Whitcomb v. City of Pan. City

RONALD WHITCOMB, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PANAMA CITY; FRANK McKEITHEN, in his official capacity asSHERIFF OF BAY COUNTY, FLORIDA; CHRIS TAYLOR, individually;MARK AVILES, individually; JEFFREY BECKER, Individually;and SCOTT TEEPLE, individually, Defendants.

CASE NO. 5:13-cv-30-RS-EMT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PANAMA CITY DIVISION

ORDERED December 30, 2013

ORDER

Before me are Defendant Scott Teeple's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 96), Plaintiff's Response and Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Teeple's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 129), Defendant Frank McKeithen's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 97), and Plaintiff's Response and Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant McKeithen's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 128).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to ajury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and in deciding whether the movant has met this burden, the court must view the movant's evidence and all factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993).

An issue of fact is material "if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case." Wright v. Sandestin Investments, LLC, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2012). Thus, if reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment. Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Mercantile Bank & Trust v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir. 1985)). However, a mere 'scintilla' of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party. Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).

BACKGROUND

I accept the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Galvez v. Bruce, 552 F.3d 1238, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1343 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002)). "'All reasonable doubts about the facts should be resolved in favor of the non-movant.'" Id. (quoting Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999); Clemons v. Dougherty County, 684 F.2d 1365, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1982).

On September 5, 2010, Defendant Teeple, employed by the Bay County Sheriff, was dispatched in response to a call from Plaintiff's wife, Heather Whitcomb, to 911 about a conversation she had just concluded with the Plaintiff, in which she reported that Plaintiff had threatened to kill himself. Doc. 127. Although it is undisputed that Plaintiff told his wife he was "going to end it all after [I] finish [my] last cigarette," Plaintiff disputes that he meant he was going to kill himself and claims he is unaware whether Defendant Teeple overheard this telephone conversation. Doc. 126-10, p. 9. After speaking with Heather Whitcomb, Defendant Teeple located Plaintiff at a friend's house and asked him to step outside to speak with him about the alleged suicide threats he made to Heather Whitcomb earlier that evening. Doc. 127.

During this conversation, Plaintiff did not deny making the statements that he was "going to end it all," and admitted to owning a shotgun, but claims that it was in his daughter's possession. Doc. 126-10, p. 9. Instead, Plaintiff explained toDefendant Teeple he had made those threats in an attempt to shock Ms. Whitcomb and was "trying to see if she cared about" him. Doc. 126-10, p. 14. Additionally, he claims he actually meant that he was going to end the marriage after his last cigarette, not kill himself. Doc. 127. Despite these explanations and as a result of Defendant Teeple's investigation, he believed that Plaintiff met the criteria to be taken into custody for evaluation pursuant to the Baker Act. Doc. 127. Consequently, Plaintiff was institutionalized at Emerald Coast Behavioral Hospital and held for 72 hours. Doc. 127.

On September 19, 2010, Plaintiff and his wife were involved in two separate public altercations. Doc. 127. Even though Plaintiff and his wife disagree on what occurred during the first event, it is undisputed that neither party contacted law enforcement or requested the assistance of law enforcement. Doc. 127. The second event occurred later that evening. Doc. 127. Again, the Plaintiff and his wife disagree on what transpired during the altercation, but it is undisputed that Plaintiff took possession of Ms. Whitcomb's car, owned jointly by them, without her permission, and drove to his residence. Doc. 127, Doc. 126-10, p. 20. It is also undisputed that, after the second altercation, witnesses of the altercation contacted law enforcement. Doc. 98. When Defendant Teeple arrived at the scene, Ms. Whitcomb reported to him that Plaintiff held her against her will, attempted to snatch her keys, had snatched her cell phone, and took her vehicle, leaving herstranded approximately 12 to 14 miles from her home. Doc. 98. Although Plaintiff denies these allegations, he does not deny that Ms. Whitcomb alleged them. Doc. 127.

