Werenka v. City of Boise

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TY JUSTIN WILLIAM WERENKA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BOISE, a municipal corporation; CORPORAL NORMAN CARTER, in his official and personal capacity; and OFFICER AVERY WESTENDORF, in his official and personal capacity, Defendants.

No. 1:23-cv-00275-BLW

United States District Court, D. Idaho

January 30, 2024

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

B Lynn Winmill, U.S. District Court Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is a motion for partial dismissal filed by Defendants City of Boise, Corporal Norman Carter, and Officer Avery Westendorf pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. 8. The Plaintiff, Ty Justin William Werenka has responded to the motion, and the Defendants have replied. Dkts. 10, 12. The Defendants and Mr. Werenka have also filed supplemental memoranda (Dkts. 16, 17) in response to the Court's order directing the parties to brief the preclusive effect of the probable cause hearings held in Ada County Case No CR01-22-18326 (Dkt. 15). The Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Werenka has filed an eleven-count Complaint against the City of Boise and two Boise police officers in their personal and official capacities concerning his 2022 warrantless misdemeanor arrest. Compl., Dkt. 1. Mr. Werenka alleges the incident occurred on June 11 shortly after 3:00 A.M. at a ParkBOI parking garage, where Corporal Norman “Denny” Carter and Officer Avery Westendorf were responding to an automobile accident. Id. at 2. Werenka was leaving the garage at that time in his vehicle and had a short discussion with a garage employee. Id. The employee asked him to move along. Id. Werenka exited the garage, parked nearby, and returned on foot with his phone to film the police officers' interactions with the public. Id. The garage employee again asked Werenka to leave. Id.

Werenka alleges that he then began to walk away, but Corporal Carter stopped him, “approached him, and asked him why he was interfering with an investigation.” Id. Werenka moved his phone and asked Carter to explain the purported interference. Id. He alleges that Carter then “slapped Mr. Werenka's phone into the ground, shoved Mr. Werenka by his neck, threw him into a nearby wall, and violently took him to the ground.” Id. ¶ 18. With Officer Westendorf's assistance, Carter arrested Werenka for resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer, pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-705. Werenka alleges that “none” of the conduct which Carter provided in his sworn statement as support for the arrest actually occurred. The statements specifically alleged by Werenka to be false are that Werenka obstructed Carter while he was carrying out his duties; that Carter feared for his safety; that Werenka had failed to leave the garage; and that Werenka physically resisted being arrested. Id. ¶¶ 23, 24.

Werenka states that the Boise City Attorney's Office charged him pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-705 based upon Carter's statement. Id. ¶ 26. The criminal complaint was dismissed on October 26, 2022, over five months after Werenka's arrest. Id. ¶ 34. While Werenka states that the dismissal occurred after his attorney filed a motion to dismiss, he later acknowledges that the city prosecutor had also filed a motion to dismiss. Id. ¶¶ 34, 35.

Werenka brings nine claims alleging violations of certain provisions of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, some of which are styled as federal constitutional tort claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and others styled as “Common Law” claims. Compl., Dkt. 1, at 5-10. Werenka brings two claims, “assault and battery” and “false arrest,” unambiguously pursuant to Idaho tort law. Compl., Dkt. 1, at 6, 8.

The Defendants argue that all Counts except for Count II should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). They also urge the Court to dismiss Carter and Westendorf as defendants in their official capacities. After thoroughly reviewing the briefing, the Court finds oral argument unnecessary to issuing its Order.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so as to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While a complaint challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must set forth “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 571. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.'” Id. at 557.

The Supreme Court identified two “working principles” that underlie Twombly in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). First, the court need not accept legal conclusions as true which are couched as factual allegations. Id. Rule 8 does not “unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 678-79. Second, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

ANALYSIS

The Court will first turn to Mr. Werenka's claims which are clearly alleged pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Next, the Court will review Werenka's state tort claims and those which he ambiguously pleads as either state tort claims or § 1983 claims. The Court will then consider Werenka's Monell claim against the City of Boise and the propriety of naming Corporal Carter and Officer Westendorf in their official capacities.

A. Section 1983 Claims

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against a “person who, under color of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any [person] to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws ....” A plaintiff seeking relief under § 1983 must show that (1) the action occurred under “under color of state law,” and (2) the action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right or federal statutory right. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Mr. Werenka appears to claim in Counts I, III, IV, VI in part,^[1]VIII-1, IX, and X in part,^[2]that the Defendants violated a number of his constitutional rights because his arrest was not supported by probable cause. The Defendants argue that these counts should be dismissed because Werenka is precluded from relitigating this issue. Additionally, with respect to the § 1983 claims en masse, the Defendants argue that the Complaint itself alleges facts which “demonstrate that not only was there probable cause for the stated reason of Plaintiff's arrest, there was also probable cause to arrest him for criminal trespass.” Defs.' Mem., Dkt. 8-1, at 8.

The Court is uncertain whether Werenka intended to bring Count VII (defamation), Count VIII-1 (intentional infliction of emotional distress), and Count IX (malicious prosecution) as state tort claims or as § 1983 claims because these Counts are styled as “Common Law” claims, yet allege violations of Werenka's rights as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and are alleged to be “enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Compl., Dkt. 1, at 7-8, 9. The Court will discuss these claims in the contexts of both causes of action in turn.

1. Preclusive Effect of the Probable Cause Finding

The Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice “of records from Plaintiff's criminal case” which establish, in the Defendants' view, that the magistrate judge found on two occasions that the misdemeanor charge was supported by probable cause and that Mr. Werenka “had every opportunity to challenge probable cause” but failed to do so. Defs.' Mem., Dkt. 8-1, at 5 & n.2. The Defendants assert that the magistrate judge's finding of probable cause precludes Mr. Werenka from relitigating the issue in this case. Id. at 4-6.

a. Probable cause finding

A court may consider certain materials in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, such as “documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice” without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2008). Judicial notice of an adjudicative fact under Rule 201 is proper if the fact is “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). Such a fact must be “generally known” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(1)-(2).

In his Complaint, Werenka repeatedly references and incorporates the Ada County criminal case which resulted from his June 2022 arrest. The Court finds it may consider the...