White-Hughley v. State

495 P.3d 82

Tyerre Lanell WHITE-HUGHLEY, a/k/a Tyerre Lanell White, Appellant,

v.The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.

No. 80549

Supreme Court of Nevada.

FILED SEPTEMBER 16, 2021

Nobles & Yanez Law Firm and Dewayne Nobles, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Alexander G. Chen, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, SILVER, J.:

Appellant Tyerre White-Hughley was arrested and booked on two separate warrants simultaneously. He subsequently pleaded guilty in both cases. White-Hughley was sentenced in the first case on December 9, 2019, and in the second case on January 7, 2020, by different judges, with each sentence imposed to run concurrently. The first sentencing judge applied credit for White-Hughley's time served to the sentence in the first case, but the second sentencing judge, voicing concerns about double-dipping credit for time served, declined to likewise apply credit for time served to the sentence in the second case.

In this opinion, we reiterate, consistent with NRS 176.055(1), Poasa v. State, 135 Nev. 426, 453 P.3d 387 (2019), Johnson v. State, 120 Nev. 296, 89 P.3d 669 (2004), and Kuykendall v. State, 112 Nev. 1285, 926 P.2d 781 (1996), that a district court "must give a defendant credit for any time the defendant has actually spent in presentence confinement absent an express statutory provision making the defendant ineligible for that credit." Poasa, 135 Nev. at 426, 453 P.3d at 388. We clarify that where a defendant simultaneously serves time in presentence confinement for multiple cases and the resulting sentences are imposed concurrently, credit for time served must be applied to each corresponding sentence. Because we conclude that White-Hughley is entitled to have 70 days’ credit for time served applied to his sentence in his second case, we vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for the district court to enter a judgment of conviction with the correct amount of presentence credit.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

White-Hughley had outstanding warrants for his arrest in two felony cases: a child abuse, neglect, or endangerment and battery case (the child abuse case); and a home invasion case. He was arrested and booked on both warrants on October 1. 2019. White-Hughley entered into a ‘packaged deal" plea agreement whereby he pleaded guilty in the child abuse case on October 28, 2019, and pleaded guilty in the home invasion case on November 7, 2019. The parties agreed that both sentences were to run concurrently.

On December 9, 2019. Judge Tierra Jones sentenced White-Hughley to 12-36 months with 70 days’ credit for time served in the child abuse case. On December 11, 2019, Judge Tierra Jones entered a judgment of conviction in the child abuse case.

On January 7, 2020. Judge David Jones sentenced White-Hughley to 12-30 months in the home invasion case. Judge David Jones ordered the sentence in the home invasion case to run concurrently with the sentence in the child abuse case. White-Hughley requested credit for time served from the date of his arrest, arguing that because the cases were concurrent, he was entitled to credit for time served on the home invasion case as well as the child abuse case. The district attorney opposed, asserting that credit for time served had already been applied in the child abuse case and that numerous unpublished dispositions by this court prohibit applying that credit toward more than one sentence. Judge David Jones agreed "we don't double dip" and declined to apply credit for time served in the home invasion case, noting "that's how I always rule." On January 16, 2020, Judge David Jones entered a judgment of conviction in the home invasion case.

White-Hughley appealed, arguing that Judge David Jones should have at least applied credit for time served from the time of his arrest until the time he was sentenced on the first case—the child abuse case. The court of appeals affirmed. We granted White-Hughley's subsequent petition for review under NRAP 40B, and we now issue this opinion addressing his arguments.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue before us is whether NRS 176.055 required the district court to give White-Hughley credit for time served in the home invasion case. We review questions of statutory construction de novo. Jackson v. State , 128 Nev. 598, 603, 291 P.3d 1274, 1277 (2012). While legislative intent controls our interpretation, we will not look beyond a statute's plain language if the statute is clear on its face. State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011).

