White v. Venice HMA, LLC

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CALLIE WHITE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. VENICE HMA, LLC and VENICE HMA HOLDINGS, LLC, Defendants.

No. 8:22-cv-1989-CEH-AEP

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division

July 7, 2023

ORDER

Charlene Edwards Honeywell, United States District Judge

This cause comes before the Court on Defendants', Venice HMA Holdings, LLC, and Venice HMA, LLC, Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (Doc. 27), which Plaintiffs Callie White, et al., oppose (Doc. 33). In this putative class action, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (“WARN”) Act when they closed ShorePoint Venice Hospital without the required advance notice. Doc. 23. Defendants now request dismissal pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) because they contend that the Amended Complaint does not adequately allege that the Plaintiffs have suffered an “employment loss” as defined by the WARN Act. Doc. 27.

Upon review and consideration, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court will deny the motion.

I. Background

On August 29, 2022, the named Plaintiffs filed suit against Venice HMA, LLC, d/b/a ShorePoint Health Venice, and Venice HMA Holdings, LLC (“Defendants”), alleging that Defendants violated the WARN Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101-09. Docs. 1, 23. Each of the named Plaintiffs is a former employee of ShorePoint Health Venice Hospital (“the hospital”), with varying degrees of experience and seniority. Doc. 23 ¶¶ 68, 77, 87, 93, 99, 104. Defendants have common ownership over the hospital. Id. ¶¶ 21-26.

On August 22, 2022, Defendants' CEO sent a mass email to employees informing them that the hospital would be closing as of September 22, 2022. Id. ¶ 38. The CEO's email stated, “Retaining our valued team members is our top priority during this transition. There are sufficient job openings across ShorePoint Health for the majority of our staff.” Doc. 23-1 at 2. The email went on to announce that Defendants would host job fairs in the coming days, at which hospital employees could apply for positions at Defendants' other facilities. Id.; Doc. 23 ¶ 55. When employees applied for such a position, their application stated that requesting a transfer “does not guarantee you will be interviewed for the opening.” Id. ¶ 53. Some of the named Plaintiffs did not receive any transfer offers. Id. ¶ 54. Other named Plaintiffs did receive transfer offers, but the offered positions had less seniority, a lower salary, and fewer benefits. Id. ¶ 56. No transfer offers were made until after the named Plaintiffs and putative class members' employment was terminated and the hospital closed. Id. ¶ 50.

In all, Plaintiffs allege that the named Plaintiffs and approximately 600 employees lost their jobs as a result of the hospital closure. Id. ¶¶ 46-47. They further allege that they experienced an “employment loss,” as defined by the WARN Act, by the time the hospital closed on September 22, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 48, 51-52 (“The Named Plaintiffs and Putative Class Members were each terminated by Defendants on or about August 25, 2022, or thirty days thereafter. This was not a temporary “layoff” for less than six months as the above facts and Exhibit A indicate.”) (emphasis in original). They allege that Defendants failed to provide adequate notice of the hospital's closure, in violation of the WARN Act. Id. ¶¶ 41, 43.

Defendants now move to dismiss this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Doc. 27 at 1. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege that they experienced an “employment loss” as required under the WARN Act. Id. at 3, 5, 10-11. They first contend that any layoff has not yet lasted six months, rendering the Plaintiffs' claim premature. Id. at 6-8. Moreover, the CEO's email clearly communicated an intent to continue their employment rather than provide notice of an employment loss, and any actual loss in employment has been temporary. Id. at 10-11. As a result of these pleading inadequacies, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing and have failed to state a claim. Id. at 12-14.

Plaintiffs oppose the motion to dismiss, maintaining that the named Plaintiffs suffered an employment loss as defined by the WARN Act. Doc. 33 at 2, 9-19. They argue that the hospital was permanently closed for more than two months by the time of Plaintiffs' response, which constitutes a “plant closing” that does not necessitate a delay of six months. Id. at 3-4, 11-14. Moreover, inviting employees to apply for new employment is not the same as a transfer offer, particularly where there was no guarantee of receiving an offer and Defendants did not represent that all current employees would be able to remain. Id. at 14-16. In any event, Plaintiffs contend that the WARN Act requires that valid transfer offers be made prior to the closure, which did not occur. Id.

II. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a pleading must include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009), quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action are insufficient. Id. at 678, citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Mere naked assertions are also insufficient. Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, which, if accepted as true, would “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal citation omitted). The Court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion stated as a “factual allegation” in the complaint. Id. Overall, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).

Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be facial or factual. A facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction “requires [] the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion.” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). A factual attack, on the other hand, permits the court to consider matters outside of the pleadings. See Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Associates, M.D.'s, P.A., 104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997). Standing to bring a lawsuit is a component of a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving standing, which requires a three-part showing that: (1) the plaintiff suffered or will imminently suffer an injuryin-fact; (2) a causal connection exists between this injury and the defendant's conduct; and (3) the plaintiff's injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 618 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 2010) (overruled on other grounds by Janus v. American Federation of State, Cnty., and Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018)).

III. Discussion

The WARN Act requires employers to provide 60 calendar days' notice to affected employees of a plant closing or mass layoff. 21 U.S.C. § 2102(a); Sides v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 725 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. 2013). If the employer fails to provide the requisite notice, the employees are entitled to 60 days' pay and benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1).

The WARN Act defines a “plant closing” as:

[T]he permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of employment.. .if the shutdown results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day period for 50 or more employees excluding any part-time employee[.]

29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2). A “mass layoff” is a reduction in force that is not the result of a plant closing, and that results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during a 30-day period for a certain number and/or percentage of employees. Id. § 2101(a)(3).

An “employment loss” is defined as: “(A) an employment termination, other than a discharge for cause, voluntary departure, or retirement, (B) a layoff exceeding 6 months, or (C) a reduction in hours of work of more than 50 percent during each month of any 6-month period.” Id. § 2101(a)(6). An employment loss does not occur if: “the closing or layoff is the result of the relocation or consolidation of part or all of the employer's business and, prior to the closing or layoff[, ] the employer offers to transfer the employee to a different site of employment[.]” Id. 2101(b)(2).

At issue is whether Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that they experienced an “employment loss.” Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' claims are not ripe because the Amended Complaint “alleges only the possibility that the named Plaintiffs may experience an employment loss, in the form of termination or layoff exceeding six months, at some future date if certain conditions, which have not yet occurred, happen.” Doc. 27 at 2 (emphasis in original). In support, Defendants cite some of the named Plaintiffs' allegations that they received a transfer offer. Id. at 8. They contend that Plaintiffs “have already either received transfer offers or are involved in continuing discussions about continuing their employment at another facility.” Id. at 8. Defendants...