White v. Brown

1

ANTUAN WHITE, Plaintiff, v. CHRIS BROWN and BASIL LU, Defendants.

No. 3:20-CV-00720 (SVN)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

February 13, 2023

RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SARALA V. NAGALA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In this civil rights and state law tort action, Plaintiff Antuan White alleges that Defendants Chris Brown and Basil Lu officers of the Orange, Connecticut, Police Department violated his rights by handcuffing him too tightly during his October 12, 2017, arrest. Plaintiff's amended complaint asserts claims for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, which he brings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; state law assault and battery; and state law negligence. Defendants now seek summary judgment on each claim, arguing that no reasonable jury could find in favor of Plaintiff, and that qualified immunity and state law discretionary act immunity shield them from certain of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff opposes summary judgment and, in doing so, attempts to characterize his complaint as asserting an additional claim for malicious prosecution.

The Court finds that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on each of Plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, Defendants' motion is DENIED. The Court will not, however, allow Plaintiff's proposed malicious prosecution claim to proceed.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted herein, the parties agree on the following facts.^[1]On October 12, 2017, Defendants-who, at all relevant times, were employed as police officers for the Town of Orange, Connecticut-were dispatched to perform a welfare check on Fernbrook Road in Orange. Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St., ECF No. 53-8, ¶¶ 3, 4. The welfare check was precipitated by a 911 caller's report of a male passed out behind the wheel of a car parked in the middle of the road. Id. ¶ 4. Portions of Defendants' encounter with Plaintiff were recorded by Defendants' body worn cameras. See ECF No. 50 (notice of manual filing of footage from Brown's and Lu's body worn cameras, which is referenced as Exhibits E and F to Defendants' summary judgment motion, ECF No. 49); see also ECF No. 62 (Plaintiff's notice of manual filing of body worn camera footage).

When Defendants arrived on the scene, they observed a stopped 2016 Chrysler 300S running with its brake lights on. Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 5. Defendants approached the vehicle and observed a shirtless male, later identified as Plaintiff, unconscious in the driver's seat. Id. ¶ 6.^[2]The parties agree, and the body worn camera footage shows, that Defendant Brown knocked on the vehicle's driver's side window, but Plaintiff remained unconscious and did not respond. Id. ¶ 7; see Ex. E to Mot. Brown then opened the vehicle's driver's side door, put the vehicle in park, and turned the vehicle off. Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 7.

After opening the vehicle's door, Brown continued his efforts to wake Plaintiff and was ultimately able to do so. Id. ¶ 8. Upon waking Plaintiff, Brown asked him if he was alright or needed assistance. Id. ¶ 9. Initially, Plaintiff's response was mumbled and incoherent, and Defendants were unable to understand him, id. ¶ 10; they also observed drool on Plaintiff's chin, id. ¶ 11. Based on Defendants' observations, and in light of Plaintiff's difficulty communicating, Brown performed a horizontal gaze nystagmus test while Plaintiff remained seated in the vehicle. Id. ¶ 12. Both Defendants observed that Plaintiff was unable to follow the stimulus with his eyes. Id. ¶ 13. Brown then asked Plaintiff to step out of the vehicle, and Plaintiff complied with this request. Id. ¶ 14. Defendants assert that they were able to smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage on Plaintiff; Plaintiff, however, denies this, claiming that he did not drink any alcoholic beverages on the night of October 12, and that alcohol is odorless. Id. ¶ 15.

After Plaintiff exited the vehicle, Brown asked him to perform standardized field sobriety tests, and Plaintiff agreed to do so. Id. ¶ 16. These tests are recorded on the body worn camera footage. See Exs. E & F to Mot. Prior to beginning these tests, Brown asked Plaintiff if he had any handicaps that would prevent him from taking the tests; Plaintiff stated that he did not. Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 17; Brown Aff., ECF No. 49-4, ¶ 14. Brown then performed a second horizontal gaze nystagmus test on Plaintiff, and both Defendants observed indications of a lack of sobriety, including a lack of smooth pursuit, distinct and sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation, and onset of nystagmus prior to forty-five degrees in both of Plaintiff's eyes. Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 18.

Brown next explained and demonstrated a “walk and turn” sobriety test for Plaintiff; after Brown did so, Plaintiff stated that performing the test “would be hard.” Id. ¶ 19. While performing this test, Plaintiff lost his balance, failed to place his feet heel to toe, stepped off the line he was supposed to walk, raised his arms, and took an incorrect number of steps. Id. ¶ 20. Brown subsequently explained and demonstrated the “one leg stand” sobriety test. Id. ¶ 21. While performing this test, Plaintiff swayed, used his arms for balance, and put his foot down. Id. ¶ 22.

