White v. OXARC, Inc.

DERRICK W. WHITE, an individual, Plaintiff, v. OXARC, INC., a Washington Corporation, Defendant.

No. 1:19-cv-00485-CWD

United States District Court, D. Idaho

December 13, 2022

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: Dkt. 113 114

HONORABLE CANDY W. DALE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Derrick W. White filed this action against Defendant Oxarc Inc., alleging deprivation of rights secured by the Family Medical Leave Act, (“FMLA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2615, the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended in 2008 (“ADA-AA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), and the Idaho Human Rights Act (“IHRA”), Idaho Code § 67-5909, et seq. The Complaint asserted three causes of action against Oxarc: (1) FMLA interference; (2) FMLA retaliation; and (3) disability discrimination. A jury trial was held in this matter and, after deliberation, the jury returned a verdict on April 22, 2022, in favor of White on all three of his claims.

Pending before the Court is White's Motion for Liquidated Damages, Interest, and Adjustment, and Oxarc's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, Alternatively, New Trial. (Dkt. 113, 114.) The parties have fully briefed the motions and they are now ripe for the Court's consideration. Having reviewed the record herein, the Court finds the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding delay, and because the Court conclusively finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the motions will be decided on the record before the Court. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

White's employment at Oxarc was terminated on July 28, 2017, after he had been approved for FMLA leave, and while he was suffering from a disability. White contends that Oxarc's termination decision was made in violation of the FMLA, and the ADA-AA and IHRA. White initiated this action on December 9, 2019, against Oxarc, and Oxarc later filed a motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 1, 26.)

On July 6, 2021, the Court entered an order denying Oxarc's motion for summary judgment, finding material factual disputes precluded entry of judgment as a matter of law. (Dkt. 36.) The relevant facts for purposes of deciding the instant motions, and as reflected in the Court's order denying summary judgment, follow.

White was hired by Oxarc on December 26, 2000, as an Inside Sales and Back-Up Driver. On or about May 12, 2017, White sought medical attention for ongoing back and leg pain.^[1]On May 19, 2017, White was diagnosed with lumbar spondylosis, lumbar radiculopathy, and a herniated disc. He was thereafter scheduled for laminectomy surgery to occur on August 15, 2017.

On May 31, 2017, White requested FMLA leave. Oxarc granted the request. White took FMLA leave from May 31, 2017, to July 4, 2017. Upon his return to work on July 5, 2017, White was limited to light duty work,^[2] and prohibited from lifting, pushing, or pulling more than fifteen pounds. White was also restricted from delivering and performing any other duties that required excessive lifting. White's healthcare provider noted that White may need to take additional leave for flare-ups of his back and leg pain.

Accordingly, Cammie Hill, Oxarc's Human Resources manager, approved White for intermittent FMLA leave. White's supervisor, Mike McGuire, was made aware that White had been approved for intermittent FMLA leave and that White was restricted to light duty work.

On Friday, July 21, 2017, White was training another employee, Ian Jensen, on the delivery route. While on the delivery route, White received a phone call informing him that his upcoming laminectomy surgery would not be covered by insurance. White was also experiencing severe leg pain. White asked Jensen to take him back to the Oxarc store. While on the way, White called to speak with McGuire to obtain approval to leave early that day. McGuire was out at the time White called, so White spoke instead to another employee, asking that the information about him leaving early be relayed to McGuire. White also attempted to speak with Hill, and he left her a voice message requesting a call back.

White left one hour early on that Friday. On Monday, July 24, 2017, Hill drafted a warning letter for McGuire to present to White as discipline for leaving work early the preceding Friday without preapproval from McGuire. On July 25, 2017, McGuire met with White and gave him the warning letter.

On July 28, 2017, McGuire spoke with White regarding two invoices in which White had made errors. Later that same day, White returned to his desk, and put his leg up to relieve his pain. McGuire confronted White, asking him if he needed something to do. White informed McGuire that his leg hurt, and he needed a moment to gather himself. McGuire recalls White telling him to “get off my back.” Ultimately, McGuire told White to go home.

Following White's departure, McGuire spoke with Hill. She instructed McGuire to compose an incident report of what had transpired earlier that day. McGuire did so. McGuire also found White's timesheet on his desk for the preceding two week pay period and forwarded this information to the Oxarc Executive Team. The Executive Team noted that White had recorded eight hours of work on July 21, 2017, the day he left one hour early.

Thereafter, Jana Nelson, Michael Sutley, and Jason Kirby, who comprised Oxarc's Executive Team, participated in a conference call with Cammie Hill, and decided to terminate White's employment. The termination letter identified three reasons for termination: performance (mistakes on invoices), insubordination or other disrespectful conduct, and falsification of timekeeping records.

Trial began on April 18, 2022. Neither party lodged any formal objections to the Court's jury instructions. (Dkt. 100.) On April 22, 2022, the jury returned a Special Verdict in favor of White. The jury found that White incurred back pay damages because of Oxarc's violation of the FMLA, ADA-AA, and IHRA, awarding $51,711.35.^[3]The jury also found White incurred non-economic damages because of Oxarc's violation of the ADA-AA and IHRA, awarding $877,500.00. (Dkt. 102.)

Post trial, the parties stipulated to a schedule for filing motions before the Court entered judgment on the verdict. On June 2, 2022, the parties filed their respective motions. Having reviewed the motions and supporting materials, the trial transcripts, and the entire record, the Court finds as follows.

ANALYSIS

1. Oxarc's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, Alternatively, New Trial

At the close of the evidence,^[4] Oxarc made a Rule 50(a) motion. The Court denied the motion and the case was submitted to the jury, resulting in the verdict in White's favor. Oxarc now renews its motion for a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), and requests the Court vacate the jury's award. Oxarc alternatively contends that the Court should grant a new trial on the grounds that the jury's verdict and damage awards are based on error and not supported by the evidence, and also that the damages awarded are speculative and excessive.

A. Legal Standards

(1) Rule 50

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 governs motions for judgment as a matter of law. Under Rule 50(a), a party must first move for judgment as a matter of law before the case is submitted to the jury and “specify.. .the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(2). Under Rule 50(b), if the Court denies the pre-verdict motion, “the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). “A post-trial motion for judgment can be granted only on grounds advanced in the pre-verdict motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), advisory committee's note to 1991 amendment.

The Court may grant a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law only if “there is no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” Krechman v. County of Riverside, 723 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). “A jury's verdict must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence.even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion from the same evidence.” Wallace v. City of San Diego, 479 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 2007). “The test is whether the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to that of the jury.” White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002); see also E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The test applied is whether the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury's verdict.”).

“[I]n entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court ... may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 at 961 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). Rather, “[t]he evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of that party.” Id.

(2) Rule 59

Rule 59(a) governs a request for a new trial. The rule provides that, “[n]o later than 28 days after the entry of judgment, the court, on its own, may order a new trial for any reason that would justify granting one on a party's motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(d). The Court has not only the right but “indeed the duty.. .to weigh the evidence as he [or she] saw it.and to set aside the verdict of the jury even though supported by substantial evidence, where, in his ...