Whirlpool Corp. v. Vanderburgh County-City

875 N.E.2d 751

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, Appellant-Petitioner, v. VANDERBURGH COUNTY-CITY OF EVANSVILLE HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION and Harriett Layne, Appellees-Respondents.

No. 82A04-0703-CV-165.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

November 5, 2007.

Todd M. Nierman, Dustin D. Stohler, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Kevin W. Winternheimer, Evansville, IN, Denise K. Larue, Meghan U. Lehner, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.

OPINION

RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Petitioner, Whirlpool Corporation (Whirlpool), appeals the trial court's Final Order affirming a decision by Appellee-Respondent, Vanderburgh County-City of Evansville Human Relations Commission (the Commission), concluding that Whirlpool discharged and refused to reinstate employment of Appellee-Respondent, Harriett Layne (Layne), in retaliation for Layne filing a discrimination charge against Whirlpool.

We affirm.

ISSUE

Whirlpool raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as the following single issue: Whether the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 6, 1992, Whirlpool hired Layne, an African American female, to be an hourly assembly worker at its facility in Evansville, Indiana. Hourly employees at Whirlpool's Evansville facility are represented by the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and Furniture Workers Union, Local 808 (Local Union 808). Beginning in February 2000, Layne worked the first shift, from 6:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., in the facility's 50-pound icemaker department. Layne was supervised by two Caucasians.

On June 13, 2000, Whirlpool suspended Layne for an alleged violation of Shop Rule 10, which prohibits "leaving [the employee's] department or the plant during working hours without permission." (Appellant's App. p. 0011). That day, Layne left the premises and went to lunch with co-worker, Ron Darrett (Darrett), also African American. After returning from lunch, Layne and Darrett were each called into a supervisor's office and suspended for three days for violating Shop Rule 10. This was Layne's first disciplinary action in her eight years of employment with Whirlpool. On July 4, 2000, as a result of being suspended, Layne filed a complaint of race discrimination, "Charge No. 00-68," with the Commission. (Appellant's App. p. 0011).

On November 2, 2000, Layne's daughter was ill and stayed home from school. The next morning, around 5:00 a.m., Layne took her daughter to the emergency room at St. Mary's Hospital, but did not obtain medical services for her due to financial reasons. Layne left the emergency room and took her daughter home. Layne arrived to work at 7:30 a.m., one hour late. Earlier that morning, prior to the start of her shift, Layne had called Whirlpool and advised that she would be late. Also, upon arriving at work, Layne advised a supervisor that her daughter was ill.

Later that day, during a break, Layne called the Welborn Clinic and spoke to a nurse, Jo Casey (Casey). Layne informed Casey that her daughter had been ill for the last two days and requested the doctor call in a prescription. Thereafter, Casey called Layne back at work and stated that the doctor would have to see her daughter before prescribing any medicine. Layne scheduled an appointment at the Clinic for her daughter at 3:30 p.m. Casey then faxed Whirlpool a doctor's statement indicating Layne's daughter was ill and had an appointment with the doctor that afternoon. However, Layne did not take her daughter to the doctor that afternoon because by the time she got home from work, she and her daughter were late for the appointment and her daughter reported she was feeling better. Layne then began a one-week pre-approved vacation from Whirlpool.

On November 7, 2000, Casey faxed to Whirlpool a letter indicating that Layne did not bring her daughter to the scheduled appointment. On November 13, 2000, when Layne returned from vacation, her supervisor suspended her, pending termination, for allegedly violating Shop Rule 1, which prohibits "[f]alsification of personnel or any other Company records." (Appellant's App. 0011). On November 15, 2000, Layne participated in a fact-finding meeting. On November 17, 2000, she was terminated. Thus, during the pendency of Layne's discrimination charge, Charge No. 0068, Whirlpool discharged Layne.

Following her discharge, Layne filed a grievance with Local Union 808, which remained pending until December 19, 2001 when a grievance settlement hearing was held and Whirlpool declined to reinstate Layne's employment. Consequently, on January 15, 2002, Layne filed her second charge of discrimination with the Commission, "Charge No. 02-01," alleging retaliatory discharge. (Appellant's App. p. 0012).

