Where Do We Go Berkeley v. Cal. Dep't of Transp. (Caltrans)

1

WHERE DO WE GO BERKELEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CALTRANS), et al., Defendants.

No. 21-CV-04435-EMC

United States District Court, N.D. California

June 23, 2023

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

DOCKET NO. 170

EDWARD M. CHEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The instant case involved a challenge to Defendants' attempts to evict homeless individuals from encampments located on Caltrans property or rights of way. This Court issued a preliminary injunction in favor of Plaintiffs but that injunction was vacated on appeal by the Ninth Circuit. Although the preliminary injunction was vacated, Plaintiffs now move for attorney's fees and costs based on the fact that this Court granted the preliminary injunction (plus an extension of the injunction) as well as a temporary restraining order at the outset of the case.^[1] Having considered the parties' briefs and accompanying submissions, as well as the oral argument of counsel, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiffs' motion.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The instant action was initiated by six individual plaintiffs and Where Do We Go Berkeley (“WDWG”) in June 2021. At the time they filed suit, the six individual plaintiffs and WDWG also filed a motion for a TRO, i.e., to prevent the closure of an encampment located on a Caltrans right of way. The Court granted the motion for a TRO on June 11, 2021. See Docket No. 20 (Order at 2) (noting, inter alia, that “Plaintiffs need only demonstrate serious questions going to the merits because the balance of hardships tips strongly in their favor.”). The TRO lasted until July 20, 2021, which was when a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction would be heard. In the meantime, the Court encouraged the parties to work together and to work with local agencies to see if they could find housing for the individual plaintiffs as this would mean the individuals would not need to live at the encampment any longer. See Docket No. 20 (order). The preliminary injunction hearing was later pushed back to late August 2021 as the parties continued to work together. See Docket No. 26 (stipulation and order); Docket No. 46 (minutes).

Shortly before the preliminary injunction hearing was to take place, a first amended complaint (“FAC”) was filed. The six individual plaintiffs were no longer named plaintiffs because they had found housing or alternative arrangements for them had been made). Only WDWG was named as a plaintiff. The allegations in the FAC also shifted, focusing on Caltrans's recent closure of two different encampments (Seabreeze and Downstairs), which led to new people moving into the encampment at issue in the instant case. See Docket No. 48 (FAC).

Because it was not clear that WDWG itself could get a preliminary injunction to stop closure of the encampment at issue, WDWG moved to amend the FAC - specifically, to add eleven new individual plaintiffs to the suit. At the same time, WDWG moved for a new TRO (effectively, on behalf of the eleven individuals). The Court held a hearing on the motions in early September 2021. The Court granted both motions and set a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction in late September 2021. See Docket No. 70 (minutes).

On September 23, 2021, the Court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction based on Plaintiffs' ADA claim. See Docket No. 88 (Order at 11) (taking note of Plaintiffs' position that, under Title II, “Caltrans has implemented a ‘program' regarding the removal of homeless encampments (e.g., as reflected in the Interim Guidance) and, under Title II, that program must give reasonable accommodation to disabled persons because they have more difficulty in relocating and/or finding housing and therefore need more time before being evicted.”). The preliminary injunction was set to expire in six months - i.e., on March 23, 2022. See Docket No. 88 (Order at 13).

Defendants then moved to dismiss the second amended complaint (“SAC”). They also appealed the preliminary injunction order. See Docket No. 90 (motion); Docket No. 96 (notice).

In December 2021, the Court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss. The Court dismissed several claims but allowed the ADA claim against Caltrans for injunctive relief (not damages) to proceed. See Docket No. 112 (order).

Shortly before the preliminary injunction was due to expire in March 2022, Plaintiffs filed a new motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court granted in part and denied in part that motion. It did not, as Plaintiffs requested, allow for the Seabreeze encampment to be (in effect) reopened. Nor did the Court extend the preliminary injunction for another four months, as Plaintiffs requested. However, the Court did give a brief extension of the preliminary injunction -for about a month, until April 30, 2022. See Docket No. 152 (order).

