Wheatley v. N.Y. State United Teachers

80 F.4th 386

Robin WHEATLEY, Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS, New Hartford Employees Union,New Hartford Central School District, Appellees.

No. 22-2743-cv

August Term 2022

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Argued: June 26, 2023

Decided: September 5, 2023

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Scullin, J.)

David R. Dorey (Nathan J. McGrath, Stephen B. Edwards, Logan Hetherington, on the brief), The Fairness Center, Harrisburg, PA, for Appellant.

Scott A. Kronland, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA (Robert T. Reilly, Andrea Wanner, on the brief, NYSUT, Latham, NY), for Appellees New Hartford Employees Union and New York State United Teachers.

Nicole Marlow-Jones (Heather M. Cole, on the brief), Ferrara Fiorenza PC, East Syracuse, NY, for Appellee New Hartford Central School District.

Before: Lynch, Lohier, and Kahn, Circuit Judges.

Maria Araújo Kahn, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Robin Wheatley brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Appellees the New Hartford Employee's Union ("NHEU"), the New York State United Teachers Union ("NYSUT," collectively with NHEU, the "Unions"), and the New Hartford Central School District (the "District"). Appellant asserts that Appellees' deduction of union dues from her paycheck after she resigned from the Unions in March 2021 violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018).

The Supreme Court's decision in Janus invalidated the collection of agency fees from non-union members but left intact "labor-relations systems exactly as they are." Id. at 2478, 2485 n.27. Appellant's claims against the Unions fail because, even assuming that there was state action taken by Appellees, the District's withholding of union dues did not constitute a violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. We, therefore, affirm the district court's dismissal of the case.

BACKGROUND

Appellant became a member of the Unions in 2005 when she began her employment with the District as a school bus driver. In 2018, Appellant signed a union membership and dues deduction authorization form (the "Membership Agreement"). In relevant part, the Membership Agreement contained the following language:

I understand that this authorization and assignment is not a condition of my employment and shall remain in effect, regardless of whether I am or remain a member of the union, for a period of one year from the date of this authorization and shall automatically renew from year to year unless I revoke this authorization by sending a written, signed notice of revocation via U.S. mail to the union between the window period of Aug. 1-31 or another window period specified in a collective bargaining agreement.

J. App'x at 27. The Membership Agreement authorized the District to deduct union membership dues from Appellant's wages and remit them to NHEU in accordance with the New York Public Employees Fair Employment Act, N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §§ 200, et seq. (the "Taylor Law"). Under the Taylor Law, such deduction authorizations remain in effect until they are revoked by the individual employee "in accordance with the terms of the signed authorization." N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 208(1)(b)(i).

On March 22, 2021, Appellant resigned from the Unions by sending a signed letter via email and interoffice mail to NHEU's President, Vincent Nesci, and the District's payroll office. In response, Nesci informed Appellant that although she was no longer a member of the union, dues would continue to be deducted from her paychecks unless and until she sent a written and signed notice of revocation in the August "window period," as described in the Membership Agreement. J. App'x at 11. The District continued to deduct union dues from Appellant's paychecks through at least May 28, 2021, but ceased when Appellant sent the required notice of revocation in August. Id. As a nonmember of the Unions, Appellant did not receive member benefits "while her deductions were ongoing from the date of her resignation until the day they ceased." Id.

Appellant commenced this action on September 10, 2021, asserting two claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Unions and the District.¹ Count One alleged that post-resignation deductions to the Unions from Appellant's wages violated her First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. Count Two alleged that post-resignation deductions violated Appellant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Appellant sought, among other things, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages equal to the total amount of union dues deducted from her wages after her resignation in March 2021, plus interest.

The Unions and the District moved to dismiss Appellant's claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, which the district court granted. See Wheatley v. New York State United Tchrs., 629 F. Supp. 3d 18 (N.D.N.Y. 2022). The court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Appellant's claims for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief because the District had ceased deducting dues from Appellant's wages. See id. at 23-25.

The court also held that Appellant's § 1983 claims against the Unions and the District failed to state viable claims for relief. Specifically, the court concluded that Appellant's claims against the Unions failed because the Unions "are not state actors within the meaning of § 1983." Id. at 27. With regard to the § 1983 claim against the District, the court concluded the District was not a state actor because "it was not a policy of [the] District, but rather state law, that required [the] District to deduct union membership dues from [Appellant's] wages until [Appellant] revoked that authorization 'in accordance with the terms of the signed authorization.' " Id. at 32 (quoting N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 208(1)(b)). Moreover, in continuing to deduct dues until Appellant's revocation during the window period, the court noted that the "District was merely honoring [Appellant's] self-imposed, voluntary authorization that [the] District deduct union dues from her wages unless she revoked said authorization during the annual window period." Id. at 33. In addition to the absence of state action, the court also held that Appellant's claims failed because Appellant "ha[d] not plausibly alleged that [Appellees] violated her constitutional rights by abiding by the authorization that she voluntarily provided to them in her Membership Agreement." Id. at 26. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Appellant revives the arguments made before the district court—namely, that, pursuant to § 1983, the post-resignation deductions from her wages by the District to the Unions violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, she argues the Unions and the District were state actors under § 1983 when they purportedly violated her constitutional rights.

DISCUSSION

Because Appellant challenges the district court's dismissal of her claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo, accepting all factual allegations in it as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Appellant's favor. See Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2012) (Rule 12(b)(1)); Melendez v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 50 F.4th 294, 298 (2d Cir. 2022) (Rule 12(b)(6)).

"To state a claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, [Appellant] must establish that [she was] deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law." Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999). We need not address the state action issue in this case because even assuming that there was state action taken by Appellees, Appellant's arguments that she was deprived of certain constitutional rights fail. See Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Loc. 100 of New York & Vicinity, AFL CIO v. City of New York Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 544 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Because we also find no constitutional violation, we will assume, without deciding, that the parties' License Agreement renders Lincoln Center, Inc. a state actor for purposes of event-scheduling in the Plaza."); see also Jones v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 936 F.3d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 2019) ("We need not address [defendants] alternative arguments because we conclude that, even if the state action and seizure questions were to be decided in [plaintiff's] favor, the special needs doctrine warrants the district court's award of summary judgment to defendants.").

I. APPELLANT'S FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM

Appellant first argues that her First Amendment rights were violated when the District deducted union dues from her paychecks after her resignation from union membership. She relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Janus, stating that public employees have a right to be free from compelled speech in the form of subsidizing a union's political activity through compelled payroll deductions. She contends that because Janus was decided two months after she signed the Membership Agreement, she was not able to fully understand the rights she would forgo by executing that agreement. For the reasons set forth below, we join the growing list of our sister circuits² and conclude that Janus does not relieve Appellant of her contractual duties to pay union dues under the Membership Agreement.

Janus involved a situation where a non-union member was subject to "fair share" automatic wage deductions, which were used towards funding the union. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2461-62. Overruling Abood v. Detroit Board of...