On December 8, 2005, the Commission conducted a public hearing to address allegations of discrimination by Layne against Whirlpool. On April 4, 2006, the Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Order on the matter, stating in pertinent part:

FINDINGS OF FACT

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29. The preponderance of evidence supports a finding that Layne was not reinstated because she had engaged in protected activity — the filing of her first charge of discrimination with [the Commission].

a. Layne had only filed her charge of discrimination four months prior

to her termination. Additionally, the investigation of that charge was still ongoing at the time Whirlpool determined that it would not reinstate her employment. This proximity in time supports a conclusion that these events were causally related.

b. There is insufficient evidence that Layne falsified any company record or document as charged by Whirlpool. Layne did not write the medical statement nor did she submit the document to Whirlpool. Further, none of the information contained in the medical statement was proven to be false. The undisputed evidence is that on November 3rd Layne's daughter was sick and Layne did have a doctor's appointment for her daughter for later that afternoon. Layne produced a school record that showed her daughter stayed home from school due to illness on November 2nd and 3rd.

c. There was evidence of other similarly situated employees who were discharged for violation of Shop Rule 1 but were subsequently reinstated by Whirlpool [].

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30. There was no evidence presented during the hearing that, subsequent to her discharge from Whirlpool, Layne failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate her damages by either failing to apply for a job she could have gotten or that she turned down a job that was offered to her.

31 As a result of Whirlpool's discriminatory practice concerning Layne's termination of employment on November 17, 2000 through the date of the hearing, December 8, 2005, Layne lost wages in the amount of $113,137.34 ($157,224.80 less mitigation income $44,087.46).

[32.] Layne further testified that she had every intention of continuing her employment with Whirlpool until retirement and seeks reinstatement.

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

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5. A "discriminatory practice" as defined in Municipal Code Section 3.30.138(B)(9) consists of in relevant part:

a. The exclusion from or the difference in treatment or the failure to grant any person equal opportunities by reason of race, religion, color, sex, national origin, ancestry, or handicap[. . .;] or

b. The exclusion from, the difference in treatment of, or the failure to grant to any person equal opportunities because that person did one or more of the following:

(1) Filed a complaint alleging the violation of this subchapter.

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7. Layne failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she was suspended on June 13, 2000 because of her race.

8. Layne established by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case that Whirlpool committed a discriminatory practice based on retaliation when it terminated her employment on November 17, 2000, and then subsequently refused to reinstate her on December 19, 2001, based on the following:

a. Layne had engaged in protected activity, namely she had previously filed a charge of discrimination against Whirlpool. This charge was still under investigation when Layne was discharged on November 17[, 2000] and was still pending at the time of the employer-union grievance settlement meeting on December 17, 2001.

b. Layne suffered an adverse employment action when Whirlpool terminated her employment and then subsequently refused to reinstate Layne's employment on December 17, 2001.

c. The evidence supports a conclusion that the protected activity and the adverse action are causally related.

9. Whirlpool's stated reason for refusing to reinstate Layne's employment is pretextual because:

a. Evidence supports a finding that Whirlpool evidenced a retaliatory animus toward Layne.

b. Evidence supports a finding that Layne's filing of [Charge 00-68] and the adverse employment action-termination [-] and then the refusal to reinstate were not wholly unrelated.

c. The reason for discharging Layne is factually baseless. There was insufficient evidence introduced to substantiate that Layne falsified any document as charged by Whirlpool.

d. There is evidence of other similarly situated employees who were discharged for violation of Shop Rule 1[,] but were subsequently reinstated by Whirlpool Management . . . . those employees, unlike Layne, had never previously engaged in protected activity — the filing of a charge of discrimination.

10. The evidence of Layne's prima facie retaliation case coupled with a finding that the reason advanced by Whirlpool for not reinstating Layne's employment is pretextual supports a conclusion based on the preponderance of evidence that Whirlpool engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice based on retaliation when it terminated Layne and then subsequently refused to reinstate Layne's employment.

(Appellant's App. pp. 0012-14). Ultimately,...