White v. United States

Carlson, Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Matthew W. Brann, Chief United States District Judge

Plaintiff William A. White filed the instant action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)^[1] in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. Several of his claims were subsequently transferred to this Court, and the matter was referred to a magistrate judge at the summary judgment stage.^[2] Upon designation, a magistrate judge may “conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and . . . submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations.”^[3] Once filed, this report and recommendation is disseminated to the parties in the case, who then have the opportunity to file written objections.^[4]

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On August 3, 2021, Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson issued a thorough report and recommendation, ^[5] recommending that the United States' motion for summary judgment^[6] be granted in its entirety and White's motion for summary judgment^[7] be denied. Magistrate Judge Carlson also recommended that White's pending motion^[8] for an extension of time to supplement the Rule 56 record be denied.

White filed objections to the report and recommendation on August 27, 2021, ^[9] to which Defendant responded on September 2, 2021.^[10] When objections are timely filed, the District Court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the report to which objections are made.^[11] Although the standard of review for objections is de novo, the extent of review lies within the discretion of the District Court, and the Court may otherwise rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent that it deems proper.^[12] For portions of the report and recommendation to which no objection is made, the Court should, as a matter of good practice, “satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in

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order to accept the recommendation.”^[13] Regardless of whether timely objections are made by a party, the District Court may accept, not accept, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.^[14]

Because this discussion is intended solely for the parties, the Court will not restate the facts, but will instead adopt the recitation of facts as set forth by the magistrate judge and will provide additional facts and procedural history when necessary. A de novo review has been conducted. The Court will accept in part Magistrate Judge Carlson's recommendations.

At the outset, the Court must clarify the scope of the claims that are pending in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.^[15] When the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia transferred several of White's claims to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), its transfer order^[16] was somewhat ambiguous with respect to Counts 37 and 38 of White's Second Amended Complaint.^[17]

Counts 37 and 38, like Counts 41 and 42, contain allegations that involve federal actors located in different districts of the United States. Counts 37 and 38-which assert claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and

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negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), respectively-involve alleged tortious conduct that occurred at Federal Transfer Center (FTC) Oklahoma City (located in the Western District of Oklahoma) as well as at USP Canaan (located in the Middle District of Pennsylvania).^[18] Counts 41 and 42-also respectively alleging IIED and NIED-involve alleged tortious conduct that occurred at FCI Loretto (situated in the Western District of Pennsylvania) as well as USP Canaan.^[19]For reasons unknown, Counts 41 and 42 were subdivided into 41(a) and (b) and 42(a) and (b) to reflect that White's allegations in those counts concerned conduct occurring in different federal districts, but Counts 37 and 38 were not similarly bifurcated. This is true despite the chart in the transfer order intimating that, as to Counts 37 and 38, only the IIED and NIED claims involving “USP Canaan, Dec. 29, 2014 to Jan. 9, 2015” were transferred to this Court.^[20] Thus, it appears that the entirety of Counts 37 and 38 were transferred to this Court, despite portions of the alleged tortious conduct occurring in the Western District of Oklahoma.^[21]

The FTCA contains its own venue provision, which states that “[a]ny civil action on a tort claim against the United States under subsection (b) of section

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1346 of [Title 28 of the United States Code] may be prosecuted only in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred.”^[22] Because the federal district court of White's residence-the Western District of Virginia-has already severed and transferred Counts 37 and 38 to this Court, the only proper venue remaining for his claims regarding his incarceration at FTC Oklahoma City is the Western District of Oklahoma. Accordingly, the Court will subdivide Counts 37 and 38 into 37(a) and (b) and 38(a) and (b): Counts 37(a) and 38(a) concern the alleged tortious conduct at FTC Oklahoma City and in transit thereto and therefrom; Counts 37(b) and 38(b) concern the alleged tortious conduct at USP Canaan. The Court will sua sponte transfer the improperly venued Counts 37(a) and 38(a) to the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1402(b) and 1404(a), where they should have been transferred with Counts 47 and 48 initially.^[23]

Magistrate Judge Carlson's report does not directly address Counts 37 and 38, which have now been pared down to Counts 37(b) and 38(b). Nevertheless, they are easily disposed of. White admits that the allegations in Counts 37(b) and 38(b) regarding his confinement at USP Canaan from December 29, 2014, to January 9, 2015, are inaccurate.^[24] Notably, he concedes that no tortious conduct

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occurred during his incarceration at USP Canaan during this time.^[25] Because there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to Counts 37(b) and 38(b), the Court will grant the United States' motion for summary judgment on these claims.

Only Counts 41(b) and 42(b) remain. Count 41(b) asserts intentional infliction of emotional distress for White's confinement at USP Canaan from February 23, 2015, to March 3, 2015.^[26] Count 42(b) alleges negligent infliction of emotional distress for the same period. As to Count 41(b), Magistrate Judge Carlson determined that White's averments of the conditions of his confinement at USP Canaan fail to rise to the level required by Pennsylvania law to maintain a claim for IIED. The Court agrees.

Establishing an IIED claim under Pennsylvania law is extraordinarily difficult.^[27] This cause of action is reserved for only the “most egregious

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conduct.”^[28] Such conduct “must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.”^[29] This Court cannot conclude that the complained-of conditions-even if true, as the United States admits for purposes of Rule 56 adjudication^[30]-are sufficiently egregious to meet Pennsylvania's exacting standards.

White avers that for nine days he was kept in lockdown in USP Canaan in extremely cold temperatures, without the ability to exercise or access the common area, and was served “snack packs” three times a day that consisted of “1 oz peanut butter, 1 oz jelly, 1 oz of bread, and [] 1 oz of crackers, plus a Kool Aid packet.”^[31]White contends that such conditions violate Bureau-of-Prisons regulations and policies and triggered his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from prior tortious incarcerations.^[32]

While the Court in no way condones conditions of confinement that contravene applicable regulations or policies, White's averments, as a matter of law, do not meet Pennsylvania's demanding requirements for IIED.^[33] White

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admits that he was not confined in isolation and had adequate bedding and blankets to help protect him from the cold conditions.^[34] He also admits that he was provided three meals a day, although such pre-packaged meals may have contravened BOP policy. These conditions stand in stark contrast to the much more troubling allegations surrounding his confinement at other federal facilities outside of this district.^[35] In sum, White's averments fall short of describing conduct that is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.”^[36]

Even if the Court were to reach the opposite conclusion on this issue, White's IIED claim falters for another reason. A successful IIED claimant must establish that the tortfeasor intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress through outrageous conduct.^[37] White has not proffered any evidence that

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the federal actors at USP Canaan had the requisite intent to cause him severe emotional distress.

Nor has White established recklessness on the part of the alleged tortfeasors. In contrast to the near torture-like conditions White maintains he endured in other facilities, his conditions at USP Canaan alone do not evince reckless disregard for the potential to cause severe emotional distress. White himself admits that these conditions triggered underlying PTSD “[b]ecause [he] had been previously subjected to life-threatening cold and been left without food or water[.]”^[38] There is no record evidence that the federal actors at USP Canaan had knowledge of White's prior treatment at other facilities such that they were (or reasonably should have been) substantially certain that the conditions at USP Canaan would...