Wentzel v. Williams Scotsman Inc.

Elaine Wentzel, Plaintiff, v. Williams Scotsman Incorporated, Defendant.

No. CV-18-02101-PHX-SMB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

March 9, 2020

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Williams Scotsman Incorporated's Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 80, "Mot."). Plaintiff Elaine Wentzel responded, (Doc. 87, "Resp."), and Defendant replied, (Doc. 90, "Reply"). Both parties filed separate statements of facts with multiple exhibits. (Doc. 81, "DSOF"; Doc. 86, "PSOF"). The Court has considered the pleadings and viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Wentzel and now enters the following Order.¹

BACKGROUND

Elaine Wentzel worked for Williams Scotsman Inc., a modular office space provider, out of its Phoenix, Arizona office from September 3, 2013 until being fired on August 1, 2017. (PSOF ¶¶ 30-34, 126-27; DSOF ¶ 1.) Although Williams Scotsman initially hired her as a sales support center representative, she was eventually promoted to Account Executive on August 25, 2014, where her primary responsibility was leasing modular buildings and related products to businesses and public entities in Arizona. (PSOF¶¶ 33-34; DSOF ¶ 1.) While employed at Williams Scotsman, Ms. Wentzel was the only female Account Executive working in the Phoenix office, where at most two Account Executives, including her, worked at any given time. (PSOF ¶¶ 33, 51; DSOF ¶ 2.) The Phoenix office split its sales responsibilities between the two Account Executives into a northern and southern territory, which were allegedly unequal in size and profitability.² (PSOF ¶¶ 38-39, 64-66, 78; DSOF ¶ 2.)

When Ms. Wentzel first started as an Account Executive at Williams Scotsman, Mr. Gomez supervised her in addition to serving as an area manager. (PSOF ¶ 33.) However, after Mr. Gomez stepped down from this position in June 2015, Mr. Reynolds assumed responsibility for Arizona's Account Executives.³ (PSOF ¶¶ 43, 57, 64, 67.) Three months into Mr. Reynolds' supervision of Ms. Wentzel, she was placed on a performance improvement plan ("PIP"). (DSOF ¶¶ 7-14.) However, Ms. Wentzel was not immediately fired because her performance steadily improved in 2016. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 20.) Indeed, her 2016 performance improved so much that Williams Scotsman moved her off the PIP, (DSOF ¶ 15), and even recognized her for numerous sales performance achievements. (PSOF ¶¶ 121, 123-25.) Her 2017 performance appears no different. For example, she already met 67% of her sales goal in the first seven months of 2017. (DSOF ¶ 15.) This productivity even exceeded her 2016 sales performance, where she had reached only about 65% of her annual target sales goal after the first seven months. Additionally, although Ms. Wentzel was subject to the same sales incentive plan as Mr. Whitaker, the other Account Executive for 2016 and 2017, she earned more than him on an annual basis in 2016 and on a monthly basis in 2017. (PSOF ¶¶ 111-118; DSOF ¶¶ 3-6.) At any rate, notwithstanding Ms. Wentzel's remarkable sales performance relative to Mr. Whitaker, Williams Scotsmanfired her on August 1, 2017 because her overall performance remained unsatisfactory.⁴ (PSOF ¶¶ 126-27; DSOF ¶¶ 17-21.)

Then about eleven months after being fired, Ms. Wentzel filed suit against Williams Scotsman. (See Doc. 1.) Her Complaint alleges: (1) a violation of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); (2) sex discrimination under the Arizona Civil Rights Act ("ACRA"), A.R.S. § 41-1463(B); and (3) disability discrimination under the ACRA, A.R.S. § 41-1462(B). (See Doc. 1.) Williams Scotsman now moves for summary judgment on all three. (Mot.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is any factual issue that might affect the outcome of the case under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or by "showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). The court need only consider the cited materials, but it may also consider any other materials in the record. Id. 56(c)(3). Summary judgment may also be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

Initially, the movant bears the burden of demonstrating to the Court the basis for the motion and "identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323. If the movant fails to carry its initial burden, the nonmovant need not produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. FritzCos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). If the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 1103. The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor, but it "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The nonmovant's bare assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a motion for summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 247-48. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted). However, in the summary judgment context, the Court believes the nonmovant's evidence, id. at 255, and construes all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004). If "the evidence yields conflicting inferences [regarding material facts], summary judgment is improper, and the action must proceed to trial." O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 311 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

Williams Scotsman generally claims summary judgment is appropriate because Ms. Wentzel cannot point to evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary judgment. (Mot. at 2.) In stressing the importance of witness credibility determinations by the factfinder in employment discrimination cases, Ms. Wentzel argues summary judgment is unwarranted. (Resp. at 10-11.) However, as explained below, only Ms. Wentzel's second claim, sex discrimination under the ACRA, withstands Williams Scotsman's Motion. The Court addresses each of her three claims in further detail below.

I. Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)

The Equal Pay Act ("EPA") provides in part:

No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of theopposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.

29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (emphasis added); see also Hein v. Oregon Coll. of Educ., 718 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[The EPA] embodies the deceptively simple principle that employees doing equal work should be paid equal wages, regardless of sex." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

A. Ms. Wentzel Cannot Establish a Prima Facie Case Under the EPA.

To establish a prima facie case under the EPA, Plaintiff must "show[] that employees of the opposite sex were paid different wages for equal work." Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1022 (1999). In other words, she must "show (a) that the jobs being compared are 'substantially equal' and (b) that she did not receive equal pay for that substantially equal work." Huebner v. ESEC, Inc., No. CV 01-0157-PHX-PGR, 2003 WL 21039345, *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 2003) (citing Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1074). Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because she was paid more than her alleged comparator, Mr. Whitaker.

1. Substantially Equal Work

Plaintiff must first establish that her job is "substantially equal" to a job performed by someone of the opposite sex. Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1074. For this inquiry, the court compares the jobs in question, not the relative skills of the individuals holding those jobs. Id.; see also Hein, 718 F.2d at 914 ("The statute explicitly applies to jobs that require equal skills, and not to employees that possess equal skills."). The jobs need not be identical to be "substantially similar." EEOC v. Maricopa Cty Cmty. Coll. Dist., 736 F.2d 510, 513 (9th Cir. 1984). Rather, "[i]t is the actual job performance requirements, rather than job classifications or titles, that is determinative," id. (citation omitted), and "[m]inordifferences in responsibility . . . do not make the equal pay standard inapplicable," id. at 514. "Courts examine whether the jobs at issue have a 'common core of tasks' and then determine whether any additional tasks required for one job but not the other make the two jobs substantially different." Allender v. Univ. of Portland, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1285 (D. Or. 2010) (quoting Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1074).

Here, Ms....