White v. UT Sw. Med. Ctr.

JONATHAN M. WHITE, Plaintiff, v. UT SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-1386-D

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

December 28, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SIDNEY A. FITZWATER, SENIOR JUDGE.

Plaintiff Jonathan M. White (“White”) brings this pro se action against defendant The University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (“UT Southwestern”) alleging claims under Titles I, II, III, IV, and V of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794.^[1] UT Southwestern moves to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. For the reasons that follow, the court grants UT Southwestern's motion but also grants White leave to replead.

I

White was formerly employed by UT Southwestern for approximately six months in 2017 as an administrative assistant.^[2] During his tenure, he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. White was approved for emergency leave for the period of October 26, 2017 through November 30, 2017. While White was on leave, UT Southwestern contacted him to determine his return-to-work date, which had not been included on his accommodation request form. White did not respond to these inquiries and was subsequently terminated by UT Southwestern on November 10, 2017, while he was seeking treatment for his disability, because of his inability and unavailability to work.

White filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on November 20 2018, and was issued a Notice of Right to Sue on March 29 2022. White then filed the current lawsuit alleging disability discrimination, in violation of Titles I, II, III, IV, and V of the ADA, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

UT Southwestern contends that White's claims under Titles I and V of the ADA are barred by sovereign immunity and, consequently, that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate these claims. UT Southwestern maintains that White's claims under Titles II, III and IV of the ADA, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rehabilitation Act must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. White opposes the motion,^[3] which the court is deciding on the briefs that are properly on file.^[4]

II

The court begins by setting out the standards that apply when deciding UT Southwestern's motion to dismiss.

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.” Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Veldhoen v. United States Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1994)). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can mount either a facial or factual challenge. See, e.g., Hunter v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 2013 WL 607151, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2013) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981)). When a party makes a Rule 12(b)(1) motion without including evidence, the challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is facial. Id. The court assesses a facial challenge as it does a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in that it “looks only at the sufficiency of the allegations in the pleading and assumes them to be true. If the allegations are sufficient to allege jurisdiction, the court must deny the motion.” Id. (citing Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523). “The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court evaluates the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint “by ‘accepting all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'” Bramlett v. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne, Ind., 855 F.Supp.2d 615, 618 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (alterations adopted) (quoting in re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). “The court's review [of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion] is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).^[5] To survive UT Southwestern's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, White's complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ....”). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘shown'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (alterations adopted) (quoting Rule 8(a)(2)). Furthermore, under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,'” it demands more than “labels and conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). And “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III

A

The court turns first to White's Title I claim. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that, although the ADA states that sovereign immunity is abrogated for Title I claims, 42 U.S.C. § 12202, Congress did not validly abrogate the States' immunity. See Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding that because Congress failed to identify a pattern of discrimination by the States that violated the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not validly abrogate the States' immunity). Therefore, because UT Southwestern is an arm or instrumentality of the State of Texas, Daniel v. University of Texas Southwestern Medica Center, 960 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir. 2020), it is entitled to sovereign immunity from claims brought under Title I of the ADA, and, in turn, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over White's Title I claim.^[6]

B

The court turns next to White's ADA Title II claim and concludes that it fails as well. Title II provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “Title II does not create a cause of action for employment discrimination.” Taylor v. City of Shreveport, 798 F.3d 276, 282 (5th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). Because White's claim is based entirely on allegations of employment discrimination, he has failed to state a claim under Title II of the ADA.

C

White's Titles III and IV claims must also be dismissed because they are clearly inapposite to the factual allegations on which his lawsuit is based.

Title III provides that “no individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Title IV governs telecommunication services for hearing-impaired and speech-impaired individuals. 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611. UT Southwestern is not alleged to be a telecommunication service or a place of public accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1), 12181(7). And White does not allege that he is impaired in his hearing or speech. Therefore, White has failed to state claims on which relief can be granted under ADA Title III or IV.

D

White's ADA Title V claim is barred by sovereign immunity. “Title V itself does not abrogate a state's sovereign immunity. Instead, a plaintiff may bring a retaliation claim against a state entity only to the extent that the underlying claim of discrimination effectively abrogates sovereign immunity of the particular state.” Block v. Tex. Bd. of L. Exam'rs, 952 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Dottin v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just., 627 Fed.Appx. 397, 398 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)). Because, as explained above, White's ADA Title I discrimination claim is barred by sovereign immunity, any retaliation claim brought under Title V is similarly barred.

IV

White's Rehabilitation Act claim must also be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be...