White v. City & Cnty. of W. Sacramento, 2:20-cv-02383-MCE-AC

ROBBIE D. WHITE, Plaintiff, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF WEST SACRAMENTO, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-02383-MCE-AC

United States District Court, E.D. California

September 7, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Through this action, Plaintiff Robbie White (“Plaintiff” or “White”) seeks to recover damages against the City of West Sacramento (“City”), the West Sacramento Police Department (“WSPD”), Officer Fortier, Officer N. Ogden (“Ogden”), Officer Mahaffey (“Mahaffey”), and Officer A. Schreiber (“Schreiber”)^[1] (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants among other things, discriminated against him on the basis of race, used excessive force in his arrest, falsely charged him with nonexistent crimes, and violated his rights under the state and federal constitutions. Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss claims one and two to the extent they are premised on a Monell theory of liability, and claims five, seven, and eight of the Complaint. ECF No. 4 (“Motion”) (citing ECF No 1, Ex. A, First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”)). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED with leave to amend.^[2]

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a 59-year-old African American male, who is a military veteran and a retired peace officer. In July 2019 he went to the WSPD with a female friend to inquire about a call and police response to his home that occurred approximately three days prior. As Plaintiff was speaking with the front desk clerk in the lobby, an unidentified Caucasian man in civilian clothes entered the area and began walking back and forth nearby. The man interrupted Plaintiff's conversation with the clerk and began yelling, “Shut up!” He then threatened Plaintiff, “You don't know who I am and what I'll do to you, ” and proceeded to use a nearby phone to request police assistance.

Shortly thereafter, between eight and ten Caucasian officers including Defendants Ogden, Fortier, Mahaffey, and Schreiber, entered the lobby and detained and handcuffed Plaintiff. According to Plaintiff, he informed the officers that he was a retired peace officer and that he needed assistance because he'd been threatened by the unidentified man in the lobby. He also advised the officers that he smelled the odor of alcohol on Defendant Ogden.

In detaining Plaintiff, the officers employed pain compliance tactics, twisting Plaintiff's thumbs and shoulders. They then put him in a hot patrol car, leaving the windows rolled up. Plaintiff was eventually informed that he was arrested for disorderly conduct, drunk in public, and resisting arrest.

Plaintiff was transported to booking at approximately 3:00 p.m. but not given an alcohol screening test until 10:00 p.m. The results showed no alcohol in his system. Plaintiff was nonetheless placed in a “filthy cell that was filled with urine, feces, and blood.” Compl. ¶ 18. He was denied food, water, or medical treatment, and was released several hours later.

All criminal charges against Plaintiff were eventually dismissed. The state court determined that there was no probable cause to arrest Plaintiff or make physical contact with him and eventually declared Plaintiff factually innocent. This action followed. Defendants now seek to dismiss claims regarding Monell (Claims One and Two); malicious prosecution (Claim Five); negligent hiring, training, and retention (Claim Seven), and the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Claim Eight).

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require detailed factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the pleading must contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”)).

Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing Wright & Miller, supra, at 94, 95). A pleading must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” Id. However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)).

ANALYSIS

A. The Complaint Fails to State a Claim for Monell Liability.

Plaintiff's attempt to hold the City and WSPD liable for his injuries under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), is unavailing. Municipalities and local officials cannot be vicariously liable for the conduct of their employees under § 1983, but rather are only “responsible for their own illegal acts.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 665-83). In other words, a municipality may only be liable where it individually caused a constitutional violation via “execution of government's policy or custom, whether by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The Supreme Court has made clear that plaintiffs may not merely state that a municipal employee wronged them to achieve success on a Monell claim: “Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee.” Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997) (emphasis added). Similar demands apply to allegations of inadequate training. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989). Following Twombly and Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Monell plaintiffs must provide allegations that are not mere recitations of the elements of such a claim, and such facts must plausibly suggest entitlement to relief. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012); see, e.g., Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900-01 (9th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff's Complaint offers only conclusory allegations that City and WSPD executed policies and customs that would support Monell liability. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 41. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. Accordingly, the first two causes of action are DISMISSED with leave to amend.

B. Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action for Malicious Prosecution Fails Because Under the Facts as Pled Defendants are Entitled to Immunity.

“In California, the elements of malicious prosecution are (1) the initiation of criminal prosecution, (2) malicious motivation and (3) lack of probable cause.”^[3] Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Aw...