Wellstar Health Sys., Inc. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.

591 F.Supp.3d 1305

WELLSTAR HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiff,

v.MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-02841-SDG

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

Signed March 10, 2022

Robert Moore, Moore Law Firm, Corinth, MS, for Plaintiff.

Seth M. Friedman, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Mid-Century Insurance.

James Townshend Budd, Mabry & McClelland, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Peter Coffin Brown, Dan Chapman & Associates, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance.

OPINION AND ORDER

Steven D. Grimberg, United States District Court Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Mid-Century Insurance Company (Mid-Century) and Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance, Inc.’s (Philadelphia) (collectively, Defendants) motion to dismiss [ECF 7] Plaintiff Wellstar Health Systems, Inc.’s (Wellstar) complaint.¹ After careful consideration of the record and for the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

I. Background²

On August 5, 2019, non-party Jose Antonio Alfaro (Alfaro) was admitted to Wellstar Kennestone Hospital, where he was treated for injuries resulting from a car accident.³ Wellstar treated Alfaro at the cost of $87,468.70.⁴ Though not expressly pleaded in the complaint, the parties do not dispute that Alfaro did not pay Wellstar for his treatment. Sometime after September 24, 2019, Wellstar filed liens in Cobb County and Cherokee County, Georgia for Alfaro's outstanding medical bill.⁵ By February 2021, Mid-Century and Philadelphia, Alfaro's uninsured motorist insurance (UM) carriers,⁶ settled Alfaro's claims for benefits "without consent and without payment of Wellstar[’s]" liens.⁷

On June 14, 2021, Wellstar filed two lawsuits—one against Mid-Century, and one against Philadelphia—to enforce its liens. Defendants removed these cases to federal court on July 16.⁸ On July 30, Defendants moved to dismiss.⁹ The parties do not dispute that Wellstar's actions against Mid-Century and Philadelphia arise from the same hospital liens emanating from Wellstar's treatment of the same non-party, Alfaro. Defendants’ nearly identical motions to dismiss Wellstar's nearly identical complaints implicate the same issue: whether Defendants are liable for Wellstar's $87,468.70 in hospital liens pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-470, et seq. As a result, and because the parties consented, the Court consolidated these cases on January 5, 2022.¹⁰

II. Discussion

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendants’ sole asserted basis for jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship.¹¹ Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction over civil actions between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. "The party wishing to assert diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that diversity exists." Duff v. Beaty , 804 F. Supp. 332, 334 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (citing Cameron v. Hodges , 127 U.S. 322, 8 S.Ct. 1154, 32 L.Ed. 132 (1888) ). "[F]or purposes of ... subject matter jurisdiction of the district court, the critical time is the date of removal." Leonard v. Enters. Rent a Car , 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 2002).

At the time of removal, Defendants—the parties seeking to assert diversity jurisdiction—met their burden of establishing diversity jurisdiction. Id. ; Duff , 804 F. Supp. at 334. Mid-Century alleges that it is "a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of California with its principal place of business in California."¹² Philadelphia asserts that it is "a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania."¹³ Defendants claim that Wellstar is a "Georgia corporation with a principal place of business in Georgia."¹⁴ 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (A corporation is a "citizen of every State by which it has been incorporated and of the State ... where it has its principal place of business."). The lien amount exceeds $75,000. Therefore, this Court has diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

1. Legal Standard

At the motion to dismiss stage, "all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." FindWhat Inv'r Grp. v. FindWhat.com , 658 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp. , 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) ). However, this principle does not apply to legal conclusions set forth in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A complaint is plausible on its face when the plaintiff pleads factual content necessary for the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged. Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "The well-pled allegations must nudge the claim ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’ " Sinaltrainal v. Coca–Cola Co. , 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth. , 566 U.S. 449, 132 S.Ct. 1702, 182 L.Ed.2d 720 (2012).

2. Statutory Interpretation

When interpreting Georgia statutes, "the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter." O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(b). The Court must "avoid constructions that make some language mere surplusage or meaningless, construe a statute in relation to other statutes of which it is a part, and construe together and harmonize all statutes relating to the same subject-matter wherever possible." Aimwell, Inc. v. McLendon Enters., Inc. , 318 Ga. App. 394, 397, 734 S.E.2d 84 (2012) (citation omitted) (cleaned up). Moreover, "[a] federal court applying state law is bound to adhere to decisions of the state's intermediate appellate courts absent some persuasive indication that the state's highest court would decide the issue otherwise." Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. , 710 F.2d 678, 690 (11th Cir. 1983).

The grounding principal of Georgia statutory interpretation is simple: Courts interpreting Georgia statutes are to "presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant." Arby's Rest. Grp., Inc. v. McRae , 292 Ga. 243, 245, 734 S.E.2d 55 (citation omitted) (2012); Harrison v. McAfee , 338 Ga. App. 393, 397, 788 S.E.2d 872 (2016).

3. Analysis

Georgia's hospital lien statute, O.C.G.A. § 44-14-470(b) (Section 470 (b)), states in pertinent part:

Any [hospital] ... in this state shall have a lien for the reasonable charges for ... care and treatment of an injured person, which lien shall be upon any and all causes of action accruing to the person to whom the care was furnished or to the legal representative of such person on account of injuries giving rise to the causes of action and which necessitated the ... care .... The lien provided for in this subsection is only a lien against such causes of action and shall not be a lien against such injured person, such legal representative, or any other property or assets of such persons and shall not be evidence of such person's failure to pay a debt.

Section 470(b) describes how and when hospital liens may attach—"upon causes of action accruing to persons for injuries treated." Id.

O.C.G.A. § 44-14-473(a) (Section 473(a)) provides:

No release of the cause or causes of action or of any judgment thereon or any covenant not to bring an action thereon shall be valid or effectual against the lien created by Code Section 44-14-470 unless the holder thereof shall join therein or execute a release of the lien; and the claimant or assignee of the lien may enforce the lien by an action against the person, firm, or corporation liable for the damages or such person, firm, or corporation's insurer.... The action shall be commenced against the person liable for the damages or such person's insurer within one year after the date the liability is finally determined by a settlement, by a release, by a covenant not to bring an action, or by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.

Section 473(a) explains that releases and covenants not to sue are ineffective against a lien unless the lien claimant consents, and then it describes how that lien may be enforced. Id.

The dispute here centers around the parties’ differing interpretations of how these two statutes interact. If the Court presumes—as it must—that the Georgia General Assembly meant what it said with respect to this statutory scheme, then the Court must conclude that hospital liens may be enforced against UM carriers like Defendants and deny their motion to dismiss.

First, Section 470(b)’s provision that hospital liens "shall be upon any and all causes of action accruing to the person to whom the care was furnished" clearly contemplates that hospital liens may attach to any cause of action an injured person might have had. Id. (emphasis added). No language in Section 470(b) limits or qualifies a hospital's lien, except a clause dictating that such a lien shall be against the cause of action, not any party. Cf. Harrison , 338 Ga. App. at 399, 788 S.E.2d 872 ("That the statute does not identify the particular civil defendants against whom it applies does not make it ambiguous, it makes it unlimited. The General Assembly knows how to limit the sort of civil defendants to which a statute applies, when it wishes to do so."). That the Georgia General Assembly contemplated a hospital lien would attach to a cause of action instead of a party counsels that the statutory scheme does not discriminate regarding the relationship between an injured person and the party against which the injured...