As we held in Poasa v. State , a district court "must give a defendant credit for any rime the defendant has actually spent in presentence confinement absent an express statutory provision making the defendant ineligible for that credit."¹ 135 Nev. at 426, 453 P.3d at 388. At issue here is the portion of NRS 176.055(1) that provides for the award of presentence credit:

[W]henever a sentence of imprisonment in the county jail or state prison is imposed, the court may order that credit be allowed against the duration of the sentence ... for the amount of time which the defendant has actually spent in confinement before conviction, unless the defendant's confinement was pursuant to a judgment of conviction for another offense.

(Emphasis added.)

Nothing in this provision, expressly makes a defendant ineligible to have credit for presentence confinement applied to multiple concurrent sentences where the defendant was in presentence confinement for those cases simultaneously. Rather, NRS 176.055(1) only precludes this credit if the presentence confinement was served "pursuant to a judgment of conviction for another offense." We consider this language in tandem with NRS 176.335(3). which establishes that a term of imprisonment imposed by a judgment, of conviction begins on the date of the sentence. It follows that when a defendant is simultaneously serving time before sentencing in multiple cases, and the sentences are imposed on different dates, the time served is not "pursuant to a judgment of conviction for another offense" until a sentence is actually imposed—because serving a term of imprisonment pursuant to a judgment of conviction begins at sentencing.

This interpretation finds ample support in our jurisprudence, In construing the phrase "time which the defendant has actually spent in confinement before conviction," this court has recognized the statute's purpose "is to ensure that all time served is credited towards a defendant's ultimate sentence." Poasa, 135 Nev. at 427-28, 453 P.3d at 389 (quoting NRS 176.055(1) and Kuykendall , 112 Nev. at 1287, 926 P.2d at 783 ). We have therefore previously held that NRS 176.055 requires district courts to award credit for time served in presentence confinement despite the discretionary language used in the statute. Id. at 428, 453 P.3d at 389. This construction "comports with notions of fundamental fairness, prevents arbitrary application of the statute, and avoids constitutional concerns with discrimination based on indigent status." Id. at 429, 453 P.3d at 389-90.

To be sure, before today, we have not had occasion to consider this statute's application where the defendant was confined simultaneously pursuant to charges in more than one case before sentencing. However, in Johnson v. State, we determined that the defendant was entitled under NRS 176.055(1) to have credit for presentence confinement be applied to concurrent sentences imposed for two counts in a single case. 120 Nev. at 299, 89 P.3d at 671. Relying on Kuykendall, we concluded that credit for time served "may not be denied to a defendant by applying it to only one of multiple concurrent sentences," as this "would render such an award a nullity or little more than a ‘paper’ credit." Id.

We recognize that Johnson, Poasa, and Kuykendall differ factually from this case. White-Hughley was arrested and confined on two warrants, entered guilty pleas in separate cases, was sentenced to concurrent sentences in each case, and now seeks application of his presentence confinement credit to both concurrent sentences. In contrast, Johnson dealt with the application of presentence confinement credit to multiple counts within a single case, and Poasa and Kuykendall dealt with presentence confinement credit in a single case. Nevertheless, the takeaway from Poasa, Kuykendall, and Johnson is uniform and applicable here: NRS 176.055(1) must be construed in favor of application of presentence credit for time served unless there is an express statutory provision precluding application of such credit.

Here, the district court ordered White-Hughley's sentence on the home invasion case to run concurrent to his earlier sentence on the child abuse case but gave him no credit on the home invasion sentence for the presentence time that he actually served. The court reasoned that White-Hughley had already been given credit for time served on his child abuse case—a sentence White-Hughley began serving nearly a month before he was sentenced on the home invasion case. But because White-Hughley was sentenced to identical minimum sentences, and nearly identical maximum sentences, crediting his time served solely to the earlier-imposed sentence deprives him of the full effect of credit for time he has served prior to his sentencing. Under these facts, the district court's denial of White-Hughley's credit neither comports with NRS 176.055(1) ’s plain language nor furthers the statute's purpose of ensuring that credit for time served is reflected in the defendant's ultimate sentence. Cf. Kuykendall, 112 Nev. at 1287, 926 P.2d at 783 (explaining the statute's purpose).

Furthermore, White-Hughley's presentence confinement was not "pursuant to a judgment of conviction for another offense" until he was actually sentenced in the first case. White-Hughley was simultaneously booked...