Whitener v. St. Charles Parish

RACHEL WHITENER v. ST. CHARLES PARISH AND CLAYTON FAUCHEUX

CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-12696 SECTION "B"(1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

April 30, 2021

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are plaintiff's "Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 59(e)" (Rec. Doc. 21) and defendants' opposition (Rec. Doc. 22). For the reasons discussed below,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Rachel Whitener ("Whitener") was hired by the defendant St. Charles Parish Department of Public Works and Wastewater ("Department") in 2015. Rec. Doc. 1 at 2-3. Prior to her September 2018 termination, plaintiff was a Public Works Financial Officer, a classified position within the Parish Civil Service of St. Charles Parish. Id. at 3.

In the summer of 2018, fellow Department employee Blake Schexnaydre ("Schexnaydre") asked Whitener for her help in preparing a discrimination complaint against the Department. Id. Plaintiff agreed to assist Schexnaydre in drafting his grievance papers. Id.

On August 22, 2018, upon receipt of Schexnaydre's grievance, defendant Clayton Faucheux ("Faucheux"), who served as the Director of Public Works, confronted Whitener about her role in the grievance. Id. at 4. Plaintiff admitted to assisting Schexnaydre but "clarified that the words and ideas expressed" belonged to Schexnaydre and never assisted him in the workplace. Id.

Whitener advised Schexnaydre to request copies of the interview sheets sought by him, and the latter expressed concern that Department employees may alter the records before producing them. Id. Although Whitener did not believe Schexnaydre's concern to be realistic, she agreed to take a screenshot of the list of names on the server to record the "date modified" for each file. Id. According to the complaint, Whitener believed the screenshots would protect the Department if Schexnaydre "incorrectly alleged that the files were changed to a later date." Id. Whitener later considered the possibility that the "date modified" could be changed without the contents of the documents actually being changed and instead took screenshots of the documents' contents. Id. at 4-5. On August 23, 2018, plaintiff copied the files from a folder on the Department's server and created a document containing the screenshots. Id. at 5.

Defendant Faucheux and other high-ranking employees in the Department informed Whitener that she was suspected of copyingconfidential files to a public network drive. Id. On September 11, 2018, Whitener was suspended, pending the results of the IT investigation. Id.

According to plaintiff, on September 19, 2018, Faucheux sent Whitener a notice, informing her that she was terminated "for misconduct" without further explanation. Id. at 6. On October 11, 2018, plaintiff submitted a grievance to Faucheux, alleging that her termination was in violation of the St. Charles Parish Civil Service Rules and Regulations, her right to Due Process, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. On November 6, 2018, Faucheux upheld Whitener's termination. Id.

On September 19, 2019, plaintiff filed the instant complaint against the defendants, alleging denial of her pre-deprivation due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 7.

On November 8, 2019, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Rec. Doc. 12. Defendants alleged that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing her federal complaint. Rec. Doc. 12-1 at 4-5. Defendants further alleged that the Louisiana Constitution authorizes the state Civil Service Commission to oversee employment matters of classified employees;thus, they maintained that plaintiff should have presented her claims to the pertinent civil service board. Id. at 6.

On November 26, 2019, plaintiff filed her opposition to the motion to dismiss, alleging that she is not required to exhaust post-termination remedies before filing the instant suit. Rec. Doc. 13 at 1. Moreover, plaintiff alleged that her failure to exhaust post-deprivation state remedies did not affect her claim of denial of pre-deprivation due process. Id. at 2. Thus, plaintiff asserted that this Court had exclusive jurisdiction over her claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. at 3.

On December 4, 2019, defendants were granted leave to file a reply to plaintiff's opposition. Rec. Doc. 14. Defendants alleged therein that plaintiff received oral notice of the charges against her as permitted by law. Rec. Doc. 14-2 at 2. Moreover, defendants alleged that plaintiff was presented a pre-termination opportunity to be heard on multiple occasions, including a meeting with the parish president and head of procurement to discuss the incident. Id. at 3. Lastly, defendants prayed that the Court consider their factual attack on jurisdiction through affidavits, testimony, and other evidentiary material attached to their motion. Id. at 6. As such, defendants alleged that their factual attack should be sustained in light of plaintiff's multiple admissions in her complaint and grievance to receiving pre-termination due process. Id.

On December 11, 2019, this Court denied plaintiff leave to file a sur-reply as unnecessary. Rec. Doc. 18.

On September 8, 2020, this Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss. Rec. Doc. 19. Upon considering the complaint and undisputed facts, we determined that the plaintiff was given an opportunity to defend her position before the Parish President and attempted to clear the air with the Department Director prior to her termination. Id. at 7. Thus, she was given an opportunity to exercise her right to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker before she was terminated. Id. Accordingly, we dismissed the matter without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Rec. Doc. 20.

On October 6, 2020, plaintiff filed a motion to alter the judgment, alleging generally that the Court erred on three grounds: (1) applying the incorrect legal standard, (2) finding that it lacked jurisdiction because plaintiff had not asserted a valid claim for relief on the merits, which she alleges is not a consideration before the Court on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion and (3) not reaching a conclusion on defendants' sole jurisdictional argument as to whether the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Rec. Doc. 21 at 3.

On October 20, 2020, defendants timely filed an opposition, alleging that a Rule 59(e) amendment is unwarranted if theplaintiff simply disagrees with the judgment and cannot meet her burden to present a manifest error. Rec. Doc. 22.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) Standard

A motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) is "a motion that calls into question the correctness of a judgment." In re TransTexas Gas Corp., 303 F.3d 571, 581 (5th Cir. 2002). "Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly." Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004). When a party seeks to amend or alter a court's judgment under Rule 59(e), she must "clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence and cannot. . . raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued." Schiller v. Physicians Resource Group Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003). A court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion for the following limited reasons: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) new evidence not previously available; or (3) need to correct manifest errors of law or fact. See id. at 567-68.

B. Applying the Plausibility Standard to a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion

Plaintiff claims the Court misapplied the 12(b)(6) standard to defendants' 12(b)(1) motion and incorrectly determined theplausibility of her claim without reference to jurisdiction. Rec. Doc. 21-1 at 4.

Furthermore, plaintiff argues that the Court misstated the law in Wagstaff and In re FEMA Trailer based on a "mis-citation" to the Supreme Court's holding in Hospital Building Company. Id. at 6; see Rec. Doc. 19 at 4. Both Wagstaff and In re FEMA Trailer contain the following language: "a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should only be granted if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claims entitling him to relief." In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Products Liability Litigation (Mississippi Plaintiffs), 668 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2012); Wagstaff v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 509 F.3d 661, 663 (5th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the Wagstaff Court supplied this standard from its previous decision in Benton, which cited to the Hospital Building Company case that plaintiff believes was mis-stated. Id.; see Benton v. U.S., 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims by applying the Rule 12(b)(6) standard) ("We employ the same standard in reviewing dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).")

In Hospital Building Co., the defendants sought to dismiss the matter under both 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), primarily arguing that the amended complaint lacked sufficient factual allegations.Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 742 (1976). The district court granted the defendants' motion, which was subsequently affirmed by the Fourth Circuit. Id. The Supreme Court noted that the Fourth Circuit treated the decision as a holding under Rule 12(b)(6) despite having "perceived some ambiguity as to whether the [d]istrict [c]ourt decision was grounded on Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6)." Id. The Court ultimately held that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in...