West v. Bonds

MITCHELL WEST, Petitioner, v. WILLIE BONDS, Respondent.

Civ. No. 17-5294 (MCA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

July 14, 2020

OPINION

MADELINE COX ARLEO, U.S.D.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, Mitchell West ("Petitioner" or "West"), is a state inmate proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the following reasons, Petitioner's habeas petition is denied and a certificate of appealability shall not issue.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The factual background is taken from the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division's opinion on Petitioner's direct appeal.

On February 17, 2005, at approximately 5:25 p.m., the Jersey City police responded to a 9-1-1 call from Rashon Ponder, who stated that he had been shot. Ponder was found in his car at the curb in the vicinity of Atlantic and Bergen Avenues. He had been shot multiple times. Detective Kevin Guy asked Ponder if he knew who shot him. Ponder nodded his head yes, but refused to identify the shooter.

Shortly thereafter, paramedics arrived and, after examining Ponder, informed the police that he was likely to die from his wounds. When Ponder was informed of his status, he again refused to disclose the name of the shooter. However, on April 10, 2005, Ponder, who survived, disclosed to the police that his shooter was defendant. Ponder told the police that he had initially refused to identify defendant because he was "afraid of dying," that he was "still in shock" and that he was "afraid of [defendant]." Defendant was arrested on April 26, 2005.

One year after the shooting, on February 17, 2006, defendant's former girlfriend, Shamia Henderson, provided the police with additional corroborative evidence of defendant's identity, stating that in mid or late February, 2005, defendant had bragged to her that he had "handled business for his brother." "He shot up the guy or car." Henderson later learned that the victim was Ponder.

An investigation of the scene of the crime disclosed seven nine-millimeter bullet casings next to the passenger side of the car occupied by Ponder. No casings were found on the driver's side. Additionally, the police found four vials containing suspected cocaine in the street next to the passenger door. The police were unable to determine who possessed the vials. While in the emergency room, approximately $1,500 was found in Ponder's pockets.

Directly in front of the car driven by Ponder, the police found a Plymouth minivan with its engine running. Inside the minivan was a cell phone. At trial, the parties stipulated that the van and phone belonged to defendant.

Ponder was surgically treated for eighteen entry and exit gunshot wounds, spending twelve days in the hospital. He remains disabled by his injuries. Ponder received three wounds on the front of his right arm, three on the rear of his right arm, one in the armpit, one in the mid-chest, two in the upper right thigh, two in the lower right thigh, two in the upper left thigh, two in the lower left thigh, and one in the scrotal area. Bullets fractured his upper right arm and his left femur. Analysis determined that all of the bullets were fired from the same semi-automatic pistol.

According to Ponder, the shooting occurred after he became stopped in traffic. Defendant got out of his car, which was stopped in front of Ponder's, walked over to the passenger side of Ponder's vehicle, and started shooting through the open window. Ponder testified that he was able to guide his car to the curb, where it was found directly behind the minivan belonging to defendant. He then called 9-1-1, his son's mother and his cousin.

Ponder claimed that he had known defendant for more than ten years. When asked at trial if Ponder knew of any reason defendant would want to shoot him, Ponder replied that a week or a few days before, "[w]e had a little altercation, like, verbal dispute. That's it."

State v. West, No. A-3402-06T4, 2009 WL 2146882, at *1-2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 21, 2009). Petitioner was convicted by a jury of first-degree attempted murder, second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose and third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon. He was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment subject to an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period.

The Appellate Division affirmed Petitioner's conviction on appeal, but remanded the matter for resentencing on the weapons counts because the two offenses were improperly merged. See id. at *6. On remand, Petitioner received the same aggregate sentence. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on Petitioner's direct appeal in October, 2009. (See ECF 8-10).

In March, 2010, Petitioner filed his first post-conviction relief ("PCR") petition in the New Jersey Superior Court. (See ECF 8-11). On July 15, 2011, the New Jersey Superior Court denied Petitioner's PCR petition in a written decision. (See ECF 8-16). On September 19, 2013, the Appellate Division affirmed that denial. See State v. West, No. A-2049-11T4, 2013 WL 5268933 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 19, 2013). The New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on Petitioner's first PCR petition on April 11, 2014. (See ECF 8-24).

As Petitioner's first PCR petition was progressing, he filed a second PCR petition in the New Jersey Superior Court in June, 2012. (See ECF 8-25). On October 5, 2012, the Superior Court dismissed the second PCR petition without prejudice because Petitioner had an appeal pending before the Appellate Division. (See ECF 8-26). Ultimately, on December, 2, 2014, the Appellate Division reversed the Superior Court's dismissal of the second PCR petition and remanded the matter for further proceedings. See State v. West, A-1294-12T3, 2014 WL 6751523 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 2, 2014). In October, 2015, the New Jersey SuperiorCourt denied Petitioner's second PCR petition in a written decision and order. (See ECF 8-33 & 8-34). On September 13, 2016, the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of Petitioner's second PCR petition. (See ECF 8-38). On February 1, 2017, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on Petitioner's second PCR petition. (See ECF 8-40).

In July, 2017, Petitioner filed this § 2254 habeas petition. Petitioner raises six claims in his petition; they are as follows:

1. The prosecutor's remarks during summation violated Petitioner's due process rights ("Claim I").

2. Permitting Petitioner's out-of-court statement to be admitted at trial infringed on Petitioner's right to cross-examination ("Claim II").

3. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate whether Petitioner was competent to stand trial ("Claim III").

4. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present a diminished capacity defense at trial ("Claim IV").

5. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advise Petitioner of his maximum sentence exposure upon conviction at trial which caused him to reject a plea offer ("Claim V").

6. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to obtain a current report on Petitioner's mental health and presenting this as a mitigating factor in Petitioner's favor at sentencing ("Claim VI").

Respondent filed a response in opposition to the habeas petition. (See ECF 8). Thereafter, Petitioner filed a reply in support. (See ECF 11).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A writ of habeas corpus for a person in custody under judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982); see also Mason v. Myers, 208 F.3d 414, 415 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254). Because Petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus after April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), applies. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997). Under AEDPA, federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

As a threshold matter, a court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). "'[C]learly established federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id. (citations omitted). Having identified the governing principle of federal law, a habeas court must also ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000). Thus, "a federal court may not issue a writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly establishedfederal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411.

The AEDPA standard under § 2254(d) is a "difficult" one to meet; it is a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). Review under § 2254(d)(1) "is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Id.

In applying AEDPA's standards, the relevant state court decision that is appropriate for federal habeas corpus review is the last reasoned state court decision. See Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 289-90 (3d Cir. 2008)....