About two weeks before the extended preliminary injunction was due to expire, the Ninth Circuit issued an order vacating the Court's original order granting a preliminary injunction (even though that injunction had technically expired). See Docket No. 153 (order). On April 27, 2022, the Ninth Circuit issued its full decision.

In its order, the court began by explaining that, “[a]lthough the appealed order expired before argument, . . . the dispute is not moot because it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Docket No. 154 (Order at 8).

The Ninth Circuit then noted that, contrary to what Caltrans argued, the agency did have a “program” with respect to homeless encampments for purposes of the ADA. However, the program was

far more limited than Plaintiffs contend or the district court held. The Interim Guidance states that Caltrans collaborates with local partners to help people at the encampments connect with critical services and housing solutions. But Caltrans itself does not provide those services; it “is not the appropriate entity to provide social services or relocation assistance.”

Docket No. 154 (Order at 17). Moreover, Caltrans's program included the clearing of encampments, and how Caltrans cleared an encampment depended on the encampment's priority level. See Docket No. 154 (Order at 17). As part of the program, Defendants had designated the encampment at issue a level 1 encampment which meant that the encampment posed a critical safety concern and thus, as a general matter, could be vacated within 72 hours' notice. See Docket No. 154 (Order at 3-4, 17-18) (contrasting level 1 encampments with level 2, 3, and/or 4 encampments). In effect, the Ninth Circuit defined the applicable program in terms of level 1 and not anything more.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that this Court's preliminary injunction which delayed Caltrans from clearing the level 1 encampment at issue was a fundamental alteration of Caltrans's program. See Docket No. 154 (Order at 19) (stating that “a six-month delay is a fundamental alteration of Caltrans's programs, which provide for expedient clearing of level 1 encampments and include, when possible, 72 hours' notice and coordination with local partners”). Thus, there was not a serious question as to whether Caltrans had violated the ADA.^[2]

In October 2022, about six months after the Ninth Circuit's decision, Caltrans ended its Interim Guidance on Homeless Encampments. According to Plaintiffs, because Caltrans ended its program (replacing the Interim Guidance with a different program), their case was thereby mooted. See Mot. at 2, 5.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 provides that “[a] claim for attorney's fees . . . must be made by motion unless the substantive law requires those fees to be proved at trial as an element of damages.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2)(A). Rule 54 further provides that, “[u]nless a statute or a court order provides otherwise, the motion must: (i) be filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2)(B).

B. Procedural Objection

As an initial matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' fee motion is premature because no final judgment has been entered. See Opp'n at 6. Defendants acknowledge Plaintiffs' representation, made in their motion, that they believe their claims are now moot. Nonetheless, Defendants maintain that it “is an essential procedural step” for there to be a final judgment first. Opp'n at 7. Defendants note that a final judgment could be issued if Plaintiffs were to move to dismiss their case.

In response, Plaintiffs argue that a final judgment is not needed before a party can move for attorneys' fees. They note that Rule 54 specifies the latest date by which a motion may be filed but it does not preclude an earlier filing. They also point to case law, including that from the Supreme Court, indicating that pre-final judgment fee motions are not automatically barred. See, e.g., Tex State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791 (1989) (in a § 1988 case, stating that “Congress cannot have meant ‘prevailing party' status to depend entirely on the timing of a request for fees: A prevailing party must be one who has succeeded on any significant claim affording it some of the relief sought, either pendente lite [i.e., pending litigation] or at the conclusion of the litigation”); see also Hutchinson v. Patrick, 636 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (in ADA case, stating that “an award under a federal fee-shifting statute may sometimes be appropriate prior to the entry of a final judgment[;] [s]uch an award is proper, pendente lite, ‘where a party “has established his entitlement to some relief on the merits of his claims”' and “[t]hus, prevailing party status is not restricted to a party who has secured a favorable final judgment”); Dupuy v. Samuels, ...