White v. Montesano

466 F.Supp.3d 331

Randy WHITE, Plaintiff,

v.Robert MONTESANO and Bernard Williams, Defendants.

1:19-CV-00206 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed June 11, 2020

Derek Scott Sells, Stephanie Rose Correa, The Cochran Firm, New York, NY, Robert H. Perk, Buffalo, NY, for Plaintiff.

Denetra D. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.

Robert Montesano, pro se.

Bernard Williams, pro se.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Randy White ("Plaintiff") filed this action against defendants Robert Montesano ("Montesano") and Bernard Williams ("Williams") (collectively "Defendants"), who are both parole officers employed by the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"). (Dkt. 1). Plaintiff alleges claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988, along with various state law claims. (See id. ). Presently before the Court is Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Dkt. 21). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint. (Dkt. 1). As is required at this stage of the proceedings, the Court treats Plaintiff's allegations as true.

On the evening of February 27, 2018, Plaintiff drove his friend Dwayne Gordon ("Gordon") home before Gordon's court appointed curfew as he was a parolee under DOCCS supervision. (Id. at ¶ 10). After Gordon exited Plaintiff's vehicle, an unidentified individual, who Plaintiff later learned was Montesano, approached the vehicle, aimed a flashlight in Plaintiff's face, and demanded that Plaintiff produce identification. (Id. at ¶ 11). Plaintiff asked Montesano to identify himself. (Id. at ¶ 12). Montesano refused and again demanded that Plaintiff show his identification and turn off the vehicle. (Id. ). Plaintiff told Montesano that he was not going to turn off his engine as he needed to get home to his children, but "in an effort to diffuse the situation," Plaintiff offered to show his identification. (Id. ).

As Plaintiff went to retrieve his identification from his pants pocket, Montesano falsely claimed that Plaintiff had a gun. (Id. at ¶ 13). Immediately thereafter, another individual, who Plaintiff later identified as Williams, aggressively entered Plaintiff's vehicle through the passenger side and shot Plaintiff in the leg. (Id. at ¶ 14). Williams then threatened to shoot Plaintiff again in the head. (Id. at ¶ 15). Because both Williams and Montesano had not identified themselves as members of law enforcement, Plaintiff, fearing for his well-being and safety, attempted to drive away. (Id. at ¶ 16). While threatening to shoot Plaintiff in the head, Williams repeatedly punched Plaintiff in his face, causing Plaintiff's vehicle to collide with an unidentified object. (Id. at ¶ 17). During this interaction, Plaintiff did not threaten or use physical force against Defendants, and repeatedly stated that he did not possess a gun. (Id. ).

Plaintiff was eventually able to drive away from Defendants. (Id. at ¶ 18). Defendants then made allegedly false claims to the Buffalo Police Department about Plaintiff having engaged in criminal wrongdoing. (Id. ). Plaintiff picked up his wife at her place of employment and drove to Mercy Hospital. (Id. at ¶ 19). On their way to Mercy Hospital, Plaintiff and his wife were stopped by members of the Buffalo Police Department who then arrested Plaintiff "without any probable cause." (Id. ).

While detained at the Buffalo Police Department, Plaintiff was taken to Erie County Medical Center where his wounds were treated. (Id. at ¶ 20). After being treated, Plaintiff was transported to Buffalo Police Headquarters where he was detained and interrogated. (Id. at ¶ 21). During this time, Plaintiff was in significant pain and continued to bleed as a result of his gunshot wound. (Id. ). Approximately 45 minutes later, Plaintiff was transported back to Erie County Medical Center for further medical treatment. (Id. at ¶ 22). Plaintiff was ultimately released and no criminal charges were brought. (Id. at ¶ 23).

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

"Judgment on the pleadings may be granted under Rule 12(c) where the material facts are undisputed and where judgment on the merits is possible merely by considering the contents of the pleadings." McAuliffe v. Barnhart , 571 F. Supp. 2d 400, 402 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). "In deciding a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court should ‘apply the same standard as that applicable to a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting the allegations contained in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.’ " Aboushama v. EMF Corp. , 214 F. Supp. 3d 202, 205 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Mantena v. Johnson , 809 F.3d 721, 727-28 (2d Cir. 2015) ).

"In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint." DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C. , 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010). To withstand dismissal, a complaint must set forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Turkmen v. Ashcroft , 589 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ).

"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotations and citations omitted). "To state a plausible claim, the complaint's ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ " Nielsen v. AECOM Tech. Corp. , 762 F.3d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

II. Plaintiff's State Law Claims

Plaintiff's fourth and fifth causes of action allege state law claims against Defendants. (Dkt. 1 at 6-9). Defendants argue that these claims should be dismissed because they are barred by New York State Correction Law § 24 and Executive Law § 259-q. (Dkt. 21-1 at 3-4). In response, Plaintiff argues that there is a question of fact as to whether Defendants were acting within the scope of their employment precluding dismissal of such claims at this stage of the proceedings. (Dkt. 24 at 9-11). The Court agrees.

Courts in this Circuit have interpreted both § 24 and § 259-q analogously. See Sloane v. Getz , No. 00 Civ. 4708(DLC), 2001 WL 504879, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2001) ("There is no reason to interpret Section 259-q differently from Section 24 with respect to immunity from suit."); Oliver v. Cuttler , 968 F. Supp. 83, 90 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that § 259-q is "word for word[ ] identical" to § 24 ). Section 259-q provides, in pertinent part:

1. No civil action shall be brought in any court of the state, except by the attorney general on behalf of the state, against any officer or employee of the board of parole or former division of parole, in his personal capacity, for damages arising out of any act done or the failure to perform any act within the scope of the employment and in the discharge of the duties by such officer or employee.

2. Any claim for damages arising out of any act done or the failure to perform any act within the scope of the employment and in the discharge of the duties of any officer or employee of the board of parole or former division of parole shall be brought and maintained in the court of claims as a claim against the state.

N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-q.

" New York Correction Law § 24 provides that New York courts lack jurisdiction over claims for money damages brought against ... Parole officials in their personal capacities arising from conduct within the scope of their employment." Hassell v. Fischer , 96 F. Supp. 3d 370, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (footnote omitted), aff'd , 879 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2018). Specifically, § 24 provides, in pertinent part:

No civil action shall be brought in any court of the state, except by the attorney general on behalf of the state, against any officer or employee of the department, which for purposes of this section shall include members of the state board of parole, in his or her personal capacity, for damages arising out of any act done or the failure to perform any act within the scope of the employment and in the discharge of the duties by such officer or employee.

N.Y. Correct. Law § 24(1). Section 24(2) has been interpreted to "preclude[ ] the assertion of [such claims] ... in any court, including the federal courts." Baker v. Coughlin , 77 F.3d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1996).

In order to determine whether immunity is available under § 24 or § 259-q, courts look to factors associated with New York's scope of employment analysis. See, e.g. , Ierardi , 119 F.3d at 187 n.3 (discussing how scope of employment analysis "has been routinely employed by New York State courts in determining the parameters of protections afforded by Section 24"); Ficklin v. Rusinko , 351 F. Supp. 3d 436, 443-44 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (applying scope of employment analysis in determining whether § 24 bars plaintiff's claims); Johnson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs. & Cmty. Supervision , No. 11-CV-079S, 2013 WL 5347468, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2013) (discussing how scope of employment analysis "has been routinely employed by New York State courts in...