White v. Presbyterian Med. Ctr. of the Univ. of Pa. Health Sys.

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MEKEDA WHITE, v. PRESBYTERIAN MEDICAL CENTER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA HEALTH SYSTEM, et al.,

Civil Action No. 20-6362 SWR

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

August 8, 2022

OPINION

SCOTT W. REID, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court^[1] are Defendants', Presbyterian Medical Center of the University of Pennsylvania Health System d/b/a Presbyterian Medical Center and University of Pennsylvania Health System d/b/a Penn Medicine (collectively “Defendants” or “Penn”), Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 19), Plaintiff's Response in Opposition thereto (doc. 23), Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's Response (doc. 25), and Plaintiff's Sur-Reply in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Brief (doc. 26). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an employment discrimination case that arises from Plaintiff's allegations that her employer unlawfully terminated her employment. Plaintiff alleges that her termination was related to her mental health issues and in response to her requests for medical leave, thus violating the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), and the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance (“PFPO”). (doc. 23 at 1). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants were antagonistic and hostile to her following the disclosure of her mental health conditions. Id. Defendants deny that Plaintiff's medical conditions or requests for FMLA leave had anything to do with her termination or treatment at work and have asked this Court to grant summary judgment on all counts.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Mekeda White, was employed by Penn as a full-time anesthesia technician from January 9, 2012 to October 7, 2020. (doc. 23, Ex. 1-A, p.2). The circumstances surrounding the termination of her employment and her requests for time off in the months preceding her termination are central to this action.

The undisputed facts are as follows: Plaintiff met with her supervisors, Javier Vasquez and Santa Iaconelli, on October 5, 2020. See (doc. 23-1 at 7); (doc. 25-1 at 10). During this meeting, Vasquez and Iaconelli presented Plaintiff with written discipline for insubordination on October 2, 2020. Id; see also (doc. 19-2 at 147). The written discipline indicated that it was Plaintiff's “Final Warning” and described the reason for the final written warning as “Insubordination and Unprofessional behavior”. Id. The written warning explained that

“Mekeda is receiving a final written warning for insubordination due to her unprofessional behavior exhibited on Friday, October 2, 2020... [Expectations for Mekeda are that she arrives to work daily prepared to perform her duties. Her blood gas card is a key component of her responsibilities as an anesthesia technician. Without her blood gas card, she cannot fully perform her duties. Mekeda should never use another employee's card. Mekeda is to exhibit and maintain a professional attitude with her manager and co-workers at all times.”

Id. Plaintiff refused to sign the discipline because she claimed she had not engaged in the alleged conduct which formed the basis for the discipline. See Id. (explaining “Mekeda refused to sign final warning. Claims she did not hang up. She said she would take it higher up.”)

Plaintiff alleges that at some point during this meeting, she informed her managers that she intended to take FMLA leave for anxiety and depression caused by her father's recent death. (doc. 23-1 at 7). She also claims that she notified her managers that she would not be able to work her on-call shift later that night. Id.

Following her meeting with her supervisors, Plaintiff returned to work and completed her scheduled shift which ended around 9:30 p.m. (doc. 23-1 at 7); (doc. 25-1 at 12). Plaintiff did not appear at work later that evening for her overnight, on-call shift. (doc. 19-3, Ex. 59 to Ex. D). Defendants subsequently terminated Plaintiff's employment on October 7, 2020, citing Plaintiff's “no call no show for [her] scheduled call shift” and three previous written disciplinary write-ups. (doc. 19-2 at 157).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.56(a). In making this determination, “inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ... must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)(alteration in original)(quotation marks omitted). “There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the ... pleading; its response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001)(alteration in original)(quotation marks omitted).

In employment discrimination cases, the summary judgment standard “is applied with added rigor ... [because] intent and credibility are crucial issues.” Stewart v. Rutgers, The State Univ., 120 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 1997)(internal quotation marks omitted). The Third Circuit has stated that “summary judgment is... rarely appropriate in this type of case.” Marzano v. Computer Sci. Corp.Inc., 91 F.3d 497, 509 (3d Cir. 1996). “Simply by pointing to evidence which calls into question the defendants' intent, the plaintiff raises an issue of material fact which, if genuine, is sufficient to preclude summary judgment.” Id. at 509-10 (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, “factually unsupported narratives about an employer's ‘discriminatory animus' do not suffice without more.” Moore v. CVS Rx Servs., Inc., 142 F.Supp.3d 321, 348-49 (M.D. Pa. 2015), aff'd, 660 Fed.Appx. 149 (3d Cir. 2016).

IV. DISCUSSION

As noted above, Plaintiff has brought claims against Defendants under four statutes - I will address them each separately.

A. Family and Medical Leave Act

The FMLA provides eligible employees with 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period due to an employee's own or the employee's immediate family member's serious health condition. Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 2014)(citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)). “When an employee returns from FMLA leave, the employer must restore the employee to the same or equivalent position [s]he held, with equivalent benefits and with conditions of employment comparable to those [s]he had when [s]he left.” Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)).

“When employees invoke rights granted under the FMLA, employers may not ‘interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or attempt to exercise' these rights.” Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 2012)(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)).

Similarly, employers may not “‘discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful.'” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)). These provisions form the basis for FMLA “interference” and “retaliation” claims. Id. Plaintiff has asserted claims under both theories.

To analyze the viability of Plaintiff's claims, it is helpful to first outline the various medical leaves that she took (or attempted to take) during her employment with Penn. Plaintiff was approved for continuous leave for her own medical conditions from April 14, 2014 through May 18, 2014, December 23, 2016 through March 16, 2017, April 4, 2018 through April 29, 2018, February 7, 2019 through April 7, 2019, and July 10, 2019 through July 30, 2019. (doc. 19 at 5). Plaintiff was also approved for and took continuous leave to care for her ailing father from June 10, 2020, through August 9, 2020.^[2] See id.

Plaintiff's final request for FMLA leave is the subject of much dispute. Plaintiff claims she notified her supervisors that she would be taking FMLA leave during a meeting on October 5, 2020. (doc. 23-1 at 7). Defendants dispute that Plaintiff requested FMLA leave during this meeting and instead claim Plaintiff did not make them aware of her intention to take FMLA leave until the morning of October 6, 2020, after Plaintiff had already missed her on-call shift earlier that day (doc. 25-1 at 9-10). The evidence concerning both positions will be discussed in detail below.

1. Retaliation

Plaintiff claims Defendants retaliated against her by terminating her employment because she requested FMLA leave on or around October 5, 2020. (doc. 23 at 6). Under the Department of Labor's regulatory interpretation “employers are barred from considering an employee's FMLA leave ‘as a negative factor in employment actions such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions.'” Id. at 301 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c)). “Accordingly, an employee does not need to prove that invoking FMLA rights was the sole or most important factor upon which the employer acted.” Id. Rather, “[t]o prevail on a retaliation claim under the FMLA, the plaintiff must prove that (1) she invoked her right to FMLA-qualifying leave, (2) she suffered an adverse employment decision, and (3) the adverse action was causally related to her invocation of rights.” Lichtenstein v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 691 F.3d 294, 301-02 (3d Cir. 2012).

“Because FMLA retaliation claims require proof of the employer's retaliatory intent, courts have assessed these claims through the lens...