J.D.W. did not suffer direct physical injury and did not seek medical treatment as a result of the cross burning.³ ( See, e.g., W. Wells Dep. 83; P. Wells 66, ECF No. 90; J.D.W. Dep. 34–35, ECF No. 88; J.W. Dep. 61–62, ECF No. 89.) Fortunately, there was no damage to Plaintiffs rental home as a result of the cross burning. (W. Well Dep. 93.)

Plaintiffs, however, have also testified regarding the distress they have suffered as a result of the incident. For example, during their deposition testimony, Plaintiffs averred to experiencing fear and anxiety as a result of the cross burning. ( See, e.g., W. Wells Dep. 56, 60–61; P. Wells Dep. 69; J.D.W. Dep. 26, 29; J.W. Dep. 39, 45, 48, 55; J. Gibson Dep. 48, 84–85, ECF No. 87; S. Gibson Dep. 52–53, 68, ECF No. 91.) Certain Plaintiffs, and most prominently Shanay Gibson, reported trouble sleeping after the incident. ( See, e.g., S. Gibson Dep. 54, 99; J.D.W. Dep. 34.) Additionally, Plaintiffs stated that they have considered moving because of the cross burning. ( See, e.g., W. Wells Dep. 61–62; J.D.W. Dep. 32; S. Gibson Dep. 65.)

On August 22, 2011, the Court held a default judgment hearing regarding damages at which time Plaintiffs testified regarding how the cross burning has impacted them. ( See generally Hearing Tr., ECF No. 80.) In addition to testifying to the fear and anxiety that the incident caused, Plaintiffs stated that the cross burning has changed their family's dynamic. ( See, e.g., id. at 17, 24, 30–31, 51, 56–57.) For example, Jalisa Gibson testified that, since the incident, her family tends to become frustrated with one another. ( Id. at 17.) Shanay Gibson stated that since the cross burning her family has basically become “shut up in the house ....” ( Id. at 24.) Furthermore, Ms. Wells indicated that the cross burning took the comfort of the family's home away from them. ( Id. at 40.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants Rhodes, D.G., Larry Matthew Gandee, and Alisa Dawn Gandee on March 11, 2011. Rhodes answered Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint in April 2011. In August 2011, the Court held a hearing concerning default judgment as to the remaining Defendants. On December 7, 2011, 2011 WL 6100325, the Court granted default judgment against Defendants D.G., Larry Matthew Gandee, and Alisa Dawn Gandee for compensatory damages, court costs and expenses in maintaining the action, and reasonable attorney's fees. (ECF No. 61.) Following a subsequent motion, the Court denied relief from this judgment.

Rhodes now moves for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiffs, in turn, move for summary judgment on their federal claims as to the issue of liability.⁴ This matter is now ripe for review.

II. STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The Court may therefore grant a motion for summary judgment if the nonmoving party who has the burden of proof at trial fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element that is essential to that party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The “party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions” of the record which demonstrate “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56). “The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505;see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (the requirement that a dispute be “genuine” means that there must be more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”). Consequently, the central issue is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. ANALYSIS

As detailed above, Plaintiff's brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 3617 of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), and Ohio Revised Code § 2307.70. The Court will consider each claim independently.⁵

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1982

Plaintiffs first maintain...