After Plaintiff failed the standardized field sobriety tests, Brown informed him that he was being placed under arrest for driving under the influence and asked him to put his hands behind his back. Id. ¶¶ 23-24; Brown Aff. ¶ 22. Plaintiff did not physically resist arrest, but the parties dispute whether he argued with Defendants and disobeyed Brown's instructions; Defendants assert that he did, while Plaintiff asserts that he complied with Defendants' instructions and merely “explained his position to officers.” Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶¶ 25-26.

The initial handcuffing is depicted on the body worn camera footage. Exs. E & F to Mot. Once Plaintiff's hands were behind his back, Brown applied handcuffs to Plaintiff's wrists. Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 28. The parties dispute whether Defendants initially handcuffed Plaintiff in a manner that was painfully tight. Id. ¶ 29; Pl.'s St. of Add'l Mat. Facts ¶ 5. The parties agree that, after handcuffing Plaintiff, Brown asked Defendant Lu to shine his flashlight on Plaintiff's wrists, but they dispute whether Defendants “double locked” the handcuffs. Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 30. The parties generally refer to “double locking” as a method officers employ to ensure that, once handcuffs are placed on an individual, they do not tighten further. Plaintiff claims that the handcuffs were not double locked, which allowed them to continue to tighten. Id. Defendants assert that Plaintiff did not communicate to them-verbally or nonverbally-while being handcuffed that the handcuffs were too tight or that he was in pain or injured. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff does not dispute this point with respect to the period of time when Defendants were first applying the handcuffs. As discussed below, however, he claims that he complained in the minutes after the handcuffs were first applied. Id.

After handcuffing Plaintiff, Defendants escorted him to the rear of Lu's police vehicle. Id. ¶ 32. Brown guided Plaintiff to the rear passenger door, where Plaintiff was placed in the backseat of the police vehicle.^[3]Id. ¶ 33. Brown then closed the police vehicle's door. Id. ¶ 35.

The parties hotly dispute whether Plaintiff complained about the handcuffs from inside Lu's vehicle. Id. ¶ 36. Defendants contend that Plaintiff never communicated, either verbally or nonverbally, that the handcuffs were too tight, that he was in pain, or that he was injured. Id. ¶¶ 36, 38. Defendants further contend that they never heard Plaintiff yelling from Lu's vehicle while the vehicle remained at the scene of Plaintiff's arrest, before Plaintiff was taken to Orange Police Department to be booked and processed. Id. ¶¶ 36, 37.

By contrast, Plaintiff claims that, about thirty seconds after he was placed in Lu's vehicle, he began to verbally express that he was feeling pain because of the handcuffs, which were too tight and became “excessively tighter” because they were not double locked. Id. ¶¶ 31, 36. He contends that he yelled for three or four minutes before Defendants, who were approximately six or seven feet from the vehicle, responded. Id. ¶ 31; Pl.'s St. of Add'l Mat. Facts ¶¶ 9, 10. Instead of helping, Plaintiff claims Defendants laughed at him and ignored his requests. Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶¶ 31, 38. Plaintiff further claims that, after an “excessively long period of time elapsed” when he was “yelling and complaining,” Defendants returned to the back of Lu's vehicle and loosened the handcuffs before leaving the scene. Id. ¶ 36; Pl.'s St. of Add'l Mat. Facts ¶ 13. According to Plaintiff, by the time Defendants adjusted the handcuffs, he was already injured, and he has had pain in his right wrist since his arrest. Pl.'s St. of Add'l Mat. Facts ¶¶ 14, 15.^[4]

The parties agree that, at the time of the incident, the Orange Police Department's squad cars had cameras in them. Id. ¶ 35. To the extent Plaintiff was recorded on such a camera while inside Lu's police vehicle, that footage is not before the Court. As discussed below, Plaintiff claims Defendants spoliated the squad car video.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff initiated this action in May of 2020 by filing a pro se complaint against Defendants Brown and Lu, two other municipal employees, and the Town of Orange. Compl., ECF No 1. Plaintiff later filed an amended complaint against the same defendants. Am. Compl., ECF No. 13; see ECF No. 9. In December of 2020, the Court (Meyer, J.) entered an initial review order allowing Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment excessive force claim (Count Two) and associated state law claims ...