Westfield Ins. Grp. v. Chattanooga Fire Prot., Inc.

WESTFIELD INSURANCE GROUP, Plaintiff, v. CHATTANOOGA FIRE PROTECTION, INC.,and CENTURY FIRE PROTECTION, LLC, Defendants.

No. 1:19-CV-36-SKL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE CHATTANOOGA DIVISION

May 20, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This case involves water damage to a La Quinta Inn that occurred after a sprinkler in the hotel's attic turned on unexpectedly. Plaintiff Westfield Insurance Group ("Plaintiff") insured the property and became subrogated to the rights of the hotel after paying a claim related to the water damage. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Century Fire Protection, LLC ("Century") and Defendant Chattanooga Fire Protection, Inc. ("Chattanooga Fire," and together with Century, "Defendants") are liable for the damage because they negligently installed and/or subsequently inspected the sprinkler system.

Before the Court are: (1) Century's motion for partial summary judgment [Doc. 61 (motion); Doc. 62 (brief and exhibits)]; (2) Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment against Century only [Doc. 66 (motion and exhibits); Doc. 71 (brief)]; and (3) Chattanooga Fire's motion for summary judgment [Doc. 64 (motion); Doc. 65 (brief and exhibits)].¹ These matters are now ripe. The Court has determined a hearing is not necessary.

I. BACKGROUND

It is undisputed that the attic of the hotel was equipped with a water sprinkler head that was rated to 155 degrees, meaning it was designed to automatically activate when the ambient temperature in the attic reached 100 degrees [Doc. 72 at Page ID # 1054; Doc. 72-1 at Page ID # 1066]. All parties agree this rating is insufficient for an uninsulated, non-airconditioned attic, and that a sprinkler head rated to 200 degrees should have been installed [see, e.g., Doc. 62 at Page ID # 236]. On June 29, 2018, the sprinkler did activate even though there was no fire, and the hotel sustained damage from the discharged water.²

Plaintiff originally sued only Chattanooga Fire. By July 2019, the parties determined that Century had also done fire protection work at the hotel, and therefore the parties jointly asked that Century be joined as a Defendant, which the Court allowed [Doc. 25 & Doc. 26].

Plaintiff does not specify which Defendant it believes installed the improper sprinkler.³ The sprinkler was engraved with "2016," which, according to Plaintiff's expert, means that it wasmanufactured in 2016 [Doc. 72-1 at Page ID # 1065]. Accordingly, the sprinkler was installed some time between January 1, 2016, and June 29, 2018. The record reflects that Chattanooga Fire performed fire-suppression-related inspections and maintenance at the hotel from 2010 until December 2016. There appears to have been a five-month gap in services, and then Century began providing those services in May 2017 [Doc. 74 at Page ID # 1195]. Neither Chattanooga Fire nor Century admits to installing the improper sprinkler. Plaintiff submitted an interrogatory response from Century indicating that "the sprinkler head at issue was already installed" at the hotel by May 2017 when Century took over at the hotel [Doc. 74-1 at Page ID # 1292-93].

Both Chattanooga Fire and Century admit to being at the hotel and performing periodic inspections. Plaintiff's expert reports that there is documentation of Chattanooga Fire employees being at the hotel five times in 2016, and documentation of Century employees being at the hotel 12 times between May 19, 2017, and June 5, 2018 [Doc. 72-1 at Page ID # 1068].

Plaintiff's second amended complaint asserts claims against both Defendants for negligence related to the installation and inspection of the sprinkler. Plaintiff also asserts claims against both Defendants for breach of the warranty of workmanship related to their alleged installation and inspections.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A "material" fact is one that matters—i.e., a fact that, if found to be true, might "affect the outcome" of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A "genuine" dispute exists with respect to a material fact when the evidence would enable a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party. Id.; Jones v.Sandusky Cnty., Ohio, 541 F. App'x 653, 659 (6th Cir. 2013); Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). In determining whether a dispute is "genuine," the court cannot weigh the evidence or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Instead, the court must view the facts and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Nat'l Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 907.

The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 n.2 (1986). To refute such a showing, the non-moving party must present some significant, probative evidence indicating the necessity of a trial for resolving a material, factual dispute. Id. at 323. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). The court's role is limited to determining whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 249; Nat'l Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 907.

In this case, both Plaintiff and Defendants have moved for summary judgment. A "moving party without the burden of proof at trial need only show that the opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial." Swansbrough v. Martin, No. 1:14-CV-1246, 2015 WL 8488814, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 19, 2015) (citing Morris v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 787 (6th Cir. 2000)). However, "a moving party with the burden of proof faces a 'substantially higher hurdle.'" Id. (quoting Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. School Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001)) (other citation omitted). "Where the moving party has the burden—the plaintiff on a claim for relief or the defendant on an affirmative defense—his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party." Calderone v. United States,799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). A moving party with the burden of proof "must show that the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it." Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452, 455-56 (6th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Defendants' Motions

The issue in Defendants' motions for summary judgment boils down to whether Plaintiff has sufficient evidence to show who installed the improper sprinkler. It is undisputed that the sprinkler was not installed until at least 2016 (the year it was manufactured), and that it must have been installed prior to June 29, 2018, when the incident occurred. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants have presented any documentation, such as an invoice or receipt, showing who installed the improper sprinkler or when. Plaintiff's theory of the case, as the Court interprets it, is that the sprinkler could only be installed by someone with specialized training and experience. If done improperly, an alarm would have gone off or the sprinkler system would have been activated. Plaintiff contends that "[t]here were no alarm activations or dry system sprinkler discharges in 2016 or later up until the date of loss." [Doc. 74 at Page ID # 1198]. Plaintiff does not provide a citation to this fact, and the Court observes that a Century employee was dispatched on April 18, 2018, "due to system tripped." [Doc. 66-3 at Page ID # 607]. Regardless, neither Defendant argues in their filings that the alarm activated or that the sprinkler system discharged at any time between 2016 and June 29, 2018.

Plaintiff further states that Chattanooga Fire was the only "fire protection company" that "had access to the subject property," in 2016 [Doc. 74 at Page ID # 1198], and that Century was the only "fire protection company" with access from May 2017 until June 29, 2018 [Doc. 72 atPage ID # 1057]. Plaintiff does not provide any citations to the record to support this statement, and the statement does not exclude the possibility of other individuals with the requisite knowledge having access to the hotel and the attic. As Chattanooga Fire points out, the hotel was acquired by new ownership in 2017, at which time the hotel underwent renovations that included the roof, though not the attic itself [Doc. 65-1 at Page ID # 314; Doc. 74-1 at Page ID # 1288].

Chattanooga Fire moves for dismissal of all claims asserted against it (negligent inspection and installation, and breach of warranty of workmanship). It argues:

Discovery in this cause has been completed. Based on the evidence produced during discovery it is evident that Chattanooga Fire did not install the sprinkler head involved in the incident of June 29, 2018. It is also evident that if Chattanooga Fire did not install the sprinkler head at issue prior to the termination of its relationship with the Hotel at the end of 2016, it could not have been guilty of any negligence in the inspection of that sprinkler head. [Plaintiff] has offered no proof to the contrary.

[Doc. 65 at Page ID # 306].

In support of its motion, Chattanooga Fire cites: (1) the following statement from one of its managers, Roger L. Wolfsperger: "I have examined the work orders, invoices and other business records maintained by Chattanooga Fire in the normal course of business relating to the Hotel. Based on Chattanooga Fire's business records,...