Wheeler v. State, A19-1799

Jetaun Helen Wheeler, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

A19-1799

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

July 20, 2020

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

Affirmed

Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-13-27810

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Rodenberg, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

BRATVOLD, Judge

Following an evidentiary hearing, appellant challenges the postconviction court's denial of her petition to withdraw her guilty plea to aiding and abetting unintentional second-degree murder, arguing the manifest-injustice standard. Because the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the district court judge's conduct did not make appellant's plea involuntary under the totality of the circumstances, we affirm.

FACTS

Wheeler supported her plea-withdrawal request by arguing that the district court judge "improperly injected herself into plea negotiations" before and during trial and coerced Wheeler's guilty plea. These facts, therefore, are based on the postconviction court's findings and focus on the parties' plea negotiations. The facts are also summarized in the supreme court opinion filed in Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558 (Minn. 2018) (Wheeler II).

Wheeler's offense and district court proceedings

In late July or early August 2013, E.S. was murdered at the home of his girlfriend, appellant Jetaun Helen Wheeler. Police found E.S.'s body in Wheeler's freezer on August 21 when police obtained and executed a warrant to search the home after E.S.'s family reported him missing. Two of Wheeler's children may have witnessed the murder; one later told a therapist of seeing Wheeler and her friend restraining E.S. and striking him. The state charged Wheeler with intentional second-degree murder, which has a presumptive 306-month guidelines sentence for a person with no criminal history.¹ The state notified Wheeler of its intent to seek an upward durational departure at sentencingbased on aggravating factors of particular cruelty to the victim and presence of the children during the victim's death.

In the months leading up to trial, Wheeler sought to plead guilty to manslaughter, but the state refused this offer. Two weeks before trial, on July 3, 2014, the district court held a pretrial hearing on evidentiary issues and discussed a competency hearing to determine whether Wheeler's two young children, about nine- and ten-years old, could testify. At the hearing, the judge encouraged the parties to resolve the case, stating that she would "really like someone to extend an offer" because there were "negatives on both sides," "wins and losses on a lot of elements in this case," "[i]t is a pretty serious situation to have children of the defendant having to come to court and testify possibly against their own mother," and "you never know what the jury is going to do."

On July 7, the district court issued its pretrial rulings, reserving only four issues for trial. The postconviction court found that "[e]ach side prevailed on some of their motions." On July 8, prosecutor Judith Hawley informed the judge in an email, with a copy to defense counsel, that the parties had not reached a plea agreement. Hawley's email described the current offers: The state had offered to reduce the charge to second-degree unintentional murder with a prison sentence of 240 months.² And Wheeler had offered to plead guilty tosecond-degree manslaughter with a sentencing range of probation up to a "double departure" of 96 months in prison.³

The judge responded to both parties by email on July 8, describing and rejecting Wheeler's offer by saying the offer "isn't something this court is willing to do." The judge's email also stated: "Given what facts the court is aware of, a plea to unintentional 2nd degree murder with a prison term the parties can agree on (something in the range of x months and 240 months) appears to be more realistic." The case went to trial. The postconviction court found that, on the first day of voir dire, July 14, "the parties put these same offers [made earlier] on the record."

On Wednesday, July 16, Wheeler's children visited the courtroom to familiarize themselves with it in case they were called to testify. The judge and counsel were present for the children's courtroom visit, but not the jury or Wheeler. The judge spoke with the children and found them competent to testify.

After the first day of trial testimony, on Thursday, July 17, the judge asked about plea negotiations, saying: "I just want[] an update. It's my understanding that the state did get permission to offer to do an unintentional second-degree murder for some range within the box . . . [but] the defendant declined?" Defense counsel told the district court that they would speak to Wheeler about the state's new offer over the weekend. The state put itsoffer of unintentional second-degree murder for a guidelines sentence of 128 to 180 months on the record by the end of the day.⁴

Trial continued on Friday, July 18. According to later testimony at the postconviction evidentiary hearing, the state called law-enforcement witnesses who testified about finding E.S.'s body and the jury viewed the freezer where his body was found. And the postconviction court found that the state suggested, on Monday, they would be offering photographs of E.S.'s body and intended to call at least one of Wheeler's children as a witness. The postconviction court also found that the state told Wheeler the new offer would be withdrawn if the children testified.

Defense counsel Nancy Laskaris later testified at the postconviction evidentiary hearing that, on Saturday, July 19, she and her co-counsel, Somah Yarney, spent "a couple of hours" with Wheeler explaining to her that they did not feel the case would go well. They were concerned that "the judge's feelings were so strong about resolving" the case due to the children having to testify, the physical evidence was incriminating, and Wheeler would be sentenced harshly if she was convicted. Wheeler eventually decided to plead guilty. Wheeler's attorneys and the prosecutors agreed upon terms over the weekend.

At the beginning of the third day of trial testimony, on Monday, July 21, Wheeler agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge of aiding and abetting second-degreeunintentional murder in exchange for the parties' agreement to request sentencing within the guidelines range of 128 to 180 months.

At a sentencing hearing one month later, the district court imposed a 172-month prison sentence. During the sentencing hearing, the district court judge stated she was "appreciative of the fact that the parties were able to come to some agreement" and that the children were "suffering," which "prompted Ms. Wheeler to enter a plea [of guilty]." The prosecutor stated, "[W]e're all thankful that [the two children] did not have to . . . testify." And defense counsel also stated during the sentencing hearing that Wheeler "gave up her right to trial . . . to protect her children."

Wheeler's first postconviction petition

Over a year later, Wheeler sought to withdraw her guilty plea, asserting in a postconviction petition that the district court judge's participation in the plea negotiations coerced her plea, resulting in a manifest injustice. The postconviction court, the same judge, denied the petition without a hearing. This court affirmed, relying on existing caselaw and reasoning that the district court judge "did not excessively involve [herself]" in plea negotiations because the judge did not offer a specific plea or threaten to impose a specific sentence. Wheeler v. State, 889 N.W.2d 807, 816 (Minn. App. 2017) (Wheeler I), rev'd by Wheeler II. Wheeler sought further review, which the supreme court granted.

Identifying the threshold issue on appeal as "what it means for a district court judge to 'participate' in the plea bargaining negotiation itself," the supreme court reversed and remanded to the postconviction court. Wheeler II, 909 N.W.2d at 562. The supreme court addressed three points in its analysis. First, the supreme court stated, "The principle that adistrict court judge may not participate in the plea bargaining negotiation itself, which we first recognized in State v. Johnson, . . . 156 N.W.2d 218 (1968), is not solely a prohibition on judicial plea offers, promises, or threats. It also prohibits unsolicited judicial comments regarding the propriety of the parties' competing settlement offers." Wheeler II, 909 N.W.2d at 560.⁵

Second, "A judge does not participate in the plea bargaining negotiation by merely inquiring into the status of the parties' plea negotiations, sharing general sentencing practices, or disclosing nonbinding plea and sentencing information at the joint request of the parties." Id. The supreme court applied these standards in determining that the district court had participated improperly in the plea negotiations in the judge's July 8 email "by providing unsolicited comments regarding the parties' competing settlement offers and proposing a plea deal of its own." Id. at 567.⁶

And third, "When a defendant proves that a Johnson violation has occurred, the plea is invalid only if it is involuntary under the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 560. In other words, the supreme court refused to invalidate every plea in which a Johnson violation occurs, and instead adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to determinewhether a plea is involuntary due to the district court's improper participation in plea negotiations. I...