After speaking with Ms. Whitcomb, Defendant Teeple called Plaintiff by telephone, threatened to arrest Plaintiff, and requested his location. Doc. 127. Defendant Teeple then brought Ms. Whitcomb to Plaintiff's residence where Ms. Whitcomb retook possession of the vehicle and their minor son. Doc. 127. While at Plaintiff's residence, Defendant Teeple encountered Plaintiff in his front yard. Doc. 127. According to the Plaintiff, Defendant Teeple then proceeded to position himself between the Plaintiff and the front door of Plaintiff's residence, placed his hand on his gun, and spoke to Plaintiff about the events that transpired earlier that day and evening. Doc. 127. Even though Plaintiff claims that Defendant Teeple questioned Plaintiff about the incidences that occurred earlier that evening, and threatened to arrest Plaintiff, Plaintiff admits that he was never arrested or charged with any offenses. Doc. 127. During this incident, it is undisputed that Defendant Teeple was not told that both Plaintiff and Ms. Whitcomb had custody of their minor son. Doc. 99-3, p. 63; Doc. 126-10, p. 28. He was, however, aware they were experiencing marital difficulties. Doc. 99-3, p. 52. It is also undisputed that Defendant Teeple did not physically touch Plaintiff or draw his gun. Doc. 127.

From September 20, 2010, to November 8, 2010, Defendant Teeple did not have contact with either Ms. Whitcomb or Plaintiff except to testify at a civil domestic violence injunction hearing filed by Ms. Whitcomb. Doc. 90, 127. On September 21, 2010, Plaintiff filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. Doc. 127. The restraining order sought by Ms. Whitcomb on September 20, 2010, was denied on September 30, 2010. Doc. 127.

According to Plaintiff, after September 19, 2010, Ms. Whitcomb prevented him from seeing their minor child. Doc. 1, at ¶17. In October, Plaintiff attempted to contact various agencies and programs for assistance in locating his minor son. Doc. 127. He was told by those agencies, including Bay County Sheriff's Office, Panama City Police Department, and the Department of Family Services, that the agencies could not assist him because it was a civil matter. Doc. 127. Subsequently, Plaintiff enlisted the aid of his adult children to locate Ms. Whitcomb and the minor child's location. Doc. 127.

On November 8, 2010, Plaintiff's adult children followed Ms. Whitcomb to the Health Department in Panama City, and contacted Plaintiff by telephone to inform him that Ms. Whitcomb and the minor child were there. Doc. 127. Plaintiff and Ms. Whitcomb disagree on what occurred in the Health Department parking lot. However, it is undisputed that the minor child, who was admittedly forcibly taken from Ms. Whitcomb, was later located with Plaintiff in WaltonCounty. Doc. 127; Doc. 126-16, p. 7. While on his way to Walton County, Plaintiff was contacted by an officer with the Panama City Police Department. Doc. 127. During this conversation, Plaintiff explained to the officer that there were no formal custody orders in place. Doc. 127. However, the officer ordered Plaintiff to reveal his location and turn himself in on charges of kidnapping his minor son. Doc. 127.

Plaintiff eventually stopped his vehicle in Walton County, and the Walton County Sherriff's Deputies arrived. Doc. 127. Again, Plaintiff explained that there were no court orders in place preventing Plaintiff from having physical custody of his minor son. Doc. 127. The Walton Count officers informed Plaintiff that because the Panama City Police Department was in the process of obtaining an arrest warrant, they had to hold him. Doc. 127. While awaiting service of the arrest warrant, Defendant Teeple arrived at Plaintiff's location and "merely confirmed Plaintiff's identity and left." Doc. 127. It is undisputed that Defendant Teeple did not arrest Plaintiff, did not obtain an arrest warrant, and did not have further contact with Plaintiff or Ms. Whitcomb. Doc. 99-1, p. 44, 48, 50. It is also undisputed that Defendant Teeple did not make the decision to charge Mr. Whitcomb with kidnapping. Doc. 127, Doc. 126-18, p. 4. Notably, Defendant Teeple did not have any communications with the arresting officer on November 8, 2010. Doc. 99-5.

After the Panama City Police Department obtained the arrest warrant, Plaintiff was taken into custody and held at the Walton County Jail until November 13, 2010, when he appeared before...