White v. Capital One

1

DOLORES WHITE, Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL ONE, National Association; MARY DICKSON, an individual; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.

No. 1:24-CV-00633-KES-SKO

United States District Court, E.D. California

October 23, 2024

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. 5)

Defendants Capital One and Mary Dickins (sued as “Mary Dickson”) (collectively “defendants”) filed this motion to dismiss on June 5, 2024, seeking to dismiss plaintiff Dolores White's first, second, fourth, seventh and eighth causes of action as insufficiently pled pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).^[1] Doc. 5. White filed her opposition, and Capital One replied. Docs. 7, 8. The Court heard oral argument on August 5, 2024.

I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS^[2]

White began working at Capital One in or about September 2019 and initially received positive performance evaluations. Doc. 7-1 (“Compl.”) at ¶¶ 7-8. In late 2022 White took maternity leave. Id. at ¶ 9. She returned to work in early 2023 after the birth of her child. Id. at ¶ 10. After resuming work in early 2023, White worked at home. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 12. Dickins, a Capital One Team Lead at the time, made comments about White's child crying and making noise in the background. Id. at ¶¶ 3,12. White's child would cry when the child needed to be breastfed. Id. at ¶ 12. Dickins told White that she could breastfeed only before or after White's regularly scheduled breaks. Id. at ¶ 11. White informed Dickins that she also needed to breastfeed at other times due to her child's feeding schedule, but Dickins refused to allow White to breastfeed at such other times. Id. at ¶ 11.

From September 9, 2023, to September 26, 2023, White took two weeks of medical leave due to stress, anxiety, and postpartum depression. Id. at ¶¶ 13-15. White provided Capital One's Leave and Accommodations Center with a note from her medical provider confirming the need for such medical leave. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14. Upon her return to work from this medical leave, White requested to work a reduced schedule for a limited time, but Dickins informed White that Capital One did not offer reduced schedules. Id. at ¶¶ 16-17.

White subsequently used sick days and took time off to attend doctor's appointments and to address issues related to her physical disabilities. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19. Dickins stated that White was going to be written up for missing work. Id. at ¶ 19. White informed Dickins that she had medical documentation for the time she was forced to miss work, but Dickins told White that, even with doctor notes, her absences would not be approved. Id.

Around November 14, 2023, White provided Capital One's Leave and Accommodations Center with a note from her medical provider advising that White could work only half days. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21. However, Capital One continued to require White to work full time. Id. at ¶ 22. During this period, White communicated with Capital One's Leave and Accommodation Center concerning taking intermittent leave under the California Family Rights Act. Id. at ¶ 23. White was informed that she had until January 25, 2024, to provide the necessary paperwork related to her request for accommodation and medical leave. Id. at ¶ 24.

Despite White having been informed that she had until January 25, 2024, to provide medical documentation to support her California Family Rights Act leave request, Capital One terminated White's employment on January 4, 2024. Id. at ¶ 25. On January 5, 2024, after being terminated, White received a letter from Capital One's Leave and Accommodation Center stating that Capital One required medical information to evaluate White's pending request for an accommodation, and that she had until January 25, 2024, to provide the necessary medical documentation. Id. at ¶ 26.

II. STANDARD OF LAW

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass 'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege “‘specific facts' beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (internal citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Defendants challenge the sufficiency of White's first cause of action for retaliation under California Labor Code section 246.5; second cause of action for harassment under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) based on White's pregnancy and breastfeeding; fourth cause of action for harassment under FEHA based on White's physical disability; seventh cause of action for retaliation in violation of the California Family Rights Act, Cal. Gov't Code § 12945.1 et seq. (“CFRA”); and eighth cause of action for interference with White's exercise of her right to medical leave under the CFRA.

1. Retaliation under Cal. Labor Code § 246.5 (First Cause of Action)

In her first cause of action, White claims Capital One retaliated against her for using her paid sick days, in violation of Cal. Labor Code § 246.5, which is part of the Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act of 2014 (“HWHFA”). Section 246.5 provides, in part, that an employer “shall not deny an employee the right to use accrued sick days, discharge, threaten to discharge, demote, suspend, or in any manner discriminate against an employee for using accrued sick days [or] attempting to exercise the right to use accrued sick days.” Id. § 246.5(c)(1). It also provides that a rebuttable presumption of unlawful retaliation applies in certain circumstances. Id. § 246.5(c)(2).

Capital One argues that the HWHFA did not create a private right of action for violations of Labor Code § 246.5, as another provision, § 248.5, grants only the Labor Commissioner and the Attorney General the ability to bring a civil action under the HWHFA. Id. § 248.5(e) (providing that “[t]he Labor Commissioner or the Attorney General may bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction against the employer or other person violating this article”). White argues that § 248.5(e) nonetheless implies a private right of action because it also refers to “any person or entity” enforcing the act “on behalf of the public as provided for under applicable state law.” See Doc. 7 at 10 (quoting Cal. Labor Code § 248.5(e)). However, this latter reference in § 248.5(e) refers not to a private right of action under the HWHFA, but to the possibility that a party might enforce a violation of the act under another California law provision.

The California court of appeal held in Seviour-Iloff v. LaPaille, 295 Cal.Rptr.3d 762, 779 (2022), that “there is no private right of action” created by Cal. Labor Code § 248.5. In Seviour-Iloff, the court considered whether a plaintiff was allowed to seek civil penalties for violation of the HWHFA's requirement that an employer provide sick leave and concluded that the plaintiff could not assert a claim under the HWHFA for such violation because the Act did not authorize a private right of action. Id.

Other courts have similarly concluded that the HWHFA did not create a private right of action in the context of violations of Labor Code sections similar to § 246.5. For example, in Titus v. McLane Foodservice, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00635-KJM-EFB, 2016 WL 4797497, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2016), the court found there was no private right of action under the HWHFA when the plaintiff attempted to bring a claim under § 246(h) for violation of sick leave notice provisions. See also Phuong v. Winco Holdings, Inc., No. 2:21-cv-2033-MCE-JDP, 2022 WL 3636369, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (finding no private right of action in Labor Code § 246 for improper payment of sick leave wages and dismissing claim without leave to amend); Rudolph v. Herc Rentals, No. 2:20-cv-05412-ODW (Ex), 2021 WL 5994514, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2021) (finding Labor Code § 248.5 provides for Labor Commissioner to enforce the HWHFA and allows employees to report violations to Labor Commissioner, but gives no private right of action to aggrieved employee).

In support of her argument that a private right of action exists for violations of § 246.5, White cites only Lobo v. Air-India Ltd., No. 20-cv-08790-WHO, 2021WL 254312 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2021). However, Lobo specifically noted that “courts have concluded that there is no standalone cause of action under the HFHW Act, [although] they do recognize that a claim for violation of the Act may be raised under other provisions of the Labor Code or under the UCL.” Id. at *3. The court in Lobo dismissed the stand-alone HWHFA claim but gave leave to amend to allow the plaintiff to allege the claim under a different law that did provide a private right of action. Id.

Accordingly Capital One's motion to dismiss White's first cause of action, the standalone claim under Labor Code § 246.5, is granted. As White may be able to assert the alleged violation of Labor Code § 246.5 as a claim under another California statute, see Lobo, 2021 WL 254312, at *3, the dismissal is with leave to amend.^[3] However, White may not replead a stand- alone cause of action under Cal. Labor Code § 246.5, as the HWHFA does not provide a private right of...